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Theses
1.	 As a result of the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Ukraine became an indepen­
dent state in an evolutionary, not a revolutionary way. Initially, the Ukrain­
ian state was a continuation of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, not 
only in terms of territory and population, but also of its structures and the 
functioning of the state. Independence came as a surprise; the country was 
not prepared for it in any area; nor did it succeed in making any radical break­
throughs in any field (apart from the symbolism of the state) during the 1990s. 
The new state was created by the transformation of existing structures and 
procedures; the way in which the state was created meant that there was no 
alternative to such a path. The process of change, however, proceeded much 
more slowly and was implemented with less determination than would oth­
erwise have been possible if there had been consent from the elites and the 
public on the need for a radical break with Communism. Such consent, how­
ever, was absent: and until the year 2000 at least, the predominant trend was 
to make changes which were as small, incremental and cautious as possible.
2.	 The Ukrainian state faced a triple challenge. It had to change from being 
an autonomous territory with numerous characteristics of a state which 
was dependent and ruled by the parent structure of the Communist Party, 
into a sovereign, full­sized state with institutions which conformed to the 
international standards of democratic regimes. It also had to establish new 
economic policies, by introducing the standards and procedures of a market 
economy in place of the chaos (a system­less state) which prevailed after the 
collapse of the command­and­control economy panel of the final years of the 
Soviet Union. Finally, it had to adapt to those changes in the outside world 
which were largely the consequence of the end of the global confrontation 
between the Soviet bloc and the West.
3.	 The main challenges for independent Ukraine were constant pressure from 
Russia and the impossibility, and in many ways also the inexpedience, 
of breaking the bonds which were the inheritance of having been in one 
state organism. The interest of the West (be it the EU or the USA) in the 
Ukrainian state has never been active and determined enough to allow Kyiv 
to make a radical break with Moscow. In this light, Ukraine has since its 
independence adopted a ‘multi­vector’ policy, that is, of balance between 
Russia and the West, allowing it to gain short­term benefits from both sides. 
In 2014, Russia put an end to this policy by annexing Crimea and starting 
the war in the Donbas.
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4.	 Ukraine has built up the basic institutions and procedures of a democratic 
system, although the party system is still underdeveloped and remote from 
European standards (as in other countries of the former Soviet Union). 
Attempts to introduce authoritarian rule have failed largely due to the 
opposition of the public, which has turned out to be much more democratic 
than the structures of the state and the parties. The Ukrainian democratic 
system is in many ways far from the standards characteristic of democracy 
in Western Europe or the United States, although it has come the closest of all 
the successor states to meeting those standards.
5.	 Ukraine managed to emerge from its deep economic downturn, lasting 
from the early 1990s until about the year 2000, after it established the basic 
institutions and procedures of a market economy. In shaping the new rules 
of the country’s economic life, Kyiv worked without any predetermined plan, 
and thus in a frequently inconsistent manner, committing numerous errors. 
As a result, the economic policies adopted, as well as the domination of the 
massive industrial complexes inherited from the Soviet Union, led to the for­
mation of a group of oligarchs, a ‘grande bourgeoisie’, which exerted a direct 
influence on the political institutions. The consequence of this was the monop­
olisation of many sectors of the Ukrainian economy, as well as a lack of oppor­
tunities for the development of small and medium­sized companies.
6.	 Kyiv’s policy of caution, avoiding firm policy decisions, in socio­cultural 
matters has facilitated the creation of a supra­ethnic Ukrainian political 
nation. The deep linguistic­cultural divides resulting from old geopolitical 
divisions and the dominance of the Russian language in the Soviet period 
decreased with the rise in the percentage of citizens educated in the schools 
of the independent state, and the link between this differentiation and the 
state’s historical regionalisation was weakened as a consequence of internal 
migration processes which had been taking place even before 1991. The war 
ultimately proved that the use of the Russian language does not preclude 
Ukrainian patriotism. The events of 2014, however, confirmed that Kyiv had 
failed to develop the instruments to bind the inhabitants of Crimea and the 
Donets Basin into the Ukrainian state.
7.	 One of the most important social changes that have taken place in Ukraine 
is that the majority of its citizens have become materially independent of the 
state, thanks both to the privatisation of the workplace and to the develop­
ment of new, private enterprise. At the same time, civic behaviour as under­
stood in the West has begun to develop, including structures of civil society, 
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although these are still limited mainly to the urban elites. The ‘revolution 
of dignity’ and the war have brought about a massive expansion of social ini­
tiatives (including among inhabitants of the provinces), which have revealed 
great potential for the self­organisation of Ukrainian society.
8.	 The young generation of Ukrainian citizens, people for whom the Soviet 
period and Communism are already ‘textbook’ history and not a matter 
of personal experience, today constitute a third of the adult population, 
and their proportion is rising each year. They have a new consciousness 
and a new kind of bond with the state as a present reality (and not, as their 
parents do, as a novelty).
9.	 Like the other post­Communist countries (apart from those with a Muslim 
tradition), Ukraine is experiencing a profound demographic collapse: in the 
years 1990–2013 its population fell by nearly 7 million. Although recent years 
have seen a rise in the number of births, the consequences of the decline 
in the 1990s cannot be made up. The situation is being aggravated by grow­
ing economic emigration on a massive scale.
10.	  The war imposed by Russia has demonstrated that the Ukrainian state, with 
all of its weaknesses, is capable of surviving and defending itself. The attempt 
to destabilise the entire state, and consequently to deprive it of real inde­
pendence, has failed. The armed forces, which for a quarter of a century 
were neglected and even effectively dismantled between 2010 and 2013, 
have recovered surprisingly effectively. Although the war has shaken the 
economy, its complete collapse (as expected in Moscow) has been avoided. 
Ukraine has not become a ‘failed state’, and there is nothing like a ‘total col­
lapse’ on the horizon. However, the state remains poor and ill­governed, and 
is failing to exploit its potential to the full.
11.	The ‘revolution of dignity’ and the war that followed opened a new chapter 
in the history of Ukraine. Today, its future depends above all on the time and 
manner in which the war is ended, as well as on changes in the international 
environment (principally the policy of Moscow, Russian­American relations, 
and the impact of the new US administration on the development of world 
trade). However, irrespective of these questions, Ukraine will remain a dem­
ocratic oligarchic­bureaucratic state for the foreseeable future, disinclined 
to implement radical reforms without pressure from the outside.
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InTroducTIon
On 24 August 1991, the Verkhovna Rada (Supreme Council, or parliament) of the 
Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic declared its independence, and on 1 Decem­
ber the nation ratified it in a referendum, at the same time electing the country’s 
first independent President. Towards the end of December the Union of Soviet 
Socialist Republics has been formally resolved, enabling the recognition of the 
independence of the former republics by the United States and other powers. 
In this way, for the first time in history, a Ukrainian state was established which 
did not from the outset have to fight a war for survival; indeed, it had complex 
structures deriving from the autonomy which had already existed.
The peaceful way in which it was created, with an undisputed territory and 
a civil administration already in existence, as well as a well­developed econ­
omy, was a huge asset. However, the essential weaknesses of the new state were 
largely the ‘dark side’ of those very strengths. Like the other Soviet republics, 
Ukraine was a part of the Soviet Union, a strictly centralised state, and as such 
it did not have any of the central structures of a state (including a general staff, 
a bank of issue or most government departments), its economy was part of the 
whole Union’s, and the vast majority of its businesses were dependent on sup­
pliers from other republics. In addition, a significant (and the most up­to­date) 
proportion of the Ukrainian economy was a segment of the Soviet military com­
plex, which was much more elaborate than necessary for the successor states.
Another weakness of the newly formed Ukrainian state was that its elites (with 
the exception of a handful of dissidents) were a product of the Soviet regime; 
they thought in terms of the Soviet political system and the command­and­
control economy, they did not know the non­Soviet world or – in general – for­
eign languages. Finally, they had for decades been used to focusing on Moscow, 
expecting policy guidelines & decisions, as well as resolutions to questiona­
ble and disputed issues, to come from the capital. They were thus unprepared 
to take strategic decisions independently. What was worse, for decades the best 
members of Ukraine’s Soviet elite advanced to Moscow, leaving the less capable 
and less ambitious behind in Kyiv. After the dissolution of the Soviet Union, few 
of the ‘nomenklatura migrants’ returned to Ukraine.
After almost a quarter­century of peaceful construction, interrupted 
in 2014 by the outbreak of war, Ukraine is indeed a weak state, but one which 
is well­established internally and internationally. No reasonable individual has 
called into question its right to exist or its place in the international community, 
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the democratic nature of its political constitution or the market­based nature 
of the economy. However, it is still a democracy in the course of its creation, 
which in more than one way is still far, especially from the standards adopted 
in Western Europe. Similarly, the economy of Ukraine still cannot reach the 
standards typical of the most developed countries.
Despite the understandable dissatisfaction of Ukraine’s inhabitants at the 
state of the country and, more difficult to understand, the impatience of exter­
nal bodies that Kyiv has not met their expectations regarding the rate of trans­
formation (although these expectations are not unanimous), there is no doubt 
that over the past 25 years Ukraine has achieved a great deal. It is true that 
many expectations remain unmet, especially those of Ukraine’s own citizens 
(but these expectations were not identical either). But would it really have 
been possible, in such a short period of time, to achieve the level of economic 
and social development of the countries of Central Europe? And has Ukraine 
really missed many real, and not simply assumed opportunities? The answers 
to these questions depend largely on understanding what the starting point 
of Ukraine (and other post­Soviet states) really was, and how very different 
it was from the starting point of Poland (and other former Communist states 
in Europe).
*
The ‘revolution of dignity’ means that – similarly to the ‘short 20th century’ 
(1914–1991) – we may speak of a ‘short quarter­century’ for independent Ukraine 
(1991–2013). The protests which started in November 2013 close this chapter 
of its history; the revolution which they became, and the war that broke out 
as their consequence, open up a new stage, which it is not yet fitting to describe. 
Thus, in this text, we will discuss the changes that took place in Ukraine until 
2013, and the last two years will be the subject of a separate chapter.
The aim of this study is not to provide a systematic description of the history 
of independent Ukraine, or an overview of all the aspects of the functioning of the 
Ukrainian state and society, but rather to describe how it was formed as a set 
of institutions, procedures and elites; how the departure from Communism 
proceeded and in which direction; and what kind of society was created in the 
1990s and 2000s. Purely political processes – the successive elections, the govern­
ments and the Presidency, the legislative work and political protests – play little 
part in this narrative. Likewise, Kyiv’s foreign policy will be only very briefly 
evaluated. After all, very considerable literature already exists on these topics.
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A common fault in analyses of independent Ukraine, as of the post­Soviet area 
in general, is the treatment of Eastern Europe (according to the tradition of Rus­
sian historiography) as a specific microcosm whose internal dynamics have lit­
tle or nothing to do with global processes. Hence the timeline which concludes 
this work will include mention of external events which have strongly affected 
Ukraine and its place in the hierarchy of the more developed countries’ objec­
tives and challenges.
The first chapter, which is primarily historical, will discuss the events that 
led to the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the formation of an independent 
Ukraine, especially those elements often forgotten today such as the abolition 
of the steering role of the Communist Party and the referendum of March 1991. 
Further chapters will deal with the following topics: the shaping of Ukrainian 
democracy as a set of institutions and procedures; the main elements of eco­
nomic transition; the formation of the modern political nation; the transforma­
tion of the policies concerning state symbolism; and finally, the main elements 
of the self­transformation of society and the dramatic demographic situation 
in Ukraine. The next part contains a summary of how Ukraine emerged onto 
the international scene, as well as the issues of its internal diversity. The final 
chapter is an attempt to describe the changes that occurred as a consequence 
of the ‘revolution of dignity’ of 2014, and later, of the ongoing war; these pro­
cesses are not yet complete, and as such will need to be approached differently 
than those of the previous quarter­century.
*
This text marks another attempt (after Trud niepodległości [The labour of inde-
pendence], published in 2002) to describe the experience of independent Ukraine 
from the point of view of the knowledge and understanding of the world accu­
mulated by the author during thirty years of dealing with Ukrainian issues 
(including as part of the OSW since the end of 1993). In part, out of necessity, 
this is not an analytical, but a historical work, and as such it sometimes passes 
beyond the OSW usual scope of reflection.
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I. PrelImInarIes of IndePendence
The territory of Ukraine took its final shape in the years 1939–1954 after the 
territories annexed by the Soviet Union at the expense of Poland, Hungary 
and Romania were incorporated into the Ukrainian SSR, and after the transfer 
of Crimea, which had previously been part of the Russian SFSR. The Ukrainian 
SSR was formally a constituent of a federal state, with residual representation 
of its own at the international level: as a founding member of the United Nations, 
it was represented in most UN organisations separately from the Soviet Union.
After the period of post­war reconstruction and the era of Khrushchev’s 
experiments, during which among other measures the development of pri­
vate agricultural production was fought and stringent anti­religious policies 
were reinstated, during the Brezhnev era the Soviet state became bogged down 
in stagnation, which gradually revealed the inefficiency of its economy and the 
risks which that posed for the Soviet Union’s military capacity. The 1979 inter­
vention in Afghanistan morphed into a tedious, bloody war,1 which the public 
did not understand and which, especially in the eyes of the younger generations, 
undermined Brezhnev’s myth of the Great Patriotic War, one of the foundations 
of the Soviet Union’s legitimacy.
1. Perestroika and sovereignisation
In March 1985, Mikhail Gorbachev became the leader of the party and the 
Soviet state, with the mission of reforming and thereby strengthening the state. 
His policies of perestroika (reconstruction) and glasnost (‘openness’)2 faltered 
almost immediately as a result of the ill­conceived anti­alcohol campaign, which 
boiled down to a cut in the volume of production and availability of alcohol, and 
decreased the state’s budget revenue by at least 10%. A year later, the Cherno­
byl disaster occurred, forcing the state to allocate huge financial and labour 
1 The military operations which continued from December 1979 to February 1989 involved 
160,000 soldiers mobilised from the Ukrainian SSR and claimed 2,400 Ukrainian lives 
(of the total number of 14,500 casualties on the Soviet side) and left more than 8,000 Ukrain­
ians injured (out of a total of 54,000 injured on the Soviet side), including 5,000 perma­
nently disabled. These are official figures and are probably understated.
2 This is an inaccurate translation: before the revolution of 1917 glasnost meant the range 
of information allowed through the process of censorship. Cf. Слюсаренко А.	 et al., 
Новітня історія України, Kyiv 2002, p. 518. It should be noted that glasnost was officially 
proclaimed only in 1987, after the Chernobyl disaster.
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resources to the rescue operation.3 These two events – the thoughtlessly planned 
and conducted campaign against alcoholism, which unleashed the people’s mas­
sive potential for private enterprise as they started to illicitly produce and sell 
alcohol, and the Chernobyl disaster which, among other consequences, greatly 
contributed to Ukraine’s national revival – may have sealed the fate of the plans 
conceived by Gorbachev and his aides.
In summer 1988 Gorbachev abolished the steering role of the party, granting 
independence to the state authorities (the soviets, or councils of people’s del­
egates, and their executive committees). The party apparatus, which had been 
effectively governing the state, thus became marginalised, while the councils 
were assigned a task which they were unprepared to handle. At that moment, 
the fate of the Communist system was sealed, but the Soviet state still stood 
a chance of surviving. However, the moment the Communist party has lost its 
grip on society, the Soviet leadership no longer held control of the dynamics 
of social processes.
In November 1988, the Estonian SSR became the first to declare suverenitet, and 
in March 1990, the Lithuanian SSR adopted its Act Reinstating Independence. 
When the Russian Federal SSR declared suverenitet in June, the snowball was set 
in motion: declarations of this special kind of ‘intra­Union independence’ were 
adopted not only by Union and autonomous republics, but also by some oblasts, 
which had never enjoyed any administrative independence.
Ukraine declared suverenitet on 16 July 1990, defining itself as a ‘sovereign 
national state’ (albeit not a socialist state), and formulating an agenda to cre­
ate a de facto independent state with full­fledged state bodies, its own taxation 
and customs systems and its own armed forces. Nonetheless, its declaration 
of suverenitet was not an act of secession, as some believed that keeping ties with 
Moscow was inevitable,4 while others treated the move as an element of political 
3 For more information about the consequences of the Chernobyl disaster, see: P. Sekuła, 
Czarnobyl. Społeczno-gospodarcze, polityczne i kulturowe konsekwencje katastrofy jądrowej 
dla Ukrainy, Kraków 2014, and for a more journalistic perspective, see: T. A. Olszański, 
Od czarnobylskiego ognia spłonęło wielkie imperium, Tygodnik Powszechny, 2006, nr 18, 
as well as T. A. Olszański, The shadow of Chornobyl. Ukraine thirty years after the disaster, 
OSW Commentary, 22 April 2016, https://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/osw­commen­
tary/2016­04­22/shadow­chornobyl­ukraine­thirty­years­after­disaster
4 This bears an interesting similarity to the early days of the Ukrainian People’s Republic 
of 1917, which first proclaimed its statehood in a federative union with revolutionary Russia 
and proceeded to proclaim formal independence only after the latter imposed a war on it.
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gamesmanship intended to lay the ground for the next step. Shortly afterwards, 
the Verkhovna Rada (parliament) of Ukraine elected in 1990 began passing bills 
to implement the provisions of the declaration. Objectively, Ukraine was mov­
ing towards full independence, even though not everyone was aware of that.
Suverenitet, not sovereignty
The declarations of gosudarstvenny suverenitet adopted by the Soviet, un-
ion and autonomous republics (and even some oblasts) in the years 1990–
1991 were not about the intention to establish independent states, but rather 
about remaining within the Soviet state as members of a genuine – and not 
a sham – federation. Moreover, at least at the formal level, they called for 
the implementation of the principles laid down in the Soviet Union’s con-
stitution which, in Article 76, described the union republics as ‘sovereign 
Soviet socialist states’.5 Therefore, even though the word means ‘sovereign-
ty’ in Russian, it should not be translated this way in the present context 
because ‘sovereignty’ means full legal and international independence, the 
right to pursue an independent foreign policy and to issue currency. The 
emancipating Soviet constituents did not aspire to any such status. Moreo-
ver, not all the entities which declared suverenitet subsequently declared 
independence.
In October 1990, the process of Ukraine’s sovereignisation gained new momen­
tum in the wake of the so­called ‘Revolution on Granite’, a fourteen­day pro­
test staged by several hundred students in central Kyiv. The protesters’ main 
demand was for Ukraine to break off its negotiations on the new Union treaty, 
i.e. to opt for independence. The protesters were supported by mass demonstra­
tions staged by the inhabitants of Kyiv (one of which brought together around 
100,000 people). After Prime Minister Vitaliy Masol stepped down (as demanded 
by the protesters), the mass disintegration of the party committees still func­
tioning followed, and large numbers of people quit the Communist Party of the 
Soviet Union and the Komsomol. The simultaneous weakening of censorship 
made it possible to give increasing exposure to Communist crimes, especially 
the Holo domor and the mass killings in Bykovnya near Kyiv.6
5 The constitution of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics as adopted on 7 October 1977, 
http://www.departments.bucknell.edu/russian/const/77cons03.html#chap08
6 The Holodomor was a catastrophic famine of during the years 1932–1933, which according 
to reliable estimates claimed between 3 million and 3.5 million lives in Ukraine, and which 
is commonly believed to have been provoked, or even planned by the Soviet leadership. 
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The ‘Revolution on Granite’ was a turning point: at that time, the advocates 
of independence (secession) started to slowly but steadily gain the upper hand. 
This was also significant for another reason: it established the symbol and stand­
ard formula of protests in Ukraine, i.e. tent pickets in the central square of Kyiv, 
which at that time was called the October Revolution Square, and today forms 
the southern part of Independence Square.7 That fact was noticed only in 2014, 
when the ‘Revolution on Granite’ started to be referred to as the First Maidan 
(the predecessor of the Orange Revolution in 2004 and the Revolution of Dig­
nity in 2014). The hunger strike was joined by many students at the start of their 
careers, who later became noted Ukrainian politicians, intellectuals and social 
activists, including Oles Doniy, Markiyan Ivashchyshyn, Vakhtang Kipiani, Solo­
miya Pavlychko, Taras Prokhasko, Oleh Tyahnybok and Oksana Zabuzhko.
In March 1991, Gorbachev called an all­Union referendum on “preserving the 
USSR as a reformed federation of sovereign republics”, which was intended 
to gauge support for the draft new Union Treaty. Kyiv added its own question 
to the referendum, which concerned “remaining within the USSR under the 
Declaration of Suverenitet”, and the leaderships of the three Galician districts 
attached questions concerning the full independence of Ukraine. The first two 
questions were not alternatives,8 and the third one effectively transformed the 
referendum in Eastern Galicia into a plebiscite.
According to official figures, the turnout on 17 March was 83%. 70% of voters 
responded ‘yes‘ to the first question, and 80% replied ‘yes‘ to the second one; 
that is, around half of those who voted responded affirmatively to both ques­
tions. In Eastern Galicia 88% voted for full independence while boycotting 
the other two questions (which means that in the remainder of the country 
support for ‘renewing the federation’ must have been even higher). Advocates 
In Ukraine it is officially regarded as an act of genocide and constitutes an important factor 
in the country’s national identity. Around 100 thousand victims of the NKVD terror dur­
ing the years 1937–1938, as well as around 1,700 Poles, mainly military and police officers 
murdered in 1940, are buried in the forest near Bykovnya (east of Kyiv). However, contrary 
to what was commonly believed in the late 1980s, Bykovnya was not the site of the crime, 
but only a burial area for the victims of killings in other parts of Kyiv.
7 It is possible that this form of the protest had been inspired by a similar action taken 
by Greek Catholic priests who staged a hunger strike in the Red Square in Moscow in May 
1988, although the protesters themselves have actually referred to the protests by Bulgar­
ian students in 1989 and the protests in the Tiananmen Square in Beijing, China.
8 It seems that many politicians in Kyiv seem to have believed otherwise; cf. Л. Кравчук, 
Маємо те, що маємо. Спогади і роздуми, Kyiv 2002, p. 73 and В. Литвин, Украина: 
политика, политики, власть, Kyiv 1997, p. 202.
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of dismantling the Soviet state thus gained a powerful, albeit not fully con­
scious, mandate from the voters.
At that stage, most Ukrainians still could not imagine the transformation of their 
republic into an independent state. Change was commonly expected, but it was 
not entirely clear what that should involve. The Soviet Union was the existing 
reality, familiar and obvious, and many considered the USSR, rather than the 
individual republics, to be their home country. The independence option was 
prevalent only in Galicia and in parts of Volhynia, where a revival of early 20th 
century traditions of independence was underway (at that time focused mainly 
on the tradition of the Ukrainian Sich Riflemen, who fought alongside the Aus­
trian army against Russia) and where the people cheered on the aspirations 
of the Baltic states. Moreover, supporters of independence controlled the city 
and district councils in those regions, which is why they were able to add their 
own, local question to the all­Union referendum.
It was presumably even more important that in the spring of 1991, the nomen-
klatura did not think it had any interest in the dissolution of the Soviet state, but 
realised it could benefit from its controlled decentralisation, which would trans­
fer more powers, but not necessarily more responsibilities, to the republic­level 
structures. Hence, the entire propaganda machine was harnessed into building 
support for the ‘reform’ option against the Soviet­conservative option, which 
was still strong as large sections of Soviet society (especially the older genera­
tions) wished for a return to the old order in which they felt secure. However, 
history continued to accelerate.
2. The path to independence
Immediately after his talks with Gorbachev in Moscow on 1 August 1991, US Pres­
ident George Bush delivered a speech in Kyiv in which he openly opposed the 
idea of dismantling the USSR and backed plans for its reform in the spirit of the 
ongoing negotiations between the Union’s central leadership and the republic 
authorities, known as the ‘Novo­Ogaryovo process’. Even more importantly, he 
announced that the United States would not support an independence strug­
gle fought in the name of “suicidal nationalism based upon ethnic hatred”.9 
The speech, which went down to history as the ‘Kiev Chicken speech’,10 was 
9 The speech had been written by Condoleezza Rice, at that time the president’s special 
assistant for international security, and the US Secretary of State from 2005 to 2009.
10 The phrase was coined by a the New York Times columnist William Safire as late as 2004.
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primarily a manifestation of the United States’ fears that the Yugoslav scenario 
could repeat itself in the Soviet Union (the Slovenian independence war had 
ended just a month before, and the bloody Serbian­Croatian conflict was already 
flaring up). It also testified to the influence that the writings of members of the 
Ukrainian diaspora and other authors convinced that ethnic conflicts were 
the main ‘driving force of politics’ had on the American understanding of the 
situation in the Soviet Union. Washington apparently did not realise that the 
nationalisms emerging in the Soviet Union were expressions not of ethnic con­
flicts (with the exception of the Baltic states and the Caucasus), but rather of the 
ambitions of the local nomenklaturas. It is also true that the fate of the Soviet 
Union was not yet sealed in the final days of July 1991, and it was in the interest 
of the United States to preserve its unity at least in the military sense (most 
importantly, as a partner in the nuclear disarmament process and in efforts 
to control nuclear technology).
At that time, the negotiations of the new Union treaty were essentially com­
plete: the draft treaty provided that the Soviet Union would be transformed into 
a Union of Sovereign States in which the central Union authorities would keep 
a large (effectively dominant) role. The treaty effectively envisaged a ‘Soviet 
Union 2.0’. This was irreconcilable with the Ukrainian and Russian declarations 
of suverenitet, and the chances that it would be signed were slim. Kyiv was play­
ing for time as it declared that it needed to verify the new treaty’s compatibility 
with the declaration of suverenitet (the two documents were incompatible at first 
sight), and perhaps wanted to delay the decision until after the Ukrainian presi­
dential elections scheduled for 1 December. Gorbachev was in a hurry, though, 
and it was decided that Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan 
would sign the treaty on 20 August 1991.
The Communist conservatives (from Gorbachev’s own circle) responded 
by attempting a putsch on 19 August 1991, although this was done so ineptly 
that suspicions arose that it may have been Gorbachev’s own provocation.11 Fac­
ing a strong reaction from the RSFSR president Boris Yeltsin, supported by the 
people on the streets of Moscow, those behind the putsch quickly capitulated. 
One reason why it could not have succeeded was the belief, deeply ingrained 
in the minds of the nomenklatura, that the security apparatus should under no 
circumstances gain an advantage over the party and Soviet structures.
11 Cf. Литвин, op. cit., p. 207–209. The author was assistant to the First Secretary of the Cen­
tral Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine at that time.
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Kyiv responded cautiously. The Verkhovna Rada’s speaker Leonid Kravchuk and 
his circle remained silent during the putsch, or waited and issued insignificant 
declarations.12 They did not have many other options, as Kyiv was surrounded 
by strong Soviet Army forces. It was only after Gorbachev came back to Moscow 
(albeit not to full power, which was clear almost from the start) that Kravchuk 
decided to back the supporters of full secession. On 24 August, the Verkhovna 
Rada almost unanimously proclaimed independence and called a referendum, 
scheduled for 1 December, to confirm this decision. It was taken because the 
outcome of the referendum held in March had to be invalidated somehow, and 
the Ukrainian leadership may also have wanted to gain some time to seek a for­
mula for a ‘civilised’ dissolution of the USSR.
In autumn 1991, the Ukrainian nomenklatura threw its weight behind the deci­
sion to choose independence, and made every effort to make sure that the 
outcome of the December referendum attested to universal support for that 
option. Not because the idea of independence reflected the inner convictions 
of the nomenklatura members: in most cases, they simply believed that it was 
the right thing to do at that time, and were accustomed to implementing direc­
tives from Kyiv without asking questions – for these were the same people and 
the same structures (without the dissolved party committees) who just a few 
months before had orchestrated massive popular support for Ukraine’s contin­
ued membership in the Union. Moreover, they did not clearly understand how 
independence would differ from suverenitet (or even what the latter meant, for 
that matter). Many presumably believed that some form of a close, quasi­state 
relation between the former Soviet republics would be preserved (and large 
sections of the public must have thought the same). Finally, it is worth not­
ing that in December 1991, independent Ukraine was already a fact, and the 
independence vote was effectively about endorsing the new reality (both for 
the nomenklatura and the voters). While back in March the question had been 
‘What kind of change do you want?’, in December people were asked whether 
they agreed to the change that had already taken place.
The Soviet nomenklatura of Ukraine therefore amplified the influence of the 
pro­independence formations and ensured that the independence option ulti­
mately got the support of 90.3% of voters, which, given the turnout of 84.2%, 
12 It should be noted, however, that at that time Kravchuk was not yet president, but merely 
chairman of the Verkhovna Rada, a collegial body, as a result of which his mandate and real 
capacity to act were much weaker than those of Yeltsin, who was already the fully­fledged 
president of the RSFSR.
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corresponded to 76% of all eligible voters13. The moment the referendum results 
were announced, the dissolution of the Soviet Union became inevitable. Nobody 
in the world could take such a unanimous expression of a large nation’s will 
lightly. Neither could Gorbachev, who had to scrap the new Union treaty project, 
work on which had continued all the time, and accept the decisions taken by the 
presidents of Russia, Ukraine and Belarus to dissolve the Soviet state – decisions 
effectively amounted to a bloodless and flawlessly conducted coup d’état. In late 
December 1991, Gorbachev left the Kremlin, and the Western powers, willing 
or not, had to recognise the independence of the Soviet Union’s successor states, 
including Ukraine.
When proclaiming independence, Ukraine opted for continuation instead 
of a decisive break with the past. It did not bring itself to dissolve the Verk-
hovna Rada which had been elected in 1990, nor to immediately implement 
a provisional constitution (it turned out that the amended 1978 Soviet consti­
tution would remain in force for another five years, albeit in theory only to the 
extent it was compatible with the declaration of suverenitet). The country still 
had a Soviet system of government (based on the principle of indivisibility 
of state power, even though the declaration of suverenitet provided for separa­
tion of powers and local self­governance), and the economy was still operating 
according to the command­and­control model (which had become ineffectual). 
The fundamental problem of independent Ukraine could be defined in the words 
of the Ukrainian poet and political activist Petro Osadchuk who said: “Ukraine 
quit the Soviet Union, but the Soviet Union did not quit Ukraine”.14
As a result, for several years Ukraine became engulfed in compete legal chaos: 
the old norms, which were glaringly incompatible with the new reality, were 
informally ‘dormant’ (but could always be invoked if needed), and clear regu­
lations were replaced by opaque rules. Suddenly relieved of the supervision 
of party committees, the judges and prosecutors, as well as the local bureau­
cracy (by 1991, no central bureaucratic bodies were hosted in Ukraine) started 
to act arbitrarily, inconsistently and incompetently. That had terrible conse­
quences for the development of the procedures and institutions of a modern 
state of law in Ukraine.15
13 We will probably never know to what extent those results were ‘enhanced’ at the vote 
counting stage.
14 Кравчук, op. cit., p. 221.
15 Transplanted into the new system, this Soviet legal nihilism later led to many complica­
tions; the most recent illustration of this is that in 2016, solutions for local governments 
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The new state had to define its borders. This was easy in the case of the origi­
nal ‘external’ borders (with Poland, Slovakia, Hungary and Romania16) because 
those had long been demarcated and were uncontested. The situation was differ­
ent in the case of the former ‘internal’ borders (with Belarus, Russia and Mol­
dova), which had not even been delimited in sufficiently detailed maps and had 
played no role in the economic life of the respective provinces. While the Com­
monwealth of Independent States17 did decide that the original administrative 
divisions between the Soviet republics would become state borders, the decision 
was not followed by a swift delimitation (drawing of the borders on detailed 
topographic maps) or demarcation (marking in the field, which is necessary for 
the effective defence of the border). 
Part of the reason why this work was postponed concerned the expectation, 
which survived for some considerable time, that the Slavic post­Soviet states 
at least would remain ‘open’ to one another, and would not introduce border 
and customs checks.
continue to be implemented by parliamentary and governmental acts, while the constitu­
tional amendment needed to make that mode of operation possible still cannot be adopted, 
as it would make most of them unconstitutional.
16 In the case of Romania, some difficulties were encountered due to the natural change 
of course of the border section of the Danube, but these were nonetheless quickly resolved. 
More serious problems arose in connection with the division of territorial waters around 
the Snake Island on the Black Sea. The dispute was resolved only in 2009, thanks to inter­
national arbitration.
17 The organisation was established at the conference in Viskuli, Belarus; the intention 
of Ukraine (and the other republics) was that the CIS would serve as a kind of ‘commission 
for the liquidation of the USSR’, while Moscow saw it as an instrument to salvage all the 
institutions and procedures of the Soviet state which could still be salvaged.
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II. from sovIeT rePublIc To elecToral democracy
Ukraine was formed by the Ukrainian SSR breaking away from the Soviet Union 
and subsequently gradually reforming itself. Its repeatedly amended Soviet­era 
constitution from 1978 was only replaced with a new constitution in 1996; the 
Soviet­era Verkhovna Rada elected in 1990 survived until the spring of 1994, and 
the government formed by Vitold Fokin in the autumn of 1990 remained in office 
until October 1992. Until the year 2000, the numbering of the successive terms 
of the Verkhovna Rada continued to be counted from the beginnings of the Ukrain­
ian SSR. Many pieces of Soviet legislation, albeit amended to varying degrees, 
remained in force for decades, and some are still in force today. There was no sym­
bolic or actual break of continuity, as Ukraine opted for the evolutionary recon­
struction of its non­sovereign statehood instead of revolutionarily choosing to build 
new state institutions from scratch. That path was the only one possible, as inde­
pendent Ukraine had been ushered into existence by the elites of Soviet Ukraine.18
1. The nature of soviet state and law
To understand the processes which shaped Ukraine’s (formal and actual) sys­
tem of government, it is necessary to know what kind of system existed in the 
Soviet Union, including its theoretical bases. That system, which had been cre­
ated in a revolutionary manner, was based not on the continuity of organic 
development of social institutions, but on an ideological programme which also 
extended to the philosophy of law.
Under the influence of the language of Soviet propaganda, in which the Com­
munist system was referred to as ‘socialist democracy’, many external observ­
ers adopted the idea that the Soviet system was a dictatorship (of an individual 
or an apparatus) hiding behind the appearances of democratic institutions 
which did not differ significantly in terms of their general make­up from their 
counterparts in Europe. Few authors noticed that “the real state was the Com­
munist party”.19 Even fewer realised that the Soviet theorists and practitioners 
had rejected Montesquieu’s fundamental concepts of a democratic state.
18 It was symbolic that the person democratically elected as Ukraine’s first president had been 
the second secretary of the Communist Party of Ukraine in charge of ideological issues and 
chair of the Supreme Council of the Ukrainian SSR, and the building formerly occupied 
by the Central Committee in Kyiv became the president’s official seat.
19 A. Åslund, How Ukraine Became a Market Economy and Democracy, Washington 2009, 
p. 36.
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According to the Marxist­Leninist theory of law, law is the expression of the 
will of the ruling class, and its contents reflect and should reflect the interests 
of that class. It is therefore a misnomer to speak about ‘the instrumental use 
of the law’ in Communist states, because law was merely one of the instruments 
of power and could not be anything else. All legal acts, including the constitu­
tion, played an auxiliary role for the state apparatus and were not binding: those 
with political power could use them, but could also ignore or freely modify them 
if need arose. This concept of law is reflected in what Soviet prosecutors report­
edly often told dissidents: that “the constitution is for abroad”.20
The original source of power and law in that system was the “will of the working 
people of towns and villages”, understood as volonté générale (the ‘universal will’, 
independent of the real views and aspirations of individual members of society), 
and expressed and interpreted by the ‘avant­garde’ of the working people, i.e. the 
professional apparatus of the Communist party (which was not a party in the 
democratic sense, but rather something between a professional corporation and 
social estate). Real power was therefore exercised by the Communist party’s 
committee system, and the role of public authorities was limited to implementing 
their decisions. This is what the ‘steering role of the party’ stood for (Art. 6 of the 
1977 Soviet constitution read: “The leading and guiding force of the Soviet soci­
ety and the nucleus of its political system, of all state organisations and public 
organisations, is the Communist Party of the Soviet Union”).
Political necessity/expedience was the main organising principle of the Soviet 
legal system. The consequence of this was that the principle of stability of law 
had to be rejected, and there was no need to educate the people about the law 
– on the contrary, efforts were sometimes made to thwart the development 
of legal awareness. All those characteristics, partly rooted in the legal system 
of pre­Revolutionary Russia, prevailed until the end of Communist rule.
The Communist system abolished the separation of powers with independent 
and mutually balancing branches of the legislative, the executive and the judici­
ary. The USSR constitution stated that “The people exercise state power through 
Soviets of People’s Deputies, which constitute the political foundation of the 
USSR. All other state bodies are under the control of, and accountable to, the 
Soviets of People’s Deputies.”21 The Supreme Soviet, the ‘highest body of state 
20 Here, quoted after V. Moroz, Reportaż z rezerwatu imienia Berii [Reports from the Beria reserve], 
[in] I. Koshelivets, Ukraina 1956–1968 [Ukraine in the years 1956–1968], Paris 1969, p. 237.
21 Art. 2 of the 1977 constitution of the Soviet Union, op. cit.
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authority’ by force of the same constitution, combined the roles of the legislative 
and the top tier of the executive (Art. 108). The judiciary was also an integral 
part of the system of ‘state power’ bodies, leaving no room for any independ­
ence of the judiciary, although the constitution did contain a provision on the 
independence of judges (Art. 155).
In the system, there was also no room for the self­governance of the people, 
or even of the regions. The soviets of people’s delegates (which characteristically 
bore the same name from village to central level) and their executive commit­
tees were the local organs of state authority, bound by the principle of demo­
cratic centralism, which effectively boiled down to hierarchic subordination. 
At the same time, the councils formally enjoyed very broad competences, 
granted to them without any concern for the system’s cohesion.
The Communist states regularly organised elections of ‘people’s delegates’ (dep­
uties and councillors), but they did not play the same role as in democratic states. 
The very act of election was ostensible because no rivalry among candidates was 
allowed, not to mention competition among political programmes.22 The elec­
tions were effectively plebiscites intended to demonstrate to the public that 
it univocally supports the programme of the authorities (i.e. was reasserting 
its ‘own’ volonté générale). The real outcomes of elections were presumably an 
important source of information for the Soviet leadership on the actual senti­
ments prevailing among the ‘working people’.
2. The path towards constitutional separation of powers
As already mentioned, the steering role of the Communist party was abolished 
in 1991, and with it the principle of democratic centralism which had enabled the 
hierarchic management of the party apparatus. However, the original system had 
a clear division of competences and responsibilities, and this was not replaced 
by a new one. In this way, the state’s backbone, i.e. the system which had made 
it governable, was removed.23 As one of the consequences, full powers were taken 
over by councils at different levels (leading to inevitable chaos created by overlaps 
22 The competition and discussions leading to the formulation of programs and candidate lists 
that would be later presented to the public, took place within the party committees, and 
usually did not take place in the public eye.
23 In Russia in that period, the KGB and the armed forces, which had their own hierarchies 
largely independent of the Communist Party structures, gained a bigger role. In Ukraine 
neither the military nor the security services played a significant role in creating the new 
state order.
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in competences). Another consequence was the emancipation of the bureaucracy, 
whose arbitrary behaviour had previously been restrained by the possibility that 
someone could complain to the party committees.
In order to tackle the mounting anarchy of social life, the post­Soviet states 
vested strong powers in their presidents and created systems of local state 
organs subordinate to the president (the so­called vertikal vlasti, or vladnaya 
vertikal in Ukrainian, i.e. literally ‘hierarchy of power’; also referred to as ‘the 
power vertical’), all in an effort to make the state governable again. Their estab­
lishment (and the move to subordinate governments to the president) became 
the first step towards a division of the original ‘state authority’ into mutually 
balancing executive and legislative branches of power. However, the old system 
did not give in easily. It was a permanent demand of the post­Soviet Communist 
parties to abolish the presidency and subordinate the executive organs to the 
Supreme Councils again, i.e. to restore the ‘unity of state authority’, in other 
words, the Soviet system. The disputes between presidents and Supreme Coun­
cils were not manifestations of the usual rivalry between the executive and 
the legislative branches, but rather struggles to transform the Councils into 
parliaments (organs of legislative power) and thereby introduce the separation 
of powers. That was the essence of the confrontations between the presidents 
and the Supreme Council speakers: Yeltsin and Khasbulatov in 1993 in Russia, 
and in Ukraine between Kravchuk and Plushch in 1993 (which the president 
lost), and Kuchma and Moroz in 1995 (in which the president won).
In Ukraine, the separation of powers was already provided for in the Declara­
tion of Suverenitet, which in 1991 started to function partly as a ‘small’ constitu­
tion, and partly as a guidance document for interpreting the constitution of the 
Ukrainian SSR / Ukraine. However, it was only Leonid Kuchma who managed, 
in 1995, to push through the separation of powers by granting the Verkhovna 
Rada the status of a legislature and subordinating the executive to the presi­
dent.24 This was a pivotal decision for Ukraine, which paved the way for the 
formation of a democratic system in the European and not the post­Soviet sense, 
and even though haggling over some detailed provisions in the constitution 
(especially concerning the early dissolution of the parliament and the impeach­
24 The constitutional agreement between the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine and the President 
of Ukraine, concluded on 18 June 1995, started with the following passage: “The Verk-
hovna Rada of Ukraine, being the sole legislative body, on the one hand, and the President 
of Ukraine, being the head of state and the superior executive authority, on the other, that 
is, the Parties who are the subjects of the constitutional law and who were granted their 
prerogatives directly by the nation...”.
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ment of the president) continued for another year, the principle of the separa­
tion of powers was never called into question again.
The 1996 constitution of Ukraine introduced a presidential­parliamentary sys­
tem in which the head of state had a significant advantage over the parliament; 
it was the president who appointed the government and the heads of the local 
state administration bodies. Arrangements offering the executive branch an 
advantage over the legislative branch were introduced in nearly all post­Soviet 
states at that time; this may have well been the only way to force the original 
soviets of people’s delegates to limit themselves to the role of parliaments and 
local self­government bodies. Unfortunately, the adoption of the constitution 
was not swiftly followed by the adoption of the necessary acts of implementa­
tion; for example, no rules on impeachment have been enacted until the present 
day, and election regulations have been revised ahead of nearly every vote, etc.
Still in 1990, the local soviets were renamed as territorial self­government bod­
ies (but not as people’s self­governments), and in 1992 their executive organs 
were dismantled as the local state administration bodies took over their com­
petences (and apparatuses). As a result, the local nomenklatura and bureaucratic 
elites became self­governed. The 1996 constitution formally introduced terri­
torial self­government by transforming the local soviets into territorial self­
government bodies, and the 1997 law on self­government established genuine 
self­governments in the major cities (with their own executive apparatuses). 
Nevertheless, those local governments continued to pay little heed to the inter­
ests or desires of the local people.
3. The constitution and politics
Even though the rule of law had been formally introduced in Ukraine, in prac­
tice the principle of ‘political expedience’ continued to prevail. The handling 
of the successive amendments to the constitution provides some dramatic 
examples. The draft amendment prepared and provisionally adopted in spring 
2004 was intended not so much to balance the powers of the different state 
bodies, as to weaken the state by undermining the president’s position.25 It was 
25 This was one of those frequent situations in which the solutions functioning operating 
in mature Western democracies proved dysfunctional or even decidedly harmful to the 
fledgling post­Soviet democracy. Another similar example concerned the decision (taken 
in 2016 under strong pressure from the EU) not to allow any influence of either the legisla­
ture or the executive to exert on the appointments of judges, which in the Ukrainian condi­
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adopted in December 2004 without observing the necessary formal conditions 
(which provided grounds for the Constitutional Court to repeal the amend­
ment in 2010), as part of a compromise solution to the political crisis, which also 
included the invalidation of the second round of presidential elections by the 
Supreme Court in December 2004 (that decision was also dubious from a formal 
point of view, to say the least).
Consequently President Viktor Yushchenko had much less power than his pre­
decessor, and had to cope with a system of checks and balances which had been 
distorted by the amendment. He started his term as president by ostensibly 
ignoring the constitution: he appointed the oblast administration chiefs imme­
diately after the government’s inauguration, despite the constitutional require­
ment to appoint them at the government’s request, i.e. after the government’s 
first sitting. The formal standards of the rule of law, which Kuchma had taken 
care to observe, were left in tatters.
After Yushchenko’s embarrassing defeat26 in February 2010, his successor 
Yanukovych decided to revert to the 1996 constitution, which would not only 
grant him more powers, but also ensure better stability and more coherent func­
tioning of the state bodies. However, as he could not get the necessary changes 
through parliament, he opted for a verdict by the Constitutional Court, which 
in September 2010 repealed the amendment on procedural grounds27 and ruled 
that the 1996 constitution was thereby restored.
Restoring the 2004 constitution was one of the most important demands of the 
Maidan protests of 2014, which rightly regarded the 1996 version of the consti­
tution as an instrument of President Yanukovych’s authoritarian rule. It also 
proved to be a providential move, thanks to which the Ukrainian state was 
able to ensure continuity of governance after Yanukovych and Prime Minister 
Mykola Azarov fled the country. The 1996 constitution stated that in a situa­
tion when the president is unable to perform his duties, the prime minister 
takes over, but it did not lay down any provisions for the further succession. 
The 2004 constitution, on the other hand, stated that in such a situation the 
speaker of parliament should take over. And since Volodymyr Rybak, who was 
tions could lead to one outcome only: conservation of the lawlessness of the judges, instead 
of the promotion of their independence.
26 As an the incumbent president, he garnered a mere 5.45% of votes.
27 The problem was that the text on which the Constitutional Court had given its opinion was 
had been changed in the parliament and adopted without consulting the Court again.
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the speaker of parliament at that time, had resigned in a fully formal way, the 
Verkhovna Rada was able to elect a new, ‘revolutionary’ speaker and entrust him 
with the presidency of the faltering state.
Those measures were necessary, but unconstitutional. The law on “restoring 
the binding force of certain norms in the Constitution of Ukraine” was adopted 
on 21 February 2014 without consulting the Constitutional Court, or even the 
competent parliamentary committee. As this bill was not signed by the president, 
who fled the capital a few hours after its adoption (the constitution normally 
allows two weeks for the presidential signature), the Verkhovna Rada as early 
as the next day adopted another resolution “on the text of the constitution”, 
based on which the 21 February bill was signed by the new speaker of parlia­
ment, Oleksandr Turchynov, in his capacity of acting president (by force of the 
same bill). The 2004 version of the constitution came into force on 1 March 2014. 
The manner in which Yanukovych was ousted is particularly dubious as there 
was no basis for that in the constitution.28 Ukraine was in a revolutionary situa­
tion, and this unprecedented predicament required precedent­setting solutions. 
Those solutions saved the state, but at the same time had a negative impact on the 
operation of the rule of law in Ukraine and the development of the people’s legal 
awareness.
One could wonder whether Ukrainian democracy was sufficiently mature 
around the year 2010 (at the onset of Yanukovych’s rule) to be able to afford 
to implement solutions typical of parliamentary systems of government which 
took generations to develop in other countries (its party system certainly was, 
and remains, too immature to sustain stable parliamentary governance). How­
ever, the 2004 constitution is certainly not suitable for today’s Ukraine – a coun­
try involved in a war and threatened by the covert rebellion of some professional 
associations. The constitution is a burden, if not a threat to the state; but it would 
be very difficult to amend it in keeping with the rules currently in force.29
28 The Parliamentary resolution stated that the president had ‘ousted himself ’ and ceased 
to perform his duties, and on this basis those duties were thereby assumed by the speaker 
of parliament. Meanwhile, the constitution provides that the president’s term may be ter­
minated early in the following circumstances: resignation, inability to perform duties due 
to poor health, impeachment and death.
29 The rules are prohibitive and designed to make the legislative process as difficult as pos­
sible. Every draft constitutional amendment first needs to be put on the agenda of a Verk-
hovna Rada session by an ordinary majority (which in Ukraine means an absolute majority 
of the constitutional number of MPs, irrespective of how many are present, i.e. 226 votes). 
Then the Constitutional Court needs to rule that the draft will not pose a threat to the 
human rights enshrined in the constitution or the independence and territorial integrity 
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4. The shape of ukraine’s democracy
Every political system rests on a certain social group (class) which supports 
it mainly because it believes that the system serves its interest. Democratic 
systems are typically supported by the middle classes, i.e. those who own the 
means of production on a small to medium scale,30 such as the small slave own­
ers in the ancient democracies, the gentry in aristocratic democracies, and the 
urban bourgeoisie in present­day Western democracies (with a large share 
of free farmers in the USA). Historical experience shows that democracies 
thrive when the middle classes enjoy stability (including peace) and prosper­
ity which enables education. When the middle classes are in decline, democracy 
turns into one or another form of oligarchy (the rule of large owners who for 
various reasons sustain the institutions of electoral democracy).
Ukraine, like the other post­Soviet states, did not have a middle class at all. With 
some marginal exceptions, its citizens did not own property, and the inequali­
ties which existed concerned the relation to power and access to information. 
The broadly understood nomenklatura (professional members of the party appa­
ratus, bureaucracy, technocracy, the administration of justice and security ser­
vices, military officers) constituted the upper class, which was highly stratified 
but privileged in terms of access to material goods, information and decision­
making. The only other class which existed was the ‘working people of towns 
and villages’, who constituted the lower, albeit formally ruling class.
At the onset, the new Ukrainian state developed mainly on the basis of the 
nomenklatura (especially the bureaucracy and technocracy). However, as the 
middle classes slowly grew and big business, whose top representatives typi­
cally hailed from the ranks of the nomenklatura, developed dynamically, it only 
took a few years for a new social group, the oligarchs, defined as large business 
owners who get involved in politics to secure their business interests, to enter 
of Ukraine, for which there is no statutory deadline. The draft on which the Court has given 
its opinion may not be changed by the parliament, but nonetheless it needs to be adopted 
twice: in a first vote by an ordinary majority, and in a second vote, held during the next 
parliamentary session (i.e. within the next half­year) by a qualified majority of 300 votes. 
The definitions of ordinary and qualified majority are a legacy of the Soviet system.
30 There are various definitions of the middle class; the most common one at present is based 
on the income criterion, as a result of which it encompasses some employees alongside the 
owners of the means of production and the self­employed. However, as the two groups 
have divergent interests and expectations vis-à-vis the state, the older definition will 
be applied here.
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the stage. The oligarchs almost immediately established close co­operation with 
the bureaucracy, and already by around the year 2000 Ukraine’s democracy 
could be described as an oligarchic­bureaucratic system (similar to aristocratic 
or bourgeoisie democracies). That group, characterised in more detail below, 
became the foundation of Ukraine’s democratic order. In early 2017, there are 
no visible social processes which could undermine that foundation.
Ukraine’s present system of government and political practice meet the mini­
mum standards of an electoral democracy: the country has a real, not a façade 
multi­party system; all adult citizens (except for those stripped of civil rights 
by the courts) enjoy equal rights to vote and stand in elections; elections take 
place regularly and the right of secret ballot is observed; no massive irregu­
larities occur at the stage of vote counting, and the vote results are binding 
on those in power; and finally, the major parties enjoy wide access to the elector­
ate through the media and are able to conduct electoral campaigns.31
The weakest part of Ukraine’s system concerns the equal access of political par­
ties to the media; and the country’s party system, while pluralist, can hardly 
be regarded as mature because most of the dominant parties represent the inter­
ests of different big business groupings, rather than the political positions and 
views of major social groups. Of the many ‘programme’ parties formed in the 
first years of independence, most failed to grow, while others were taken over 
by powerful sponsors, usually oligarchs. Ukraine has no major social­demo­
cratic, Christian­democratic, liberal or conservative party (although it does 
have a fairly strong nationalist party).
Ukraine also lacks strong and genuinely independent media or non­govern­
mental organisations which are not dependent on foreign funding, and the 
trade union movement has failed to find a place for itself in the post­Commu­
nist system. Likewise, it has no territorial self­government in the European 
sense, as the self­government’s space continues to be occupied by the post­Soviet 
‘nomenklatura self­government’ which thwarts civil initiative instead of sup­
porting it. Finally, Ukrainian democracy is hugely burdened by the disastrous 
quality of legislation and its excessive volume, which fuels corruption. And 
corruption remains a constituent element of the system (and has been since 
the times of the Russian Empire), rather than an anomaly or violation of the 
generally accepted rules.
31 Based on Freedom House criteria, https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom­world­2010/
methodology, last accessed on 19 September 2016.
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Ukraine does not meet many of the standards of liberal democracies, espe­
cially the Western model in which the legislative branch has an advantage over 
the other branches of power, and the rights of minorities have priority over 
the principle of equality before the law. The Ukrainian solutions are in many 
respects closer to those models found in the Western hemisphere where the 
executive power has an advantage, restrained mainly by the right to challenge 
its decisions in courts. Ukraine seems to be evolving towards a mixed model 
in which the strong position of the executive, in competition with the legisla­
tive organs (central, regional and self­governmental) will remain a permanent 
element (the external threat, which will presumably not disappear in the long 
term, will be conducive to that as well).
However, it should be remembered that Ukrainian democracy is only a quar­
ter of a century old, while the democracies of France or Germany have taken 
over two hundred years to develop their contemporary solutions; nor did their 
developments always proceed peacefully, to put it mildly. Even if one considers 
the acceleration of social transformations in recent decades, this is still a huge 
disproportion.
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III. The economy: away from one sysTem 
and Towards anoTher
The Soviet economy was based on a negation of both the market as a regu­
lating force and of the spontaneous (self­regulating) nature of economic 
phenomena. The economy was supposed to be shaped so as to serve over­
riding social (political) objectives as defined by the sovereign; the main 
ways of achieving this consisted in the planning of economic activity and 
allocating resources needed to implement the plans at all levels. The assump­
tion was that the planner had full knowledge of the available resources and 
economic mechanisms. The second pillar of the Soviet model concerned not 
so much the abolition of private ownership of the means of production (and 
restrictions on the ownership of other goods) as the imposition of the con­
cept of an indivisible state ownership which altogether eliminated the func­
tion of ownership from the economy: conglomerates of property did not have 
owners, but only managers.
The system built on those principles inevitably became bureaucratised, failed 
to encourage innovation, was wasteful, and struggled with impossibility 
to gather full and reliable information about the state of the economy and soci­
ety. It worked best in the armaments sector, which naturally depends not on the 
people’s needs, but rather the political objectives of the state. On the other hand, 
the volume of defence spending decreed by the Soviet leadership over the dec­
ades ruined the other branches of the national economy, contributing to the 
collapse of the Soviet system.
Like the other Soviet republics (apart from Russia), Ukraine was addition­
ally burdened by the fact that its economy was not independent. The plan­
ning of investments took place at the Union level without any consideration 
for the interests of the individual republics. Most Ukrainian manufacturers 
were dependent on supplies of raw materials and components from outside the 
Ukrainian SSR, and their products were also sent to other republics. The tank 
factory in Kharkiv, one of the largest in the USSR, did not manufacture its own 
tank guns; Ukraine’s many automotive plants were dependent on external 
supplies of clutches; and although it was the leading producer of sugar beets, 
Ukraine did not manufacture complete sets of sugar refining equipment, etc. 
The production of iron and steel, based on the local resources of iron ore and coal, 
was the only industrial complex which was almost entirely located in Ukraine. 
This constituted the foundation for the future role of the Donetsk Basin’s elites 
in the economy and politics of Ukraine.
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Ukraine did not have sufficient energy resources, and in particular it did not 
have any which were globally sought after and could be exported on a massive 
scale. Most of the products of its industry were attractive mainly to the post­
Soviet markets and other countries at medium or low levels of development, 
and much of its defence sector’s production ceased to be useful at all after the 
collapse of the Soviet Army with its global strategic objectives. The situation 
of agricultural production was similar; nobody wanted new competitors in the 
stable global market of that time, and Ukraine was left with the post­Soviet 
markets.
Like most of the public, around the year 1990 the Ukrainian nomenklatura 
believed that its country was rich, and that the problems it was experienc­
ing were the result of inadequate redistribution of national income within the 
Soviet Union. That view was reinforced during the campaign ahead of the inde­
pendence referendum when one argument was commonly used concerning the 
alleged exploitation of Ukraine by Russia and the other republics.32 Few had 
a realistic picture of the real condition of the Soviet economy, and especially 
the gap separating it from the world leaders, and virtually nobody (whether 
in Ukraine or elsewhere) was aware of the risks involved in an uncontrolled 
dismantling of the command­and­control system. The Ukrainian political and 
economic elites knew very little about the world outside the Soviet Union, and 
what they knew concerned the standards of living and lifestyles, rather than 
post­War doctrines, values and transformations. Therefore, they did not realise 
what kind of challenge was ahead of them and to what kind of economic system 
they would have to adjust.
It is a frequently voiced opinion that immediately after regaining independence, 
Ukraine could and should have undergone a programme of ‘shock therapy’ like 
Poland’s Balcerowicz Plan (this view has supporters in Ukraine as well). How­
ever, that would not have been possible: in order to undertake such a deep and 
radical reform, a country needs to possess an organisationally and intellectually 
strong economic decision­making centre capable of preparing such a project 
and then responding to the problems that arise as it is implemented. No ‘shock 
therapy’ could have worked in a country that had no central bank and no mon­
etary system of its own, no efficient legislature and no professional statistical 
service. When the Ukrainian state finally built the institutions and developed 
32 Similar views and propaganda messages, attributing poverty in one’s own country to exploi­
tation by the other republics or the Soviet Union, were common in all the Communist coun­
tries in Europe.
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the procedures enabling it to undertake radical reforms (i.e. around 1996), the 
situation had changed to such an extent, that the old solutions were no longer 
valid. Ukraine no longer had a command­and­control economy, but a spontane­
ously developed post­Communist economy whose nature nobody understood.
1. spontaneous transformation
It is questionable whether there was any chance of stopping the degradation 
of the Soviet economy, overburdened by its armaments effort and overregulated 
to the point of absurdity (for example, within the first eight months of 1986, the 
government structures of the Ukrainian SSR issued more than 500,000 writ­
ten regulations and directives addressed to state institutions;, while in all like­
lihood, at least as many arrived from Moscow33), especially in the conditions 
of a permanent military and political confrontation with the United States. Gen­
uine economic revival could only be achieved by radically restraining the arma­
ments effort and re­allocating the freed resources to the production of consumer 
goods for both the internal market and for export. However, this is precisely 
what the USSR leadership wanted to avoid: after all, the perestroika programme 
was undertaken to strengthen the state also in the military dimension.
The Soviet leadership therefore decided to tap its ‘hidden reserves’, i.e. 
to allow the people to legally undertake manufacturing and commercial activ­
ity.34 The response was massive (in the late 1980s in Ukraine alone around 
700,000 people worked in so­called co­operatives in Ukraine alone35); the retail 
and semi­wholesale trade in goods, the manufacturing of consumer goods and 
small services developed rapidly, and so did speculation (which was inevitable 
with commerce developing in the conditions of drastic shortages and in the 
absence of adequate regulations) as well as the practice of private sellers ‘cap­
turing’ the produce of state­owned manufacturing plants.
33 Ю. Алексєєв, C. Кульчицький, A. Слюсаренко, Україна на зламі історичних епох. Де ржа-
вотворчий процес 1985–1999 р. Kyiv 2000, p. 17.
34 In 1986, people in the Soviet Union were allowed to undertake economic activity in their 
‘spare time’; in 1987 the formation of ‘co­operatives’ (i.e. joint economic activity without 
hiring workers) was permitted, and in 1988 – nearly all sorts of economic activity (includ­
ing banking services) and hiring workers were allowed. For more information, see: Åslund, 
How Ukraine..., op. cit., p. 24–25.
35 ‘So­called co­operatives’ because these were not genuine co­operatives but rather pri­
vately­owned businesses (run by the owner alone, or companies, usually with an unclear 
legal form status).
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This spontaneous development occurred without access to credit, in the 
absence of a banking system adequate to the new situation, and in the con­
ditions of a widespread lack of confidence in the durability of Gorbachev’s 
new policy (which was not conducive to stimulating investment), and as well 
as in utter regulatory chaos. Most of the new businesses could only operate 
thanks to bribing the state functionaries at various levels and in different 
sections of the administration, while a considerable number were able to do 
business thanks to their corrupt links to state­owned enterprises. The fledg­
ling small and medium bourgeoisie (soon joined by the big bourgeoisie) was 
therefore trained from the start to operate according to the principles of a cor­
ruption­led market economy, and not a ‘classic’ market economy. Meanwhile, 
the lack of access to credit attracted one of the few groups possessing funds 
at their disposal, i.e. organised crime.
A little­known element of the Soviet transformations in the late 1980s concerns 
the de facto legalisation of the practice of the illicit manufacturing of consumer 
goods, which seems to have dated back to the period immediately after World 
War II. The persons involved seldom organised illegal manufacturing plants, 
(although that happened, too) more often, they conducted illegal manufactur­
ing activities at state­owned plants, for which purpose they forged documents 
on a massive scale and took advantage of the corrupt links between the criminal 
world, the plant managers, and the bureaucracy and the police. In the period 
preceding the perestroika, millions of people were involved in the system, and 
those who organised the illicit manufacturing business were among the few 
who people familiar with the principles of market economy on a micro­scale. 
However, legalising the practice also involved legalising its mechanisms.
When in 1986 the managements of companies were tasked with taking import 
and export decisions, this was followed by a wave of speculations that took 
advantage of the price differences between domestic and foreign prices. Two 
years later, the reform of those enterprises resulted in chaos: the old system 
was abolished, but no new system was introduced. Management boards were 
put in control of enterprises, while the state continued to own them (as a result 
of which the individual components of the ‘indivisible socialist property’ 
effectively belonged to nobody), while the existing links to the illicit manufac­
turing sector made it easier for the enterprises to become colonised by private 
companies selling their products (in this way, profits were privatised, while 
the costs remained state­owned). The original orientation towards output (the 
accomplishment of the plan) gradually gave way not to profit­seeking, but 
to rent­seeking.
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rent-seeking and profit-seeking
Profit-seeking means activities aimed at extracting gains from the produc-
tion of goods or provision of services in competitive markets, whereas rent-
seeking stands for activities aimed at extracting gains from the ownership 
or control of property and from various non-market mechanisms, espe-
cially links to the political world (i.e. the ability to influence the state as 
the regulator of the economy). The post-Communist model of rent-seeking 
was closely connected with the oligarchisation of the economy. Åslund has 
listed the following main rent-generating mechanisms in the Ukrainian 
economy: purchasing products of the steel and chemical industries at do-
mestic prices and reselling them at global prices; selling the imported natu-
ral gas on the internal market at higher prices (in this case the rent comes 
from the state-subsidised exchange rates), constant interest rates of bank-
ing loans in the conditions of high inflation, and direct public subsidies to 
the agriculture and energy sectors.36 The former three are already history,37 
but the fourth model is still partly in place (subsidies for the energy sector 
were abolished in 2016). Meanwhile, new models have emerged, including 
in particular the theft of budget funding allocated to various purposes.
The Soviet authorities no longer controlled anything, and new mechanisms 
had not yet been developed. Even though production of consumer goods was 
growing, market shortages were widening, accompanied by growing inflation: 
while in 1990 the USSR had an inflation of 10% year on year, in the first half 
of 1991 inflation growth was 25% week on week.38 In the autumn of 1990 the 
Ukrainian SSR introduced rationing coupons for a large number of foods and 
industrial goods (which was later transformed into the karbovanets coupon, the 
first Ukrainian currency). Nobody knew how to solve the problem on the macro­
scale, but many knew very well how to take advantage of it to their own benefit. 
Most Ukrainian businesses have their roots in those processes and that period.
This was the economy which independent Ukraine inherited. The sudden disin­
tegration of economic links between the republics and the withdrawal of most 
defence orders (while the arms manufacturers, least affected by the chaos of the 
late 1980s, probably constituted the healthiest part of the Ukrainian economy 
36 Åslund, How Ukraine..., op. cit., p. 55–56.
37 In 2016, a new kind of schemes for extracting rent from the trade in natural gas was revealed. 
See: www.epravda.com.ua/news/2016/12/14/614390, accessed on 15 December 2016.
38 Ю. Алексєєв, C. Кульчицький, A. Слюсаренко, op. cit., p.27.
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at that time) made matters even worse as the Ukrainian economy was massively 
dependent on imports and exports of goods and services.39 To some extent, the 
quick emergence of financial­industrial groups improved the situation because 
those structures enabled the co­ordination of economic processes in at least 
some parts of the economy.
The Soviet Union ceased to exist as a ‘subject of international law and a geopo­
litical reality’,40 but it still existed as an economic and social organism, and its 
dismantling required reflection and effort. First of all, there existed a single 
monetary system (the rouble zone) in which one bank of issue was replaced over­
night by fifteen such banks as all the republic­level banks, now in the capacity 
of central banks, started issuing the rouble41 without any co­ordination – it seems 
that their management boards for a long time had no understanding of the role 
of money in a market economy. Kyiv tried to speculate on its partial participa­
tion in the rouble zone by eliminating the rouble from its cash market and keep­
ing it for non­cash circulation and the issuance of credit, subsidised to a large 
degree by the budget. This created chaos and led to hyperinflation (2730% year 
on year in 1992 and a staggering 10,255% in 1993).42 That situation continued till 
September 1993 when the central bank of Russia terminated the functioning 
of the rouble zone, realizing that it was doing more harm than good to Russia.
In the initial period of independence, Ukraine was focused on building the 
structures of the state, the armed forces, diplomacy, etc., and neglected the 
development of an independent economic system. This can be interpreted 
as helplessness in the face of economic challenges (Kravchuk had no knowledge 
of the economy, while Prime Minister Masol only understood how the Com­
munist economy worked). The 1992 budget was adopted in June that year, and 
there was nobody to formulate a programme of reforms. Meanwhile, Ukraine’s 
debt to Russia was mounting as the country continued to receive raw materi­
als and components, now no longer needed, under co­operative arrangements 
39 In 1988 Ukraine accounted for 46% of the Soviet Union's iron ore production, 41% of cast iron, 
35% of steel goods, more than half its sugar production, one third of vegetable oil produc­
tion, 35% of television set production, etc. (Ю. Алексєєв, C. Кульчицький, A. Слюсаренко, 
op. cit., p. 23). Ukraine was also an educational hub; its civilian and military universities 
were oriented towards educating cadres for the entire Union.
40 The wording of the agreement on the formation of the CIS.
41 Åslund, How Ukraine..., op. cit., p. 37.
42 Unless indicated otherwise, the statistics come from the website of the State Statistical 
Service of Ukraine (Derzhstat, www.ukrstat.gov.ua) and the printed statistical yearbooks 
of Ukraine.
36
O
SW
 S
TU
D
IE
S 
 1
1/
20
17
that were still in force,43 while the inflationary depreciation of loans created 
speculative fortunes (the dual­currency trade with Russia also generated huge 
profits). The transformation (and partial privatisation) of the large industrial 
enterprises was conducted in the interest of their management boards, who 
sought rents and not modernisation or restructuring; this situation was the 
at its worst in those sectors which manufactured easily sold products, i.e. in the 
extractive, chemical and steelmaking industries.
The scale of economic decline was catastrophic: official GDP decreased by 48% 
in the years 1990–1994, although according to Åslund, the share of the grey econ­
omy in real GDP increased by 48% by 1995, and hence, the real decline was much 
smaller.44 According to estimates by Oleksandr Paskhaver, in 1991–1995 the grey 
economy accounted for 5–10% of the machine­building industry, 10% in the pet­
rochemical industry, 15–20% of cargo transports, 30–40% in healthcare ser­
vices, between 50% and 70% in commerce and service, and around 40% of the 
money circulation, and in 1994 the grey economy may have accounted for 30% 
of real GDP.45 According to that author, the illicit economy saved Ukraine from 
complete economic collapse in the first years of independence. In the years 
that followed, the share of the grey economy continued to grow (around the 
year 1998 it was even estimated at 60% of real GDP), then started to decline 
(to 30% around the year 2006) and then increased again (to around 35% in the 
years 2011–2013 and 40% in 201546). The share of the grey economy thus remains 
very high, mainly due to an unreasonable tax system and the people’s deep and 
ingrained distrust for the state.
The grey economy supplied many goods and services that were in real demand 
(while the ‘official’ economy in many cases continued to manufacture useless 
goods) and provided jobs and incomes. This kind of economic activity, which 
largely originated straight from Soviet illicit production (seee above), was para­
sitical in nature and the revenues it generated were not invested, but often ille­
gally transferred abroad (according to Paskhaver, the volume of capital illegally 
43 Åslund, loco citato.
44 Åslund, How Ukraine..., op. cit., p. 48–49. Åslund also points to the disastrous quality 
of Ukrainian statistics. Cf. the same author’s interesting reflection about the nature of GDP 
in Communist countries and in the early post­Communist period in: Building Capitalism. 
The Transformation of the Former Soviet Bloc, Cambridge 2002, p. 123 and following.
45 A.Пасхавер, Теневая экономика спасла Украину от голода, [in:] Галицкие контракты, 
1996, Issue 3. Other interesting statistics available there.
46 Г. Кукуруза, Почему растет теневая экономика, http://forbes.net.ua/opinions/ 1400265­
pochemu­rastet­tenevaya­ekonomika, accessed on 29 November 2016.
37
O
SW
 S
TU
D
IE
S 
 1
1/
20
17
taken out of Ukraine reached US$ 15 billion in the years 1991–1995 alone47). It also 
stimulated corruption and was conducive to making entrepreneurs dependent 
on the criminal world, while also encouraging members of the criminal world 
to enter the ‘normal’ economy (both public and grey).48
Those phenomena in the first phase of transformation had disastrous conse­
quences, and could not be reversed. The economy, which still in 1990 still had 
a potential to modernise and develop, was degraded, and a relatively trans­
parent set of rules was replaced by an extreme version of laissez­faire which 
permitted everything (albeit not to everyone) and allowed rampant corruption, 
which soon became the only efficiently functioning mechanism. At the same 
time, the obsolete but still functional systems of healthcare, welfare and educa­
tion were destroyed, depriving large swathes of society of access to those ser­
vices. Previously unknown, open unemployment developed, the middle­income 
strata of society became impoverished, while a new class of very rich people 
emerged. Those negative consequences have still not been reversed until the 
present day.
2. Kuchma and the oligarchs
The situation began to change after Leonid Kuchma took office as president 
in 1994. Unlike Kravchuk, he did have some idea about the economy, while 
the Dnipropetrovsk machine­building industry circles from which he hailed 
were much more progressive and open to market­economy solutions than the 
Donetsk industrialists, who played a dominant role in the final period of Krav­
chuk’s presidency. Kuchma understood the need to restore balance in Ukraine’s 
national economy and gradually adjust it to the global market economy models. 
As early as in his first adress, he presented a plan for relatively radical reforms 
based on the Russian and Polish experiences.
Unfortunately, the attempt at stabilising the monetary system (still without 
introducing a full­fledged currency), which was a prerequisite for the other 
reforms’ success, had failed already by May 1995, one of the reasons being 
47 Пасхавер, op. cit.
48 The question of the GDP share of strictly criminal activities such as drug trafficking, the 
importation of stolen cars, control of prostitution and gambling is not addressed here. With 
all the legal and ethical reservations, those activities responded to the public’s demand and 
created large numbers of jobs (in the case of drugs and gambling, however, the criminal 
world actively stimulated the growth in demand).
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a monetarist orientation which destabilised the market.49 Political reasons 
were equally important: Kuchma did not have a majority in the Verkhovna Rada, 
which was dominated by parties with a Communist orientation and strongly 
influenced by the fledgling oligarchy. The reforms had to be implemented 
by presidential decrees, and not parliamentary bills.
Kuchma was a pragmatic, experienced manager and was not attached to any 
particular ideology or concept. He decided to postpone the reforms pending 
the adoption of the new constitution (in a move which helped him reach a com­
promise with the Verkhovna Rada), and first focused instead on tackling infla­
tion, which was still very high. Shortly after the constitution was adopted, 
the situation was mature enough by the autumn of 1996 for the introduction 
of the hryvnia, which finally put one of the most important elements of eco­
nomic life in order. Further reforms had to wait until Kuchma’s re­election 
in November 1999.
Meanwhile, the chaotic rent­seeking system matured and became more orderly. 
A growing number of economic actors no longer felt comfortable in the chaos, 
especially since the rivalry over shares in the market for Russian natural gas (the 
revenues from which nurtured the second ‘generation’ of Ukrainian oligarchs) 
frequently involved assassinations of important businesspeople. After the kill­
ing, in November 1996, of the Donetsk entrepreneur and politician Yevhen 
Shcherban, Kuchma decided to impose a modus vivendi on the emerging Dnipro­
petrovsk and Donetsk ‘clans’ (here meaning oligarchic­bureaucratic struc­
tures), under which the elites of the Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts were granted 
informal autonomy. In this way, the president of Ukraine became the architect 
of Ukraine’s informal system of government frequently referred to as the ‘oligar­
chic consensus’, which has proved durable and effective. The experience of the 
two attempts at undermining that system (in 2005 and 2014) has led to the con­
clusion that in the medium term, internal transformations in Ukraine will only 
be possible within the framework of the oligarchic­bureaucratic system.50
49 In that period it became common to ‘pay’ wages in kind (sugar, pure alcohol, or whatever the 
given plant produced), and for the large and medium­sized enterprises to issue their own 
quasi­currencies.
50 For more information about the Ukrainian oligarchy and its role, see S. Matuszak, The oli­
garchic democracy. The influence of business groups on Ukrainian politics, OSW Studies, 
Issue 42, Warsaw 2012, https://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/osw­studies/2012­10­16/
oligarchic­democracy­influence­business­groups­ukrainian­politics; and W. Konończuk, 
Keystone of the system. Old and new oligarchs in Ukraine, OSW Point of View, Issue 59, 
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The problem of the oligarchs
The post-Soviet systems are usually referred to as oligarchic, and the 
members of their dominant groups as oligarchs, without asking for a close 
definition the meaning ot this term, which has been borrowed from Rus-
sian political rhetoric51. Without getting into detailed analysis, the follow-
ing definition of post-Soviet oligarchs (but not oligarchs in general) has 
been adopted for the purposes of this paper: oligarchs are big business 
owners who (a) acquired their assets thanks to the disintegration of the 
Soviet economic governance system (by appropriating state-owned as-
sets or otherwise), often in ways that were barely legal, or indeed illegal; 
(b) are sufficiently powerful to objectively influence the political situation 
at the national or regional level, (c) seek to maintain or strengthen their 
position vis-à-vis the state and other oligarchs by informally influencing 
the activities of public authorities and the bureaucratic apparatus using 
methods which are questionable from the legal point of view or evidently 
illegal; (d) tend to create monopolistic and oligopolistic structures that sup-
press competition in the economy and the process of the economy opening 
to global markets, as well as political and media pluralism. Oligarchs and 
their clans operate on a national scale, but there are also regional or city-
level oligarchs, whose economic basis tends to consist in commerce and 
services rather than manufacturing, who are more dependent on links to 
the apparatus of power, and who are more likely to have links to the crimi-
nal world.
Around that time, Ukrainian entrepreneurs gained access to a new tool: the 
ability to register companies abroad, especially in tax havens, and to siphon off 
massive funds to be invested back in the country on preferential terms as foreign 
investments. This gigantic machinery of tax evasion and money laundering, 
which had existed even before, was one of globalisation’s first ‘gifts’ to Ukraine. 
In addition to the tax evasion which significantly impoverished the country, 
with the equivalent of several annual national budgets of Ukraine likely stashed 
away in banking accounts in tax havens, the new rules had one more nega­
tive consequence: it became impossible to determine without an international 
Warsaw 2016, https://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/point­view/2016­08­18/keystone­
system­old­and­new­oligarchs­ukraine
51 Cf. the definitions proposed by Konończuk (op. cit., p. 5) or Åslund (How Ukraine..., op. cit., 
p. 107).
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enquiry which investment coming from, say, Cyprus52 was a cover for Ukrainian 
investors, and which for Russian businesses.
The emergence of post­Communist oligarchies is usually seen as a negative phe­
nomenon and an obstacle to the development of ‘normal’ market relations, i.e. 
of the type that would meet the standards adopted in leading EU states. How­
ever, it should be noted that one of Ukraine’s first tasks was to create property 
relations – not simply ‘normal’ or ‘free­market’ relations, but of any kind at all, 
as property did not exist as an economic notion under Communism, and the 
country did not have capital assets of an adequate scale. Meanwhile, opening 
up to an inflow of foreign capital in the first half of the 1990s would have posed 
a direct threat to the survival of the Ukrainian state because most of that capital 
would have come from Russia.
The Ukrainian economy was dominated by large industry and large­scale farm­
ing; small retail and industry were just starting to develop, and could not then 
have replaced the old sector as a source of tax revenue or jobs, and certainly 
not as investors. Potential Western investors at that time were not interested 
in the opportunities offered by Ukraine53 and China had yet to become a global 
investor. On the other hand Russian actors, who were interested in recreat­
ing the old co­operative links, did show interest in Ukraine, and the rapid eco­
nomic transformation in Russia and Moscow’s quiet approval of involvement 
in Ukraine created big opportunities for them. That, however, posed risks for 
Kyiv, especially as relations with Russia remained difficult (the two states’ fun­
damental treaty on mutual relations was signed as late as 1997). Moscow stead­
fastly sought to take over numerous strategically important assets in Ukraine, 
especially the transit gas pipelines running through Ukraine, or at least take 
control of them. Speaking of gas pipelines, Kyiv rightly perceived the ownership 
of them as an important guarantee of sovereignty, and successfully thwarted 
Gazprom’s repeated attempts at takeovers, in some of which the Russian monop­
oly was backed by Western companies.
In that situation, maintaining a high share of state ownership of assets and 
allowing the opaque, corrupt privatisation schemes to operate was a lesser 
evil, especially since spontaneous, illegal privatisation processes were already 
52 While being an EU member state, Cyprus is a major tax haven.
53 It seems that before 2000, the interest would have been no higher even if the Ukrainian 
market had been quickly and fully opened to foreign investment, because the possibilities 
of expansion in Central­European post­Communist states were far from being exhausted.
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underway; the state could put these in order, but could not reverse them. 
The emergence of the Ukrainian oligarchy and its successful takeover of some 
of the largest enterprises paradoxically prevented Russian oligarchs from estab­
lishing themselves in Ukraine, and thereby stopped Moscow from expanding its 
influence in Ukraine (which was particularly important after Putin later subor­
dinated the Russian oligarchs to state policy)54. It probably also prevented large­
scale deindustrialisation in Ukraine, as many Russian investors were interested 
not in developing the businesses they were taking over, but in winding them 
down as unnecessary competitors (it seems to have been no accident that the 
Donbas elites were the most determined to block Russian investments; for them, 
the Russian mining and steelmaking sectors constituted an existential threat).55
In later periods, the oligarchs (as a class, a great bourgeoisie or a plutocracy, 
often referred to as the ‘oligarkhat’) became a stabilising factor for the Ukrainian 
democracy. They competed against one another, also through their respective 
representatives within the public authorities, and were therefore interested 
in the preservation of functioning democratic mechanisms, which prevented 
the formation of a single monopolistic political bloc in Ukraine. When Yanuko­
vych and his circle attempted to take control of the entire national economy after 
2010 and to eradicate the oligarchs (the Yanukovych ‘family’ was not another 
clan, but something new and different56), some of them felt so threatened that 
they decided to back the revolutionary movement in January 2014 from behind 
the scenes, despite its anti­oligarchy slogans. Later, support of these figures 
(especially from Dmytro Firtash and, in a different way, Ihor Kolomoyskyi) con­
tributed to stabilising the new government.57
As already mentioned, after his re­election, Leonid Kuchma resumed the 
reforms that had been on hold since 1995. He fairly quickly managed to build 
a majority in the Verkhovna Rada in support of the reform programme, which 
led to the formation of a new government under Viktor Yushchenko’s leadership 
54 Cf. the in­depth analysis by the Korrespondent weekly: „Чужих не нужно. Как олигархи 
сформировали Украину”, http://korrespondent.net/ukraine/politics/3720239­chuzhykh 
­ne­nu..., accessed on 25 July 2016.
55 In later periods some Russian oligarchs did take over Ukrainian companies. However, the 
situation was different: the dominance of the local oligarchic capital was firmly estab­
lished, and the 1990s threat of ‘creeping re­integration’ was gone.
56 The system created around Yanukovych by his son and aides lasted too short a time to lend 
itself to detailed description.
57 For more information on the transformations within the oligarchy and its role in post­rev­
olution Ukraine, see: Konończuk, op. cit.
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to deal with its implementation. This time, the reforms were carried out deter­
minedly and effectively: rent­seeking was curbed dramatically (even though 
it was not fully eradicated in the two key sectors: the gas trade and coal mining), 
barter exchange was eliminated almost completely, and some of the ‘first gener­
ation’ oligarchs were pushed out of the game58 (including Viktor Medvedchuk,59 
who lost his business position even though he remained a leading politician). 
Payment backlogs of many months (or years in some cases years) were elimi­
nated (salaries had become properly monetarised some time sooner). The manu­
facturing oligarchs gained as a result of the changes, especially those from the 
metallurgy sector.
According to Anders Åslund, Ukraine transformed into a market economy 
within the first four months of 2000.60 The reforms could not change the already 
established character of the system, which was oligarchic, bureaucratic and cor­
rupt, but now all of its elements started to function under new, more progressive 
and efficient rules. After the Yushchenko government collapsed in the spring 
of 2001, the speed of reforms subsided, but none of the changes already imple­
mented were reversed. Statistics show that whereas the 1990s saw a decline 
of nearly all Ukraine’s economic and social indicators, after the year 2000 the 
country slowly started to make up for the its losses.
That decisive breakthrough was the work of President Kuchma. Under the con­
stitution of the day, Yushchenko was merely the president’s first minister. It 
was the determination and perseverance of the head of state, his pragmatism 
and ability to choose the right people to collaborate with, that were decisive for 
the reforms’ success, even if Yushchenko, who knew how to take care of his 
PR, reaped the benefits and became the symbol of the Ukrainian reforms and 
democracy (a capital he utterly wasted when he later served as president).
Many serious charges have been levelled at President Kuchma. The most impor­
tant ones from the political point of view concerned the incitement of the assas­
sination of the well­known journalist Georgiy Gongadze and authorising the 
sale of the Kolchuga radars equipment to Iraq. However, the credibility of the 
58 For information on the first oligarchs, see Åslund, How Ukraine..., op. cit., p. 107–109. 
The following pages contain interesting reflections about the phenomenon of industrial oli­
garchies in general.
59 Interestingly it was Medvedchuk who build up the pro­reform parliamentary majority 
as the Verkhovna Rada speaker in 2000, balancing on the edge of legality.
60 Åslund, How Ukraine..., op. cit., p. 128.
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former allegation is highly questionable, whereas the sale of the Kolchugas has 
never been confirmed (not even by the United States after the toppling of the 
Saddam Hussein regime; the case was likely a Moscow­inspired provocation 
intended to discredit the Ukrainian president in the eyes of the West). Another 
allegation, this time not unfounded, concerned Kuchma’s consent for the head 
of the Presidential Administration to issue the so­called temniki, i.e. instructions 
for the media. Interestingly the most serious charge against Kuchma is very 
rarely mentioned: it concerns the evident rigging of the referendum on 16 April 
2000 on constitutional amendments which strengthened the president’s posi­
tion vis-à-vis the parliament (although it should be recalled that Kuchma did not 
opt to implement those changes on the basis of the referendum result alone, nor 
did he try to push them through the Verkhovna Rada).
These allegations concern the strictly political aspect of Kuchma’s presidency 
and do not affect the assessment of his role in the economic transformation. 
The decade of his rule, which he exercised with caution, pragmatism and an 
understanding of the functioning of large systems (which both Kravchuk and 
Yushchenko lacked) allowed Ukraine to exit the post­Soviet chaos and enter 
a long period of internal stability. Kuchma’s second term, despite the mounting 
political tensions, can be regarded as the best time in the history of independ­
ent Ukraine to date.
3. The stabilisation of the oligarchic-bureaucratic system
Kuchma’s reform programme nonetheless failed to deal with many important 
spheres of economic and social life. In the case of some measures, there was not 
enough time to implement them as the new presidential elections were approach­
ing, while others faced too strong opposition from the oligarchic circles,61 and 
from especially the consolidating bureaucracy (the role of the oversized State 
Tax Inspectorate, which was rife with corruption almost from the beginning, 
was particularly destructive in this respect). The absurdly stringent sanitary 
and environmental standards were not reviewed62; the tax system, which was 
unfit for the purposes of the market economy, was not reformed, even though 
61 Yulia Tymoshenko managed to put the natural gas market in order as deputy prime min­
ister for energy; her attempts at implementing similar measures in the coal and electricity 
markets were met with resistance, which ultimately led to her resignation and (some time 
later) to the collapse of the Yushchenko government.
62 The Soviet environmental standards served a propaganda purpose; they were impossible 
to meet, and in the new conditions became a source of massive corruption rents.
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around the year 2001 a political consensus could have been reached in this 
regard which would have allowed changes to be implemented (a new tax code, 
which was decidedly unfavourable to small and medium­sized enterprise, was 
adopted only in 2011); market prices for municipal services and utilities were 
not introduced (that was done only after the Revolution of Dignity); the system 
of overly elaborate but very low social benefits was left unreformed, as was the 
pensions system; and no changes were made to the archaic and increasingly 
corrupt administration of justice and law enforcement.
The necessary deregulation (meaning a reduction of the number of rules appli­
cable to various spheres of social life, combined with an improvement in their 
coherence and quality) was actively opposed by the bureaucracy of all sectors 
and levels, for which overregulation and the low quality of regulations allowed 
– and continues to allow – them to profit from corruption. What is worse, the 
few measures that were implemented were beneficial mainly to large enter­
prises and public offices, and hardly ever to small and medium­sized businesses 
or citizens. That tendency has proven long­lasting: a major deregulation effort 
was undertaken only after the Revolution of Dignity.
The 2000 reforms opened a period of economic growth which has since proved 
to be sustainable (despite the major slump in 2009, related to the global crisis 
in the financial markets and especially in the steel market).63 Massive remittances 
from Ukrainians working abroad have been a constant factor in the economic 
growth (since as early as the 1990s),64 as it stimulated demand for individual 
homes and the construction services related to this. Nevertheless, big industry 
is still dominant and there is no indication that this will change: the middle class 
has been developing slowly, while stumbling on various obstacles, among which 
the expanding possibilities for young and dynamic people to emigrate are not 
the least significant. Still, according to some estimates, small and medium enter­
prises today account fot 5–15% of real GDP, and the share of the middle class in the 
economy of Western oblasts and Kyiv is growing (the effects of which were visible 
during the Revolution of Dignity and the first phase of the war).
63 In 2007, steel products accounted for more than half of Ukraine’s exports.
64 According to the National Bank of Ukraine, official remittances amounted to around US$ 
30 billion in the years 2010–2015 alone, while unofficial remittances (i.e. mainly cash) 
brought in at least another US$5 billion (А. Карпец, Знакомьтесь, главный инвестор 
Украины! И это не Ахметов, http://glavcom.ua/publications/334323­znakomtes­glavnyj­
investor­ukrainy­i­eto­ne­ahmetov.html, accessed on 12 April 2016). According to other 
sources, in 2006 alone Ukraine received US$ 8.4 billion in official remittances.
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Chart 1. Dynamics of the officially reported total GDP and GDP per capita 
in the years 1990–2015
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The vertical dotted lines point to where the methodology od GDP calculations was changed, as a result 
of which the figures are not fully comparable. Figures for the years 2015­2017 exclude Crimea and the 
occupied part of the Donbas.
Because of the huge expansion of the grey economy, Ukraine's real GDP was larger than the official 
figures, even by several tens of percent, especially in the 1990's, and the dynamics of that part od the 
national income have not yet been studied in detail.
Around the year 2001, Ukraine’s economy became a system again, that is, 
it started to be governed by a clear set of formal (economic and legal) and infor­
mal rules. The system is oligarchic and bureaucratic in nature, and sanctions 
corruption (while regulating and organising it), and is still far from the set 
of governing Western Europe’s economic system. Attempts at changing it65 have 
been met with strong resistance – not so much on the part of the oligarchs (other 
than the local ones controlling bazaar trade and associated with the criminal 
world66), as bureaucracy more generally understood (including the politi­
cal class, judges, police officers, etc.), i.e. the oversized state apparatus which 
is ridden with corruption. On the other hand, small enterprise has continued 
65 Two such attempts have been made so far: the efforts of Yanukovych’s so­called ‘family’ 
to capture the state and the economy, and the inconsistent attempt to implement Western 
standards undertaken after the Revolution of Dignity, which is still underway.
66 The ‘7th kilometre’ near Odessa is one of the biggest bazaars. In 2012 it occupied an area 
of 170 ha, employed 60,000 people and generated profits of more than UAH 0.5 million a day 
(T. Kuzio, Ukraine. Democratisation, Corruption, and the New Russian Imperialism, Santa 
Barbara /Denver 2015, p. 369). Similar bazaars, albeit usually smaller, exist in all the major 
cities of Ukraine.
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to develop, despite the disastrous tax system and the lawlessness of the bureau­
cracy, including IT companies typically dealing with outsourced services, which 
in late 2015 employed a total of around 100,000 people and accounted for 4–5% 
of GDP (admittedly, in a situation where the output of the heavy industry had 
declined considerably because of the war).67
Despite having a disastrously bad government in the years 2005–2009, and one 
that was hardly better in the years 2010–2013 (‘better’ only because it was more 
consistent and professional, and worse, because it encouraged corruption on an 
unprecedented scale and tried to replace the oligarchic­bureaucratic order with 
the rules of mafia activities), the Ukrainian economy, which is still dysfunc­
tional in many respects, was stable enough to face the new challenge of a war 
and the loss of part of the country’s territory, along with the production capacity 
located in the lost areas.
4. europe’s granary?
Central and eastern Ukraine was one of the most important agricultural regions 
of the Russian Empire and later the Soviet Union.68 Thanks to excellent soil 
conditions (‘black earth’ [chernozem] of the steppe, one of the best kinds of soil 
that exist) and its favourable climate, its large agricultural holdings and, since 
the late 19th century, also the intensive smallholder farms which generated large 
surpluses of cereals, sugar beetroot, as well as cattle and pigs. Ukraine in that 
period was indeed a ‘granary’ of not only the Empire, but also Europe.
The Soviet system destroyed both the large holdings and the smallholder farms. 
The system of kolkhozes (collective farms subjected to the central planning 
regime but formally non­state­owned) and sovkhozes (state­owned agricultural 
holdings) restored the large agricultural holdings, but could not make them 
as efficient as before. The uneconomical, extensive land management and the 
mass cultivation of oil crops (mostly sunflower) and maize degraded the pro­
ductivity of soils, especially in the southern oblasts, as a result of badly managed 
irrigation.
67 В. Некрасов, Є. Сисоєв, Масштаб подій в нашій IT­галузі унікальний навіть для 
Європи, www.epravda.com.ua/publications/2016/01/20/577478/view_print, accessed 
on 22 January 2016.
68 Western Ukraine, which is not part of the chernozem cereal basin (apart from the Ternopil 
Oblast), is not discussed in this chapter.
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The most important problem, however, lay elsewhere: the Ukrainian country­
side ceased to exist as a community of farmers and small­ to medium­sized 
agricultural producers. While the small allotment gardens that the kolkhoz 
employees were allowed to use for personal purposes did play an immense role 
in feeding the Ukrainian population,69 those tiny plots (often cultivated using 
semi­horticultural methods) could not prevent the erosion of the skills needed 
to independently run an agricultural farm. The kolkhozniks turned into agricul­
tural workers: tractor operators, herdsmen, milk maids. Where the old village 
buildings had been burnt down during World War II, i.e. in most parts of central 
and eastern Ukraine, they were replaced with workers’ housing estates, with 
small utility shacks, but without barns or other farm buildings. Finally, the 
nearly seven decades of treating the countryside as an unlimited labour reserve, 
without taking heed of the consequences that approach had for the development 
of agriculture, brought it to the brink of demographic collapse. In 1990 there 
were around 8,000 kolkhozes in Ukraine and 3.8 million kolkhoz workers as well 
as 1.2 million sovkhoz workers.70
After Ukraine regained independence it was a common hope that the country 
would once more become Europe’s granary thanks to the return of medium­
sized, private­owned land holdings engaged in intensive farming. However, 
only the kolkhoz managers and agronomy specialists had the skills needed to run 
large farms independently, and they were more interested in keeping control 
of the existing farms than they were in starting their own operations. Also 
important were the technological changes in global agriculture: while shortly 
after World War I an agricultural worker could easily become a farm business 
owner, in the late 20th century it this was practically impossible due to the 
changes that had transformed farming practices. It seems that the Ukrainian 
elites, and especially the intellectual elites, were unaware of this, as they still 
believed in the myth of the affluent steppe village from 100 years back.
On the other hand, the nomenklatura in the agricultural sector was very strong, 
and was keenly aware that it had an interest in preserving the status quo, and 
69 These accounted for 29.6% of total agricultural production of the Ukrainian SSR in 1990, 
including 48.08% of livestock production; after the collapse of the USSR their share 
increased to 46% and 56.5%, respectively, by 2013.
70 Ю. Алексєєв, C. Кульчицький, A. Слюсаренко, op. cit., p. 133. According to the latest 
figures, Ukraine's agricultural sector employs only 500,000 people. М. Заболоцький, 
Законопроект про скасування земельного мораторію зареєстровано у Верховній 
Раді, http://blogs.pravda.com.ua/authors/zablodsky/58514866f15b2/, accessed on 19 Janu­
ary 2017.
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especially the preferential credit provided by the state to the agricultural sector, 
which could not continue in the event of a real privatisation. Under its influence, 
in 1992 the kolkhozes were ‘reformed’: the new bill on collective farms stated that 
every kolkhoznik owned a proportional share of the land of his or her kolkhoz and 
had the right to obtain a plot of land of that size (usually 2–4 hectares) on leaving 
the kolkhoz. In that way, the kolokhozniks were expropriated of shares in most 
of the kolkhoz property, i.e. buildings, machines, livestock, etc. It was only 
in 2001 that property pais, i.e. shares in this kind of assets, were introduced.
The bill led to a chaotic transformation of the kolkhozes into different kinds 
of ‘agro­companies’, some of which improved their quality of management, 
while others experienced catastrophic decline. Much of agricultural produc­
tion was moved to the grey economy. Many such companies started paying 
their workers in agricultural products, practically excluding them from the 
monetary economy. The only reaction from the countryside was to focus more 
on the cultivation of the allotment gardens, now referred to as ‘personal agri­
cultural holdings’.
The process of distributing the pai certificates71 ended around 2002. The docu­
ments were issued to around 6–7 million people.72 Only 6% of those shares were 
handed over in kind and transformed into individual farms, while the remain­
der was leased or brought as contribution in kind to companies. At that time 
Ukraine had 4 million small landholders (with the former allotment gardens 
of up to 2 hectares, referred to as ‘personal farms’, accounting for half of that 
number) and 40,000 farmholdings.73
The kolkhozniks had good reasons to be disinclined to start individual farms 
on 2 to 4 hectares of land. Not only did they not have the necessary means and 
skills, but it in most parts of Ukraine it was impossible to make profit from tiny 
farms that were too small to compete with the large­scale farms producing cere­
als etc., but too large for vegetable gardening (which was the orientation of most 
of the personal farms).
71 Pais (parts, shares) defined a proportion of ownership in the entire property, but did not 
identify specific plots of land. Most of the pai certificates, the massive issuance of which 
started only started after 1999, were deposited with the kolkhoz/agro­company chiefs.
72 Л.Кучма, Сломанное десятилетие, Kyiv 2010, p. 402, 433.
73 Ibidem, p. 407; according to official statistics, in 2014 Ukraine had 39,500 farm holdings 
and 13,100 agricultural companies with various ownership arrangements, including 
700 of which were state­owned; the statistics do not include the number of private small­
holdings, even though their production is included in the general figures.
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Shortly after the pai certificates ceased to be issued, a renewed process of land 
property concentration started: some of the ‘agro­companies’ were transformed 
into agricultural companies which started to grow to colossal dimensions after 
200074; they used state­of­the art technologies and were able to compete in global 
markets. However, they did not own the land they were cultivating, as they could 
not buy it because of the ban on trade in agricultural land; instead they leased 
hundreds of thousands of land and property shares from the former kolkhozniks. 
Some of those companies have foreign partners who provide them with modern 
technologies, but these links are difficult to trace.
The gigantic agricultural holdings, dealing primarily in the production of cere­
als and increasingly in oil crops and livestock farming, have come to dominate 
the market.75 Their orientation towards short­term profit, and the fact that they 
finance their activities not from revenues but from loans, remains their weak­
ness. One of the reasons for this is that the holdings do not own their land but 
rather lease it76; they cannot contract long­term mortgage loans but only ‘cur­
rent’ working capital loans; and they do not benefit from the certainty that 
comes with ownership. On the other hand, they do not seem interested in intro­
ducing full ownership rights to agricultural land (in any case they have been 
lobbying against it), presumably in equal measure because of the risk of con­
frontation with global agricultural giants, and because of the profits they have 
been deriving from the use of pais that have not been inherited, whose number 
is already close to one million,77 and other forms of ‘economically grey­economic’ 
possession of land.
The so­called farm holdings (which have the status of enterprises, unlike the per­
sonal farms) have turned out to be a dead end: in 2014 they accounted for 70% 
of all registered agricultural businesses and a mere 8% of agricultural output, and 
74 According to 2016 figures, 15 such companies operated farms of more than 100,000 hec­
tares, including 4 with farms of more than 300,000 hectares. The largest agro­holding was 
UkrLandFarming, which in w 2016 had 654,000 hectares of land (up from 532,000 hec­
tares in 2012) in 22 different oblasts (http://latifundist.com/rating/top­100­latifundistov­
ukrainy, accessed on 30 November 2016).
75 An impulse for the creation of the agro­holdings, and generally for the revival of Ukraine’s 
agriculture, came from the sudden increase in global prices of agricultural commodities 
in the years 1995–1996 and 2007–2009.
76 Moreover, in most cases these are short term lease agreements; it was only in 2015 that 
a provision was introduced into the land code under which an agricultural land lease agree­
ment may not be concluded for a period shorter than seven years.
77 The pais of people who died and had no heirs or whose heirs were not interested in the inher­
itance; www.epravda.com.ua/publications/2016/07/13/598945/, accessed on 14 July2016.
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much of their land has been leased to agricultural holdings.78 The personal farms 
play a more important role, they still make an important contribution to feeding 
the country. However, their share has been declining and will continue to decline: 
nobody knows how many of those farms are lying fallow or serve as pasture for 
cows or goats because their users are elderly people unable to work; there are 
certainly hundreds of thousands of such cases, and their number will grow.
In 2001, Ukraine adopted a new land code which introduced the principle of the 
ownership of land. It remains merely formal only, though, because the right 
to buy and sell land, i.e. the essence of ownership, has been suspended under 
the transitory provisions.79 The suspension was initially intended to last only 
until the necessary legal tools are created (especially the land cadastre register 
and the mortgage bank), but it has since been repeatedly renewed, most recently 
until the end of 2017. The main reason for that this concerns the fear that land 
could be bought out on a massive scale by foreign companies which have mas­
sive funds at their disposal. These fears are not unfounded, as companies such 
as Cargill are already present in Ukraine, and the IMF, which has been advocat­
ing the liberalisation of land trade, openly admits that it wants foreign opera­
tors to be allowed to buy agricultural land in Ukraine. Another reason is the 
concern that the buying out of the pais could entail the expulsion of the former 
kolkhozniks from their homes, and since these are usually old people unable 
to do work other than vegetable gardening in their tiny plots, the adverse social 
consequences would be difficult to estimate.
Another problem of Ukraine’s agriculture concerns the very bad condition 
of infrastructure in rural areas, which the agricultural holdings owners main­
tain only to the extent they need it for their activities. Moreover, Ukraine is expe­
riencing soil degradation due to the neglect of crop rotation (in 2015, numerous 
obligations of land owners concerning agricultural practices were abolished) and 
the constantly growing proportion of sunflower, soy beans (including, perhaps 
predominantly, GMO soy)80 and rapeseed cultivation, which heavily degrades 
78 Ю. Самаева, Докучная сказка о спасении села, https://zn.ua/macrolevel/dokuchnaya­
skazka­o­spasenii­sela­_.html, accessed on 25 April 2016.
79 Therefore, active property rights are still non­existent in Ukraine’s agriculture; there are 
only inheritable land­use rights.
80 Andriy Vadaturski, the founder and general director of the Nibulon agroholding, said 
in 2015 that “90% of soy produced in Ukraine is GMO. The problem also concerns rapeseed, 
and is beginning to surface in maize, too”. А. Вадатурский: „Давайте поставим крест на 
Донбассе и займемся более важными вещами”, http://lb.ua/news/2015/02/04/294295_
andrey_vadaturskiy_davayte.html, accessed on 4 February 2015.
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the soil. Most of the in­field tree clumps, important for conservation purposes, 
have been cut down. It is quite clear that the agriculture in Ukraine is generally 
oriented towards maximising exports, and not sustainable development.
The position of the Ukrainian agricultural sector in international markets 
has been improving. The market for food products has been booming since 
2005 in connection with the rapid growth in Asian countries and the fact 
that some traditional producers have shifted to oil crops for the production 
of biofuels. In the business year 2014/2015, Ukraine ranked third globally 
(after the United States and the European Union) in terms of cereal exports, 
and first in terms of sunflower oil exports. In 2012, its exports of agricultural 
products exports (excluding cereals) to the EU exceeded exports to the tradi­
tional Middle Eastern markets (especially Egypt and Saudi Arabia) for the first 
time. Agricultural production accounted for around 8% of GDP and more than 
a third of exports in recent years,81 and the potential for further growth seems 
immense. Ukraine may become ‘Europe’s granary’ once again, with agriculture 
offering a great opportunity to Ukraine. The question is whether it will be con­
trolled by domestic or by global players.
81 31% in 2014, 38% in 2015, and 42% in 2016. Пузата Україна. Які регіони годують державу, 
https://www.epravda.com.ua/publications/2017/02/10/620112/, accessed on 11 February 2017.
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Iv. naTIon buIldIng
On 2 December 1991, the Ukrainians saw themselves in a different light. They 
saw their almost absolute unanimity in supporting independence, as well 
as a shared will to build a state of their own and be citizens of Ukraine, and 
not Soviet people. It is immaterial to what extent the referendum result was 
‘enhanced’ (if at all): it was generally accepted as proof of that unanimity and 
will. Crimea was the only place where support for independence was low, at 34% 
of the inhabitants (54% of voters, with a turnout of 66%), which foreshadowed 
future troubles.
Later opinion polls showed a rapid decline in support for independence, with 
many respondents declaring that they would have voted differently now, but the 
percentage of those backing independence has never fallen below the symbolic 
50% threshold.82
Chart 2. Dynamics of support for Ukraine’s independence in the years 1991–2011
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The importance of those figures should not be overestimated, though: express­
ing an opinion to a pollster is not the same as taking part in a ballot – an act 
which actually influences reality. Still, it is significant that in November 2016, 
82.6% of Ukrainians supported independence,83 i.e. only 2% less than in the 
1991 vote.
82 Chart on the basis of research by KMIS in ‘Незалежність України Підтримує 83% Українців 
– Опитування’, http://www.istpravda.com.ua/short/2011/12/1/63567/view_print/, accessed 
on 1 December 2016. It should be noted that polls by the Razumkov Centre showed consider­
ably lower support than the KMIS polls, including showings slightly below 50% in the years 
2002–3 (http://old.razumkov.org.ua/ukr/poll.php?poll_id=320, accessed on 21 September 2017). 
The difference is presumably due to research methodology.
83 ‘Незалежність України…’, op. cit.
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1. a nation à la soviétique
In order to adequately understand the condition of the Ukrainian nation around 
the year 1990, one needs to return to Communist doctrine, the foundation of Soviet 
social practice. According to that doctrine, the abolition of class divisions was 
intended to dilute and eliminate differences between nations, which would unite 
in a common ‘federation of labour’. That process was expected to lead to ethnic and 
linguistic homogenisation (by analogy to the processes which occurred in cen­
tralised European states, especially France, but also in the Russian Empire in the 
late 19th century). The aim of the Bolshevik party was to build a global state/Com­
munist society and create a ‘new man’, i.e. the Communist person.
The fact that the Bolshevik revolution had to be limited to a truncated Russian 
Empire, deprived of its most economically and socially developed parts, was 
unexpected for the Bolsheviks, and so was the independence revealed in the 
course of the civil war of the non­Russian socialist and Communist move­
ments. Their potential in Ukraine could not be taken lightly: around the year 
1920 the future of the Soviet state hinged on control of Ukraine, the main pro­
ducer of food, the coal mining and steelmaking centre, an important hub of the 
machine­building industry, and the territory where the harbour of Odessa was 
located, the second most important window to the outside world next to the port 
of Petrograd.84
It was probably because of the power and ambitions of the Ukrainian revolution­
ary movement that the Bolsheviks gave up the plans to recreate the structure 
of the Russian Empire and decided to grant Russia, Ukraine and Belarus the 
formal status of federated states.85 The pro­independence sentiments among 
the Ukrainian and Cossack landowners in the south of the Empire also played 
a role,86 as the Bolsheviks needed to ensure their neutrality for the time being. 
Establishing the Soviet republics proved a providential move: on the one hand, 
it significantly increased the efficiency of the subsequent korenizatsiya,87 and 
84 The official name of Saint Petersburg in the years 1914–1924.
85 The Russian republic was also a federation, but its constituents were in fact only autono­
mies without any attributes of statehood.
86 In pre­revolutionary Russia, the Cossacks were a social estate (free farmers under an obli­
gation to provide permanent military service). Most of the Cossack forces were made up 
of Russians; Ukrainians were in the majority only among the Kuban Cossacks.
87 Korenizatsya (or putting down roots) was the name of given to the Soviet cultural policy 
of the 1920s, the objective of which was to increase the impact of the Communist ideol­
ogy by communicating it in the local language and massively promoting literacy. Another 
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on the other, years later, provided a basis for the external world to recognise 
the independence of the former Soviet republics.
The Soviet leadership needed Soviet people, citizens of the new state. The ‘new 
man’ they sought to create was supposed to be a new incarnation of the Russian 
man [русский человек], a faithful subject of the Empire professing its faith 
(which was now the Leninist faith, which had replaced the former ‘tsarodoxy’). 
The new men could be of any nationality, speak any language and abandon any 
religion, as long as they served the state. But with one significant difference: 
the new man was supposed to be a commoner aspiring to plebeian culture. 
The Soviet authorities consistently sought to destroy the culture of both the 
higher classes and the traditional rural landowners.
At the state level, the Russian language was dominant, which was hardly sur­
prising as it was the language of the largest ethnic group and had served as the 
Empire’s lingua franca even before the revolution (in the Soviet terminology 
it was called the ‘language of internationalist communication’). In those cases 
where the local language became the ‘titular’ language of a Union republic, the 
generously financed programme of korenizatsiya stimulated its development, 
especially by allowing it to develop its own administrative, military, medical 
and other terminology. It was also conducive to the formation of new elites of the 
local nationality, and provided a stimulus for translations and the development 
of a new high culture. In this way, the local bureaucracy built up its position 
based on the people’s confidence and independence from the central authorities.
The development of those new elites and their rising ambitions (not only 
in Ukraine, but presumably mostly there) started to worry the central Union 
authorities in Moscow as early as the late 1920s, especially since most of the 
Soviet leadership believed the country needed to prepare for war, which they 
expected to break out in Europe within the next ten years – they believed that not 
only the economy would have to be switched to war mode, but also that society 
would need to become more consolidated. The Soviet planners were particularly 
concerned about the activities of the Ukrainian national movement in Poland, 
as Moscow could not afford a rebellion by Ukraine during a time of war. Part 
of the war preparations concerned the collectivisation of the agriculture, which 
deprived the rural areas of their elites, destroyed traditional forms of rural life, 
element of the policy concerned the use of local languages in offices and schools (and local 
languages did not mean only republic­level official languages: local tongues were used even 
at the level of single villages). Ukrainisation was a specific instance of that policy.
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and bound the peasants to the land again after less than one hundred years 
of freedom. Another measure was the Great Purge, which destroyed the Soviet 
elites educated before the revolution and put an end to korenizatsiya.
The 1930s marked the return of Russification, which had a different nature 
than the assimilation policies aimed at increasing the cultural and politi­
cal potential of the dominant ethnic group pursued in the democratic states 
of that time (e.g. in France). In the Soviet Union, the purpose was not to force 
the minorities to become part of the ‘titular’ ethnic community (by taking 
over its language, culture and historical narratives), but rather to ensure the 
dominance of the Russian language as an instrument in forming a new cul­
ture, new narratives and a new nation & people. In the case of the Ukrain­
ians and the Belarusians, an additional measure, possible only in those two 
cases, was undertaken: their very languages were Russified by promoting 
those elements shared by those two languages with Russian in dictionaries 
and textbooks, and eliminating or suppressing those elements which made 
the languages distinct. Another measure, applied also to non­Slavic languages, 
was to stop the development of specialist terminologies in those languages and 
impose Russian terms instead. The efforts proved to be very effective, and the 
process of lexical harmonisation between Ukrainian and Russian will prob­
ably be impossible to reverse.
The mass relocations of people also served the purposes of Russification/Sovi­
etisation, even though they were carried out for economic reasons (such reloca­
tions have accompanied all the industrialisation processes known to history). 
The migrations, whether spontaneous, managed or forced (meaning depor­
tations to camps) created ethnically mixed communities that spoke Russian 
in everyday situations. In the great construction sites, everyone, whether free 
or imprisoned, had to communicate in Russian. Likewise, the military had 
to be Russian­speaking.
After World War II, which brought with it a massive rise of patriotic propaganda 
in an imperial but not an ethnic spirit (the notion of the Great Fatherland War 
deliberately invited associations with the conflict with Napoleon, which was 
a clash not of nations but of states and civilisational principles), and after the 
brief episode of post­War Great­Russian chauvinism, under Khrushchev the 
(imperial, not civic) project of a Soviet nation was resumed. It was not about 
changing Ukrainians, Latvians or Chukchi into mental Russians – the Russians, 
too, were supposed to change and become Soviets. And they did so, easier and 
faster than the other nations.
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Under Brezhnev, the objective was clearly stated: a ‘Soviet nation’, a new histori­
cal community of people was to be formed in the Soviet Union. The existence 
of the Soviet nation88 was decreed as an accomplished fact in the preamble to the 
1977 constitution.89 The original policy of ‘bringing nations closer together’, 
which consisted in eliminating antagonisms and ensuring the dominance 
of the Russian language in public (including cultural) life, was forced to give 
way to a policy of ‘unification’90 in which migration policies and the promo­
tion of mixed marriages played an increasingly important role alongside the 
language policy.
The Soviet nation was coming into real existence, and the Soviet national 
identity turned out to be a durable concept: in 1992, up to 12.7% of respond­
ents in Ukraine said their main identification was with citizenship of the 
Soviet Union; by 2013 that number had decreased to 6.6%, and by 2015 to 3.9% 
(in areas controlled by Kyiv).91 In a 2004 poll, a Soviet identity was declared 
by 5.3% of respondents who simultaneously said they were Ukrainian­speak­
ing Ukrainians, 16.6% of those who identified as Russian­speaking Ukrainians 
and 22.4% of those who identified as Russians.92 Other polls produced similar 
results; for example, according to the Donetsk­based Research & Branding 
Group, in September 2012 49% of respondents considered themselves to be pri­
marily citizens of Ukraine, but up to 9% considered themselves to be citi­
zens of the Soviet Union,93 while research by Yaroslav Hrytsak conducted 
in 1994 showed that up to 45.4% of the inhabitants of Donetsk and 4.9% of the 
inhabitants of Lviv considered themselves to be neither Russian nor Ukrain­
ian but Soviet.94
88 The Russian word ‘narod’ in this context should be translated as ‘nation’ and not ‘people’.
89 Constitution of the USSR, op. cit.
90 Слияние (sliyaniye) in Russian literally means a confluence (of rivers) and or a merger 
(of organisations), but the verb слиться (slitsya) also means to fuse (of metals).
91 The following options were available in the poll: inhabitant of village/county/city; inhabit­
ant of region; citizen of Ukraine (45.6% in 1992, 50.7% in 2013), member of ethnicity/nation, 
citizen of former USSR, citizen of Europe, citizen of the world, other. Source: http://dif.org.
ua/article/postmaydanna­blagodiynist­i­volonterstvo­2015­rezultati­sotsdoslidzhennya, 
accessed on 25 October 2016.
92 С. Кульчицький, Червоний виклик. Історія комунізму в Україні від його народження 
до загибелі, Kyiv 2013, volume III, p. 397.
93 Information about this research has since been removed from the Group’s website.
94 Y. Hrytsak, ‘Ukrainian Nationalism, 1991–2001: Myths and Misconceptions’ [in:] CEU His-
tory Department Yearbook 2001-02, table on p. 240.
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2. between ethnicities and nation
The massive, supra­ethnic support for independence expressed in Ukraine’s 
referendum did not prove the existence of a civic nation in Ukraine (that unity 
was still very Soviet in nature), but it triggered the formation of such a nation. 
The Ukrainian political elites did not even consider the possibility of building an 
ethnic nation in the way the Baltic states did: Ukrainian citizenship was granted 
to every person with registered residency in the Ukrainian SSR as of 24 August 
1991 (even to those who had registered the day before). Requirements concern­
ing domicile and knowledge of the Ukrainian language were introduced only 
for some political positions (the latter also for some positions in the adminis­
tration). Ukrainian was declared the only state and official language95, while 
Russian was granted a special status among the national minority languages 
(Art. 10.3 of the constitution of Ukraine).
That solution ensured ethnic peace and averted the risk of the state disintegrat­
ing the way Yugoslavia did; it also contributed to the formation of a political 
nation centred around the state, its symbols and institutions, and not around 
language and culture as superior values. Finally, it also enabled an evolution­
ary transition from the old, Soviet mindset to a new civil awareness. That came 
at a price, though: having adopted such solutions, it was much more difficult 
to transform the former Soviet subjects into citizens of Ukraine who “drop 
by drop squeeze the slave’s blood out of themselves”.96
In the early 1990s, the society (i.e. the political nation) of Ukraine consisted 
of three major groups, of which only two were registered in censuses.97 These 
were the Ukrainians (more or less conscious members of the Ukrainian ethno­
historical community), the Russians (more or less conscious members of the 
Russian ethno­historical community) – and the Soviet people. The latter group 
comprised mostly people without a clearly defined ethnic identity, who iden­
95 In Ukraine and Russia, as in the former Soviet Union these two are separate legal terms. For 
more informations see: T. A. Olszański, The language issue in Ukraine. An attempt at a new 
perspective, OSW Studies, Issue 40, Warsaw 2012, pp. 13–14, https://www.osw.waw.pl/en/
publikacje/osw­studies/2012­05­16/language­issue­ukraine­attempt­a­new­perspective
96 Anton Chekhov, in a letter to A.S. Suvorin, 7 January 1889. The words, which referred to the 
consequences of serfdom, are often quoted in contemporary debates in Ukraine and Russia.
97 The authorities of the USSR treated the Soviet nation as an overarching category which 
should not be put on an equal footing with other identifications, and therefore it was not 
included in statistics. Therefore, people with a more or less crystallised Soviet identity 
tended to declare Russian nationality in the censuses.
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tified with the Soviet state, who were in large measure members of mixed 
families, military families (Soviet military officers were likely to change their 
place of residency quite frequently), or immigrants who had arrived from 
other republics after 1944 and their descendants,98 usually Russian­speaking. 
The members of Ukraine’s ethnic minorities were also included, but this group 
was so small it did not significantly alter the general picture99.
Ukraine was also home to four large linguistic groups: the Ukrainian­speak­
ing Ukrainians (i.e. those who spoke Ukrainian in everyday and family life), 
mostly hailing from the lands incorporated into Ukraine after World War II and 
from the rural areas in central Ukraine; Russian­speaking Ukrainians, mostly 
members of the industrial proletariat and big city dwellers, surzhyk­speaking 
Ukrainians,100 mostly the inhabitants of Kyiv and cities in central Ukraine, and 
finally, Russians and Russian­speaking members of other nationalities. It is not 
possible to determine the real proportions of those groups because the cen­
sus data did not include surzhyk and respondents in sociological studies tended 
to conceal the fact that they spoke surzhyk and presented themselves as speakers 
of the ‘politically correct’ language of the moment.101 Everyone, perhaps with the 
exception of the village dwellers in western and parts of central Ukraine, were 
fluent in Russian, both in speaking and in writing (in many cases their writing 
skills in Russian were better than in Ukrainian). It was quite typical for people 
to abandon Ukrainian, also in family life, while moving up the social ladder, 
and for mixed families to adopt Russian as their language (even if neither of the 
spouses was Russian).102
The members of all those linguistic groups (except for those who maintained 
intensive relations with their non­Ukrainian communities and homelands) 
98 For more information, see.: T. A. Olszański, Co ujawniła rewolucja godności [in:] Kultura 
i Społeczeństwo, 2015, Issue 2, p. 221 and following.
99 According to the 2001 census, the proportion of all ethnic groups (including immigrants) 
excluding Ukrainians and Russians was 4.9%; The most numerous of them, Belarusians, 
numbered 0.6%.
100 Surzhyk is a specific language practice which mixes elements of Ukrainian and Russian. 
It does not meet the criteria of a language or dialect. See: Olszański, The language issue..., 
op. cit., pp.12–13.
101 Census data and selected poll results can be found in: Olszański, The language issue..., op. cit., 
pp. 16–20. The results quoted these had not changed significantly by the end of 2013, whereas 
the results of later polls conducted after the war had already broken out are unreliable.
102 According to 1995 polls, nearly 28% of the inhabitants of Ukraine lived in ethnically mixed 
families, including 19% in Ukrainian­Russian families; http://www.pravda.com.ua/arti­
cles/2009/07/14/4088226/, accessed on 1 December 2016.
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shared the Soviet Ukrainian patriotism: a bond with the land, the country 
where one lives, but also a bond with Soviet Ukraine, ‘the second among equals’ 
in the common state (while some anti­Communist ethnic Ukrainians did not 
identify with the latter idea, the common country was a unifying factor for all). 
That was a good start, especially after all­Soviet patriotism lost credibility in the 
aftermath of the war in Afghanistan and the subsequent voluntary abdication 
of the Union state.
The change of the proportions between Ukrainians and Russians, as recorded 
by the censuses of 1989 and 2001 (with the proportion of Ukrainians increasing 
from 73% to 78%, and the proportion of Russians decreasing from 22% to 17%) 
was due in only a small degree to demographic changes. A more important fac­
tor concerned changing identifications, a ‘shift’ of declared nationality seen 
in people whose identification had been fluid and/or Soviet. While general fig­
ures are not available (it is unlikely that anyone has tried to study the phenom­
enon) we know, for instance, that Leonid Kuchma declared Russian nationality 
in 1990, but by 1992 he said he was of Ukrainian nationality.103 In another case, 
General Kostyantyn Morozov started to identify himself as Ukrainian after 
he became defence minister.104 After 1991, children from mixed families started 
to be generally registered as Ukrainian, not Russian.
It is worth reflecting a little on the two examples above. Kuchma was an ethnic 
Ukrainian from a village in Chernihiv oblast who, since his time at university, 
had lived and worked in an entirely Russian­speaking environment, at some 
point reaching very high echelons of the Soviet hierarchy. The Russian national­
ity that was declared was probably a substitute for the Soviet nationality which 
was not officially recognised. When that state disappeared, he easily reverted 
to his ‘natural’ identity, which now also involved identification with a state. 
The case of Morozov was different: he was an ethnic Russian from the Luhansk 
oblast, a professional military officer, and his change of declared nationality 
(but obviously not of his ethnic identity) was an act of loyalty to the new state. 
He served Ukraine, and therefore he was Ukrainian. There were thousands 
of people like him, both military and civilians.105
103 Kuzio, op. cit., p. 223.
104 Ibidem.
105 Another interesting case is that of Vilen Martirosyan, an Armenian from Azerbaijan, a pro­
fessional military officer, commander of the Rivne regiment in the late 1980s, an activist 
of the People’s Movement of Ukraine, and one of the founders and first chair of the Union 
of the Officers of Ukraine, a formation which played a key role in the Ukrainisation of the 
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The ‘nationality’ rubric disappeared from Ukrainian IDs as early as 1992,106 
which signified the diminished importance of declared nationality in public life. 
While all public biographic notes in the 1990s included information about the 
person’s nationality (and often also that of his or her parents), since 2000 infor­
mation about nationality has been omitted from an increasing proportion 
of such notes. Identification with an ethnic community has ceased to be a pub­
lic affair, and hence no longer needs to be standardised. This has opened the 
way towards the development of the mixed identities which appear in socio­
logical research,107 especially among the young people who do not remember 
the times when nationality was a factor in one’s chances of building a career. 
That change, however, also means that the 1989 and 2001 national identifica­
tion figures are not fully comparable, and the figures from the next census will 
be entirely incomparable, because even if the question remains the same, it will 
be understood very differently.
In the first years of independence, representatives of the elites from Galicia, 
who believed that the essence of identity was to speak the national language, 
came to dominate social policy. Their ‘linguacentrism’, which ignored the mul­
tilingual nature of Ukrainian society, led to tensions and problems; but without 
it, Ukraine would not have seen the development of Ukrainian­language media 
or the publication of many specialist dictionaries, etc., and the language itself 
would not have been modernised and strengthened. However, contrary to the 
Ukrainian leadership’s brash promises, an intensive Ukrainianisation policy 
was never implemented, effectively leaving language matters to the local com­
munities and the people themselves (hence the western oblasts quickly became 
deeply Ukrainianised, while in some localities in Transcarpathia, informal 
Hungarian autonomy developed).
Still, the development of popular culture promoted the use of Russian (the 
Ukrainian nationalists were late to realise the need to promote popular culture 
in their own language), and in the absence of active state policy, Russian produc­
tions (and domestic productions in Russian) came to dominate the market for 
Soviet formations stationed in Ukraine, who later unsuccessfully tried to make his way 
in politics, an ally of Kuchma in 2002 and of Yanukovych in 2004. By the way, his first name 
is an acronym: V. I. Len(in).
106 Traditional nationalists protested (and continue to protest) against that solution.
107 Cf. for instance A. Wilson, The Ukrainians: Unexpected Nation, Fourth Edition, 2015, p. 219; 
according to research quoted in the book, 27% of respondents declared to be themselves 
both Ukrainian and Russian in 1997.
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cultural goods, especially television and books.108 The absence of a nationwide 
system for wholesale book and press distribution exacerbated the situation.
What followed was routine, chaotic and inconsistent, but also determined work 
by the state. The constant impact of the public symbolism, on the army, and even 
more importantly upon the school system, which ensured universal knowledge 
of the Ukrainian language and reversed the old narrative of national identity. 
The new narrative said that the purpose of the life and work of all generations 
of Ukrainians had been to take control of their destiny and aspire to an inde­
pendent existence as a nation and a state, and replaced the old one in which 
Ukraine followed the supposed ‘eternal tendency’ to ‘merge with the great Rus­
sian nation’. That phrase did not mean unification with Russia as a state (Ukraine 
had indeed experienced such a tendency over the course of its history), but 
rather a fusion with the Russian nation/people, which was a fabrication of Rus­
sian and Soviet propaganda, as was the claim that the Ukrainians were the 
‘younger brothers’ of the Russians (if anything, they were the ‘older brothers’). 
That new narrative built a new sense of self­value and gave the people a sense 
of being a nation. A nation of victims (the memory of the Holodomor, the greatest 
disaster in Ukraine’s history was being restored), but also of invincible heroes 
(not only the Cossacks, but also Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA) struggle). 109
That process also influenced the national minorities in Ukraine, including the 
Russians, by showing them that they, too, could be nations, and not merely 
‘natsyonalnosti’, i.e. ethnic groups within the great Soviet nation, or, more accu­
rately, orphans of the Soviet nation. In that process, some of the minorities were 
supported by their national communities of origin. As a negative consequence 
of that, some Ukrainian Russians not only failed to assimilate, but turned into 
Russian nationalists; this was probably an unavoidable outcome of the state 
launching a clear­cut identity narrative.
108 See. Olszański, The language issue..., op. cit., pp. 29–34. The trends described therein 
remained largely constant until 2013. After the Revolution of Dignity some measures were 
taken to limit the access of Russian media products’ access to the Ukrainian market, but 
it is too early to say how effective these moves have been.
109 For more information about the role of restoring the memory of the UPA in the development 
of the Ukrainian national identity, see: T. A. Olszański, Miejsce UPA w Wielkiej Wojnie 
Ojczyźnianej. Dylematy polityki historycznej Ukrainy, Punkt Widzenia OSW, Issue 35, War­
saw 2013, https://www.osw.waw.pl/pl/publikacje/punkt­widzenia/2013­06­21/miejsce­
upa­w­wielkiej­wojnie­ojczyznianej­dylematy­polityki. The developments of the last three 
years have strengthened the tendency to see the UPA as part of the mainstream Ukrainian 
identity, and have undermined, if not totally eliminated, the alternative, ‘co­imperial’ iden­
tity narrative described there.
62
O
SW
 S
TU
D
IE
S 
 1
1/
20
17
Unfortunately, Ukraine did not find a way to include the millions of immi­
grants from the other Soviet republics, almost all of them Russian­speaking, 
into a national community understood as something bigger than formal citi­
zenship.110 It seems that Kyiv did not even notice the problem. Some of the chil­
dren or grandchildren of such immigrants assimilated, many became state 
activists, and some even turned into radical Ukrainian nationalists, but most 
people in that category (the youngest of whom arrived in Ukraine in the mid­
1980s) remained at best on the margins of the state and national community. 
They did enjoy full civil rights on an equal footing with all the other citizens 
of Ukraine, but their identity and sensitivities were not incorporated into the 
general national identity narrative, and were often treated with contempt by the 
‘native’ elites.111
Neither did Ukraine find a way to make Donbas and Crimea part of this uniform 
civic Ukrainianness. While President Kuchma did manage to suppress organ­
ised Crimean separatism in the 1990s, for twenty­five years Kyiv did practically 
nothing to make Crimea anything more than an ‘island off the coast of Ukraine’. 
Crimea’s autonomy (and Ukraine’s tacit consent to have no real jurisdiction over 
Sevastopol) offered the central bureaucracy and political class a perfect ali­
bi.112 Also, Ukraine clearly did not want to fight for Crimea in 2014, as it did for 
Donbas. There, however, it did not manage to pre­empt the risks related to the 
presence of large numbers of post­Soviet proletariat and lumpen­proletariat 
(mostly of foreign origin) in the Donetsk oblast and the southern part of the 
Luhansk oblast. On top of that, the Ukrainian elites never missed an opportu­
nity to insult those people with a narrative about their criminal origins and the 
criminal character of their community.113
110 See Olszański, Co ujawniła..., loco citato.
111 For an illustrative case of such contempt, see the statement by the Ukrainian minister 
for culture Yevhen Nyshchuk, who said in November 2016: “In Zaporizhia, in the Don­
bas, there… these are dragged cities. There is no genetics there. This has been deliberately 
dragged in” (quoted after: С. Дацюк, Чотири Радикалізації України, http://blogs.pravda.
com.ua/authors/datsuk/5836bf68af18c/, accessed on 24 November 2016). Genetic terminol­
ogy is generally overused in Ukrainian political rhetoric: Nyshchuk implied that there are 
no ‘real’ Ukrainians in the great industrial metropolises, only deficient ‘vagrants’).
112 It should be noted, however, that because of Crimea’s autonomous status, Kyiv did not have 
any formal ability to influence regulations concerning, for instance, land ownership rela­
tions or the rights of the Crimean Tatar community.
113 Cf. T. A. Olszański, Unity stronger than divisions. Ukraine’s internal diversity, OSW Point 
of view, Issue 40, https://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/point­view/2014­03­07/unity­
stronger­divisions­ukraines­internal­diversity, pp. 17–18.
63
O
SW
 S
TU
D
IE
S 
 1
1/
20
17
Yet in 2014, the Russian­speaking young people from eastern and central­east­
ern Ukraine were the first to oppose the pro­Russian rebellion. This was not 
a sudden turn – it was the effect, and the ultimate test, of the Ukrainian nation’s 
chaotic and largely instinctive effort to build itself.
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v. shevchenKo versus lenIn: 
a new PolIcy of symbols
Ukraine’s Act of independence made a reference to the “thousand­year tradition 
of state development in Ukraine” and to nations’ right to self­determination, but 
left no doubt as to the fact that it was the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic 
that was declaring independence, and that the new Ukraine would be its con­
tinuation, legally and symbolically. Independence was declared, not restored. 
This framing of the Act reflected the consciousness and way of thinking of the 
Ukrainian political elite in the summer of 1991.
On the eve of the first anniversary of independence, Mykola Plaviuk, the last, 
exiled president of the Ukrainian People’s Republic (or Ukrainian National 
Republic, UNR),114 handed the Republic’s insignia (seal and banner) to Krav­
chuk alongside an act stating that the authorities of the Republic recognised 
Ukraine as its legal successor. Had Vyacheslav Chornovil115 been at the helm 
of the state at that time, Ukraine would presumably have embraced that con­
tinuity, enshrined it in its constitution, and today the continuity would be an 
obvious element of its state and national identity. However, for Kravchuk and 
his circle that was politically and psychologically unacceptable, or maybe even 
unthinkable: ‘their’ Ukraine was a continuation of the Soviet one, not only in the 
real dimension (as it unquestionably was) but also in the symbolic dimension. 
Kravchuk accepted the UNR’s insignia, probably without reflecting much about 
the significance of Plaviuk’s gesture116, which dropped into a vacuum and was 
subsequently forgotten.
Another attempt at formally recognising the legacy of the Ukrainian People’s 
Republic was made in April 2015, but this failed too. A draft bill on militants who 
had participated in the fight for Ukraine’s independence stated in its preamble 
that contemporary Ukraine was a legal successor to the UNR, which had been 
114 The Ukrainian People’s Republic or the Ukrainian National Republic (UNR), proclaimed 
in Kyiv in the autumn of 1917, survived in a state of constant war with Red and White Rus­
sia, and then for some time with Poland, until the autumn of 1920 (in its final phase of it was 
Poland’s ally). After it was defeated, its governing bodies continued operating in exile. 
The best­known leaders of the UNR included Mykhailo Hrushevsky and Symon Petlura.
115 Vyacheslav Chornovil (1937–1999) was a dissident and politician, co­founder of the Ukrain­
ian Helsinki Group and the People’s Movement of Ukraine, Kravchuk’s rival in the 1991 pres­
idential elections.
116 Kravchuk does not mention this situation in his memoir (Л. Кравчук, Маємо те, що маємо, 
op. cit.).
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a victim to Russian aggression, and that this made the subsequent fight for the 
restitution of the Ukrainian state legal. At the last moment, the draft was with­
drawn and the preamble of the bill as ultimately adopted did not contain any 
references to the UNR, as a result of which the mentions of the legality of fight­
ing for Ukraine’s independence were left without a context. The reasons for the 
sudden change remain unclear.
1. new symbols
Every state and every community aspiring to form a state pursues a policy 
of symbols as an element of the formation of its collective identity. The stand­
ard elements include state or national emblems, military and other uniforms 
(such as, for instance, the uniforms of the January Uprising of 1863 veter­
ans in interwar Poland, or the historical uniforms of the guards of honour 
in many countries), the highest orders and decorations, as well as monu­
ments and the names of streets and public buildings (and in some countries 
also towns and villages).
The Ukrainian SSR did have a national emblem and a f lag, both variants 
of their Soviet equivalents, a simplified coat of arms representing a five­
pronged star, and an anthem, as well as a huge number of Soviet memo­
rial names and monuments (especially monuments to Lenin, which in the 
Soviet symbolism served as a quasi­religious way of taking control of space 
and crowding out the Christian component). The new state reached for the 
symbols of the Ukrainian national movement: the tryzub, a symbol of medi­
eval origin, a f lag which also referred back to the medieval heraldic sym­
bols of the Ruthenian principalities, a national anthem and other songs 
of anthem­like significance, and finally, the tradition of early 20th­century 
military uniforms.
Ukraine inherited the Soviet approach to the symbolic organisation of public 
space, the main motif of which was to place the symbols of the day every­
where, be it monuments, names of streets, institutions and places, heral­
dic decorations of buildings and interiors, memorial plaques to ‘everyday 
heroes’, leaders’ portraits, etc. And while negating the Soviet symbolism was 
relatively easy, the Soviet­era tendency to symbolically ‘take over’ the space 
turned out to be permanent, and laid the foundation of the new state’s sym­
bolism policy (both for the central government and for the local authorities 
which enjoyed broad freedom in this respect, especially in the first years 
of independence).
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The origin of ukraine’s state symbols
The coat of arms of Ukraine, the tryzub, was an emblem of the monarchs 
of Rus’ (knyazes), which initially served more as an element of insignia 
than as a proper coat of arms. It survived in the symbolism of the Ortho-
dox Church as the monogram of Saints Olga and Vladimir, the rulers who 
Christianised Rus’. It was adopted as the coat of arms in 1917 when it was 
also given the colours taken from the flag.
The flag of Ukraine was created in 1848 as the flag of the Supreme Ruthenian 
Council (a body of the then projected Ukrainian national autonomy in Gali-
cia) in the colours of the medieval coat of arms of the Lviv Principa lity, 
which represented a golden lion on a blue field. During the 1917–1920 war 
for independence it was used in two variants, yellow-blue and blue-yellow. 
The latter variant, more popular in eastern Galicia, was officially adopted 
in the inter-war period.
Ukraine’s national anthem, Shche ne vmerla Ukrainy (Ukraine has not yet 
perished), also adopted in 1917, is a slightly modified poem by Pavlo Chu-
bynsky, first published in 1863, set to music composed by Mykhailo Verby-
tsky. In independent Ukraine, the anthem was reduced to the first stanza 
and the refrain and its lyrics were slightly modified.
The rejection of Soviet symbolism, which was ‘non­sovereign’ even at the vis­
ual level (the coats of arms and flags of the Union republics were variations 
of the USSR symbols), was an obvious choice, but the selection of new sym­
bols was much less so. Even though a blue­yellow flag, offered by the protesters 
demanding a declaration of independence in August 1991, was brought into the 
plenary room of the Verkhovna Rada immediately after the adoption of the Act 
of Independence, that form of the flag was only officially adopted as the state flag 
on 28 January 1992, and not without resistance (the parliament had also con­
sidered a ‘raspberry red banner with an archangel’, a red­blue­yellow flag and 
several other variants).117 A little later, on 19 February, the Rada approved the 
tryzub as the small coat of arms (work on the great coat of arms is still underway, 
and the need to finally adopt it is raised every now and then in the Verkhovna 
Rada). The lyrics of the new national anthem gave rise to so much controversy 
117 As late as 2011, the Communists proposed that the Orthodox cross (sic) should be adopted 
as the national coat of arms and the blue­yellow flag replaced by a raspberry­red one.
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that only the music was adopted in January 1992, while it took eleven more years 
to agree on and adopt a text.118
Initially, there was substantial resistance to the new symbols: on several 
occasions in 1992, the police in Kyiv tried to discourage the practice of plac­
ing the flags on cars, and during the riots which erupted at the funeral of the 
Kyiv Patriarch Volodymyr in 1995 the police tore and trod on the flags carried 
by the procession. The controversies continued until the adoption of the new 
constitution in June 1996. The Communist deputies in the new Verkhovna Rada 
were so opposed to approving the already functioning state symbols that Arti­
cle 20 of the constitution, which contained the disputed provisions, could only 
be adopted in a ‘package’ with regulations concerning the Autonomous Republic 
of Crimea (supported by the Communits against the opposition of the national 
democrats).119
During his short term, which was fully devoted to saving the collapsing econ­
omy and building up Ukraine’s international position, President Kravchuk did 
not pursue any particular symbolic policy. It was only his successor, Leonid 
Kuchma, who adopted the presidential state symbols, i.e. the standard, the 
chain of office (in the form used in many states in the world), the bulava (cer­
emonial baton) and the seal (the latter two were a direct reference to Cossack 
insignia, although the seal had been a decoration of general chancellor (pysar), 
not hetman) on 29 November 1999, before his inauguration for the second term. 
Kuchma also introduced a pseudo­historic uniform for the presidential guard 
of honour,120 although it was quickly abandoned. The uniforms of the increas­
ingly neglected army remained practically unchanged until 2016, when new 
ones were introduced, reportedly modelled on the uniforms of the UNR Acting 
Army121 but certainly influenced by the Western European uniform tradition. 
Some time beforehand, possibly under the influence of Yushchenko’s American­
born wife, Ukraine adopted the American habit of putting a hand on the heart 
118 By then, the performances of the anthem in official situations were instrumental only, and 
it was sung with the lyrics (usually only the first stanza and the refrain) only in unofficial, 
civic performances.
119 During the debate on the final text of the constitution of Ukraine on 27/28 June 1996, every 
article was put to a separate vote, but some of them were combined in packages so that both 
the supporters of independence and the Communists had to back them.
120 That slightly operatic uniform of the company of the 1st Novorossiysk Kyiv Separate Guards 
Regiment was modelled on the 19th­century uniforms of the Black Sea Cossacks, the Zapor­
izhians resettled in the 18th century to Kuban region.
121 The Acting Army never had standardised uniforms.
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during performances of the national anthem and at other ceremonial moments 
(instead of the ‘at attention’ position which had previously been required in such 
situations). The uniforms of the various non­state Cossack formations were usu­
ally influenced by the Soviet tradition, but the uniform for UPA veterans, devel­
oped by the diaspora, was also accepted.
It should be noted that while the Ukrainian state is secular,122 its presidents 
swear on the Gospel, or at least in the presence of the Gospel. As early as the inau­
guration of Leonid Kravchuk, who swore on the Soviet constitution of Ukraine 
and the Act of Independence by putting his hand on the two documents, the 
Peresopnytsia Gospels lay open on a separate table to his left.123 Kuchma put 
his hand on the pages of the open Gospel, while his successors put theirs on the 
constitution and the Gospel, which was not open. It is unclear who first pro­
posed that idea in 1991, but it was repeated by Kuchma in 1994, and became an 
informal but constant element of Ukraine’s state protocol.
It could also be added that the new system of state orders recalls the old Rus’ 
traditions (the orders of Knyaz Yaroslav the Wise, Princess Olga and Danylo 
Halytsky) and the Cossack heritage (the orders of Bohdan Khmelnitsky and Ivan 
Mazepa), but does not draw upon any newer traditions, even though the highest 
state decoration is still a renamed and slightly remodelled Gold Star Medal of the 
Hero of the Soviet Union, now called the Order of the Hero of Ukraine. It exists 
in two versions: with a gold star (a near­exact copy of the Soviet one), and the 
Order of the State, in which the star is replaced by the tryzub.124
122 None of the state oath and swearing­in formulas permit adding the words ‘So help me God’ 
or similar.
123 The Peresopnytsia Gospels is a translation of the four Gospels into Ruthenian/Ukrainian 
of the day, dating back to the mid­16th century and preserved in an illuminated manu­
script commissioned by Princess Anastasia Zaslavska; it is currently stored in the National 
Library of Ukraine. This priceless historical artifact (not a contemporary printed copy) has 
been part of the presidential inauguration ceremony in Ukraine since December 1991.
124 The hierarchy of Ukrainian state decorations is as follows (the dates on which the decora­
tions were introduced in brackets): Title of the Hero of Ukraine (1998), the Order of Freedom 
(2008), the Order of Yaroslav the Wise (1995), the Order of Merit (1996), the Order of Boh­
dan Khmelnitsky (1995), the Order of the Heavenly Hundred Heroes (2014), the Order for 
Courage (1996), the Order of Princess Olga (1997), the Order of Danylo Halytsky (2003) and 
the Order for Heroic Miners’ Work (2008). The ‘presidential’ decoration, the Cross of Ivan 
Mazepa, also ranks as an order (2009).
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2. names and monuments
The initial phase of rapid decommunisation of public spaces, carried out by the 
local self­governments or spontaneously by the people, which involved remov­
ing monuments, changing street and town names, replacing patrons of schools 
and industrial plants, etc., and was limited in principle to the western oblasts,125 
was followed by a period of relative stability under Kuchma. Monuments to the 
national poet Taras Shevchenko were erected in large numbers in places where 
none had existed before, but the remaining monuments of Lenin and other Bol­
shevik activists were left untouched. Similarly, many monuments were erected 
to those killed in Afghanistan and Chernobyl (usually in the home towns 
of those commemorated), and to victims of the Holodomor (such monuments 
were erected in particularly large numbers under Yushchenko).126 In Eastern 
Galicia, monuments to the Ukrainian Sich Riflemen and the Ukrainian Galician 
Army (the formations which fought for the independence of Ukraine in the 
years 1914–1919) had been erected early in the 1990s, but in central Ukraine 
hardly any monuments associated with the Ukrainian People’s Republic (1917–
1920) were erected.127
Yushchenko, who attached great significance to the policy of national memory, 
did not seek a rapid symbolic decommunisation. It is true that during his term 
work started on the construction of a monument complex in Bykovnya, and 
a magnificent monument­museum was built for the victims of the Holodomor 
in Kyiv, but at the same time monuments to Hryhoriy Petrovsky and Stanislav 
Kosior, who were both responsible for Bolshevik crimes, continued to ‘adorn’ the 
streets of the Ukrainian capital. It was also under Yushchenko that monuments 
started to be erected to Stepan Bandera and other UPA commanders, as well 
as the organisation itself, but only in western Ukraine.128
125 President Kravchuk issued a decree on the demolition of Soviet monuments in May 1992, 
but it was never implemented.
126 However, the first mound to the memory of the victims of the Holodomor was made near 
Lubny in the summer of 1990.
127 To the author’s knowledge, Symon Petlura has only one monument in Ukraine, in Rivne. 
In 2006 plans were made to erect a monument to him in Kyiv, but the city authorities 
ignored Yushchenko’s decree to that effect; new plans were made in the autumn of 2016, 
and the monument is to be erected by 2019. More monuments have been erected to Hrush­
evsky, who is better known as a great historian than as a political leader.
128 41 Bandera monuments have been erected to date, including 9 of which before 2000 and 
only 3 after the Revolution of Dignity. Apart from three in the Rivne oblast, all the others 
are located in Eastern Galicia (http://dyvys.info/2016/10/15/bandera­na­pyedestali­skilky­
naspravdi/, accessed on 17 October 2016; the monument unveiled on 13 October 2016 in Dubno 
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That symbolic policy was a direct continuation of the Soviet tradition of appro­
priating space: back then, Lenin’s portraits and monuments were supposed 
to crowd out the symbolism of crosses and churches, directing the public’s 
attention to the ‘appropriate’ cult objects and role models (in the USSR, large 
numbers of monuments were erected to the so­called heroes of socialist labour, 
often while the person in question was still alive), and now the monuments 
to Shevchenko and (locally) Bandera were supposed, perhaps to not take the 
place of the Communist symbols, but to negate them and propose new, alter­
native models. This approach could have been effective, especially in smaller 
towns and among the less educated sections of society.
In the early days, however, the new trend very clearly differed from the Soviet 
narrative, in that the latter only recognised heroes and had no space for the 
victims (most of the sites of mass killings of Soviet prisoners in the years 
1941–1942 have remained without any commemoration until the present day). 
The new focus on the memory of the Holodomor, Chernobyl and the Afghan war 
signified a turn towards a tendency to remember the victims, glorify them and 
put them at the heart of the nation’s memory. The monuments to Bandera and 
the UPA members, on the other hand, were intended to restore the heroic narra­
tive, but this time not instead of the narrative about victims, but in parallel to it.
This heroic narrative was strengthened first by the Revolution of Dignity and 
then by the war, with the emergence of new, unquestionable heroes, people 
who had shed blood for their homeland. First, the term Heavenly Hundred 
emerged, in itself monumental and evoking religious overtones. Later, the lower 
part of Institutskaya street in Kyiv129 was transformed into a ‘scattered’ monu­
ment, very progressive in its chaotic and not entirely thought­through nar­
rative.130 Finally, monuments and ornamental gravestones for the fallen were 
erected in many places throughout Ukraine. Several months later, the Heavenly 
was not included). According to Wikipedia, there are 12 monuments to Roman Shukhevych 
(including one outside Eastern Galicia, in the place where his body was reportedly burnt), 
and 3 monuments to Dmytro Klyachkivsky, also known as Klym Savur, who was directly 
responsible for the Volhynia massacres, including 2 in Volhynia. Memorial plaques are pre­
sent in an even larger number, again, mostly in western Ukraine.
129 The site of the massacre of 20 February 2014. That part of the street was renamed as the 
Heavenly Hundred Heroes Street in 2015.
130 Only a part of that commemorative complex was formally designed; many of its elements are 
the work of the families and friends of those killed, not co­ordinated by any single person.
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Hundred Heroes were joined by the fallen ATO soldiers,131 in some places referred 
to as the Heavenly Guard, who are also commemorated with monuments and 
plaques. It is also worth noting that a new form of monument­making developed 
in Ukraine with the large number of commemorative murals, which are much 
cheaper and less time­consuming to make, and are often the work of local com­
munities, and not the authorities. This can be regarded as a form of democratisa­
tion of the policy of memory.
It took the war for a radical decommunisation of the public space of Ukraine 
(within the territory controlled by the Ukrainian government) to make it through 
the parliament and then materialise in real life. Monuments to Lenin and other 
Communist heroes (other than the heroes of World War II) disappeared from 
squares and streets,132 and the names of 987 localities were changed, including 
two oblast capitals (Dnipropetrovsk was renamed as Dnipro133 and Kirovohrad 
as Kropyvnytskyi 134), as were the names of 25 counties, 51,500 streets and an 
unknown number of institutions. The previous names were usually replaced 
by historic names (in more than 300 cases) or neutral names, and the few new 
names of a commemorative nature were usually related to the events of recent 
years or to the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (in this case, the commemorations 
of the UPA were not limited to western Ukraine).135
131 A neologism originating from the word ATO (anti­terror operation), the official euphemism 
denoting the war.
132 Among the 1300 or so monuments removed, many were destroyed during a spontaneous 
action known as Leninopad (Lenin­fall) in January and February 2014. The last urban monu­
ment to the ‘leader of the world proletariat’ was removed on 23 October 2016. It is possi­
ble that a certain number of monuments (or more likely busts) remain in villages. Around 
1,000 monuments to other Communist activists were also removed. Around 300 Lenin 
monuments and numerous monuments to other Communists remain in the areas con­
trolled by the separatists. Some monuments located in industrial plants also remain; for 
instance still in November 2016 the Roshen confectionery factory in Kyiv, owned by the 
president of Ukraine, still hosted a monument to Marx, the former patron of the plant.
133 Dnieper in English.
134 The former formally recognises the colloquial, shortened name of the city and signifies the 
name of the Dnieper in Ukrainian. The latter is a commemorative name given in the honour 
of Marko Kropyvnytskyi, the distinguished Ukrainian dramatist and actor associated with 
the city (1840–1910). Kirovohrad did not have a ‘neutral’ historical name; it had previously 
been called Yelisavetgrad and Zinovyevsk.
135 Figures from a 2016 report by the Ukrainian National Memory Institute, UINP, http://
memory.gov.ua/page/zvit­ukrainskogo­institutu­natsionalnoi­pam­yati­z­realizatsii­der­
zhavnoi­politiki­u­sferi­vidn, accessed on 16 February 2017.
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vI. de-sTaTIsIng The sovIeT man
Soviet society was completely statised. Nearly everyone was supported by the 
state: whether as an employee of a state­owned enterprise, public office or another 
institution, a dependent of such an employee, a pensioner or a prisoner. Because 
of the state’s monopoly on information (controlling the flow of information was 
a priority for the Communists; the scale of information control in the USSR 
had no historical precedent), the society also had similar worldviews and very 
homogenous ideas about the appropriate shape of social life. In part, that was 
also due to the fact that nearly everyone shared the same status – that of wage 
workers with similar if not identical interests.
For those reasons, the most important change that occurred after 1991 concerned 
the ‘re­privatisation’ or ‘de­statisation’ of the Soviet man. For some, this involved 
gaining material independence from the state (through economic activity, but 
also, through the privatisation of the plants where those people worked); for oth­
ers, looser state control over public life (with the formation of local government 
administrations or the admission of the freelance professions), and for still others, 
being ejected from society as a result of losing their care or means of subsistence. 
As early as 2002, most of those employed in Ukraine worked in private companies; 
currently the proportion of people working in state­owned enterprises has prob­
ably fallen to one­fourth or one­fifth of the total (no detailed figures are publicly 
available). Two groups remained completely dependent on the state, however: 
the pensioners, and the members of the broadly­understood state bureaucratic 
apparatus, both of whom are by nature inert and averse to change.
1. coping without the state
People’s awareness changed at a slower pace than their social status, especially 
as the privatisation of the large industrial undertakings initially changed little for 
their workers. The first changes which concerned everyone came with the scarcity 
of goods, hyperinflation, and (a little later) the coupon privatisation which turned 
out to be a great scam through which the managers of state­owned enterprises 
appropriated their assets136; and finally, the mass withholding of pay by employ­
ers. As a consequence, the very idea of a market economy became compromised, 
especially since the people had approached it with distrust from the very start, 
understanding little of the economic novelties because they had not been provided 
with adequate information. People turned their backs on prykhvatyzatsya and 
136 Åslund, How Ukraine..., op. cit., p. 79.
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dermokratiya137 and politics in general. Instead, they undertook massive, dispersed 
economic activity, in most cases hoping just to make ends meet rather than get rich.
Initially, that activity consisted mainly in cultivating allotment gardens, which the 
Soviet authorities generously allocated to city dwellers in their final years (although 
the gardens were often located 100 km or further from the city), small cross­border 
retail (often amounting to contraband) and domestic retail, and later, also work 
abroad. Gardening and small agriculture were mostly subsistence­oriented, but 
the commerce did stimulate the development of business relations and educated 
people about the market economy. However, it was also marred by corruption and 
crime from the start, as organised criminal groups preyed on small trade, services, 
and on people working abroad. Over time, the proceeds from that activity started 
to stimulate internal demand, including for construction and renovation services 
and the related materials. On the other hand, small retail started to organise into 
networks in the form of semi­wholesale bazaars. Private capital was accumulated 
in substantial, or even very substantial, albeit fragmented amounts.138 Under dif­
ferent conditions, that could have led to an investment boom. What was missing 
in Ukraine, however, was confidence in the state, which could provide neither regu­
latory stability, nor protection against crime. People still felt more like subjects than 
citizens, and subjects do not invest because nothing is really theirs.
The processes outlined here occurred against the backdrop of emerging ine­
qualities of shocking proportions. The Soviet society had been egalitarian, and 
extreme wealth and poverty were hidden from the public view. After 1988, 
opportunities to get rich emerged, and contact with the Western world (includ­
ing via popular culture) exposed people to patterns of ostentatious consump­
tion, while on the other hand the social safety net disintegrated. The number 
of wage workers with medium incomes, and especially white­collar workers, 
decreased dramatically. Extreme poverty, which had been unthinkable in the 
Soviet times, at least in Ukraine, began to appear.
Today most of the city dwellers in Ukraine continue to be wage workers. The mid­
dle class has been developing slowly, but it is growing in numbers, especially in the 
western oblasts and in Kyiv, largely thanks to the revenues from work abroad. It 
is also starting to be aware of its interests. When those interests came under threat 
137 The terms could be translated as ‘grabisation’ and ‘crapocracy’.
138 According to some estimates, around the year 2010 Ukrainian citizens held around US$ 100 bil­
lion in cash. А. Ермолаев, Четвертое измерение, http://gazeta.zn.ua/POLITICS/chetver­
toe_izmerenie.html, accessed on 23 September 2016.
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from the new tax code in 2010, more than 50,000 people protested in the Maidan.139 
Later it was those people, as well as the creative class and new technology special­
ists, often working for foreign companies, who supported the Revolution of Dignity 
and the Ukrainian armed forces with their money and organisational skills.
The rising inequalities were accompanied, especially in the initial period, by a col­
lapse of the state’s healthcare, education and culture systems, which affected rural 
areas and small towns particularly heavily. The number of hospitals decreased 
from 3,900 to 2,200 in the years 1990–2013 and the number of hospital beds per 
10,000 inhabitants – fell from 135 to 88. The number of public libraries decreased 
from 25,600 to 19,100, and their collections shrank from 419 million to 311 million 
books. Participation in culture decreased dramatically: the number of theatre goers 
went down dropped from 17.6 million to 6.9 million, and the number of museum 
visitors – fell from 31 million to 22 million (even though the number of theatres 
and museums increased, by a factor of three in the case of the latter). The number 
of new book titles published increased from 76,000 in 1990 to 263,000 in 2013, but 
their total impressions numbers dropped from 170 million to 70 million, which 
meant that the accessibility of books (other than textbooks) declined dramatically, 
while the importation of books printed in the Russian Federation could not make 
up for the decline, and simultaneously increased the advantage of Russian­language 
books over Ukrainian­language books. Large swathes of provincial Ukraine became 
deprived of access to healthcare and culture.
In another situation and in another country, such a deep degradation of a major­
ity of the people could have triggered protests on a revolutionary scale. If no 
‘hunger riots’ broke out in Ukraine (of which the Communists like to warn, 
but which they never tried to organise), it was only because of the proverbial 
patience140 of the Ukrainians, and the sense that there was no alternative. 
The powerful, stable state to which they had become accustomed had disinte­
grated for reasons they could not comprehend, and Russia was suffering similar, 
disastrous consequences of that collapse. People did not understand what had 
happened, and trusted neither the government nor one another.
There were no forces capable of organising and co­ordinating economic protests 
(in contrast to political protests). The miners of the Donbas, who had known how 
139 Kuzio, op. cit., pp. 87–89. According to the author, the amendment risked pushing as many 
as one million entrepreneurs into the grey economy.
140 Almost all participants in Ukrainian political discourse draw upon this (appraising it either 
positively or negatively).
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to organise mass strikes in defence of their economic interests back in the Soviet 
times, in independent Ukraine were only able to strike in the interest of the mine 
owners, at the owners’ initiative and for their money. The old, Communist trade 
unions could not and did not want to adapt to the conditions of the market economy 
conditions, and the new unions failed to build a significant position for themselves.141
That patience still prevails, mainly because people have little faith that any change 
is possible which would benefit the wide masses, and not just the elites. The Ukrain­
ians are prepared to stage determined, mass protests for political reasons, but not 
for economic reasons (when any such protests happen, they are organised by entre­
preneurs, and not workers, public sector employees or kolkhozniks). If people hope 
to carve better lives for themselves, they look to work abroad (either for themselves 
or for younger family members) or to conduct various kinds of business activity 
for themselves, and do not think about forcing the state to ensure a legal order 
that would promote entrepreneurship or provide adequate welfare. Only the young 
generation is starting to raise such demands, but it is at the same time these are the 
very people who are increasingly inclined to emigrate.
Chart 3. Dynamics of the Human Development Index (HDI) of Ukraine 
in 1990–2014
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Ukraine ranks in the ‘high social development’ category (the second of four), having dropped from 72nd 
position in 2005 to position 83rd in 2012. Soviet Ukraine ranked 46th in 1990, which seems to be due to an 
overestimation of social development in the Soviet Union. Sources: http://hdr.undp.org/sites/default/
files/hdr_2015_statistical_annex.pdf and http://countryeconomy.com/hdi/ukraine accessed on 10 Feb­
ruary 2017.
141 In 2013, 1130 trade union centrals and 4143 trade unions were registered in Ukraine. The trade 
union movement cannot but be ineffective as long as it remains so deeply fragmented.
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2. The generation of independence
The most important social change that has occurred in Ukraine over the last 
quarter of a century has been occasioned by the very passage of time. A new 
generation has entered adulthood, for whom a state of their own is the exist­
ing reality, and who have never experienced different statehood or a different 
doctrine of patriotism. Today this generation accounts for around 11 million 
people, a third of Ukraine’s adult population.142 Not all those young people are 
progressive and pro­Western; the group also includes poorly educated inhabit­
ants of the ‘old’ industrial centres and the shrinking category of rural youth, 
as well as people with pro­Russian views and people indifferent to public affairs. 
But Ukraine is the basic point of reference for all of them.
School has played a key role in that transition, providing all young inhabitants 
of Ukraine with a basic knowledge of the Ukrainian language, history, geogra­
phy and literature – including the students of minority schools in which the 
‘republic language’ was not taught in the Soviet times. That education has con­
solidated an attitude in which what is Russian is not entirely foreign (e.g. Rus­
sian literature does not fall under the heading of ‘world literature’), but neither 
is it native or ‘our own’. It has not only familiarised people with Shevchenko’s 
poetry, but also nurtured the view that he is the Prophet, ‘our Everything,’ the 
alpha and omega of national culture. It sought to present Gogol not as a Russian 
author, but as a writer from ‘Little Russia’, with his roots deep in the history 
and culture of Ukraine.143 Even where such narratives in education were met 
with aversion or even resistance, whether for ideological reasons, or due to an 
aversion to schooling as such, they changed the young people’s way of thinking 
about their homeland and themselves.
Another important transformative factor concerned the society’s increasing 
openness to the world, which was due to the collapse of the Soviet­era constraints 
and the new freedom to travel, as well as access to external sources of informa­
tion and culture, and as well as the revolutionary changes in social communica­
tions that have occurred over the last twenty years with the development of the 
142 For more detailed figures, see: T. A. Olszański, Aftermath of the Maidan. Ukrainian society 
two years after the revolution, OSW Commentary, 4 March 2016, https://www.osw.waw.pl/
en/publikacje/osw­commentary/2016­03­04/aftermath­maidan­ukrainian­society­two­
years­after­revolution; for a deeper analysis of the problem, see: Olszański, Co ujawniła..., 
op. cit., p. 216 and following.
143 In extreme cases, attempts are have been made at ‘recapturing’ Gogol from Russian litera­
ture, but the dominant view is that he had a double identity and a double affiliation.
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internet and, subsequently, the social media, the rise of Wikipedia, and the 
online availability of a massive number of works of art and science. The effects 
of that opening were reinforced by the fact that schools in Ukraine increasingly 
commonly taught English and other Western languages (including Polish), and 
large numbers of the Ukrainians worked abroad, which offered not only mate­
rial gains but also new knowledge about the world.
The transition described above has been progressing over the years, indepen­
dently of anybody’s will. Every year, several hundred thousand ‘natural­born 
citizens’ enter adult life and several hundred thousand people formed in the 
Soviet system pass away. In a dozen or so years, the members of that new gen­
eration will aspire to the highest positions in the state. They will be less patient 
and more radical: as throughout Europe, young people are radicalising, when 
faced with a lack of prospects and mounting threats. In Ukraine, such sen­
timents have been stoked in recent years by the war and the sense that the 
Revolution of Dignity has been defeated – as all that it achieved was a political 
reshuffle within the system, and not a change of the system itself (and neither 
has the large­scale replacement and rejuvenation of the political cadres shaken 
the system – perhaps for the time being).
A large portion of the young generation think of themselves as a civil society, i.e. 
a community of citizens who share a responsibility for public affairs. The vol­
unteering movement, which supported Ukraine’s defence in the first year of the 
war, proves that Ukraine has a great potential for civil self­organisation. How­
ever, new forms of civil self­governance for peacetime have been developing 
with great difficulty, due partly to the excessive bureaucracy and centrali­
sation of the state, and partly – to the discrediting and disintegration of the 
Soviet forms of civil organisation, some of which could have been preserved 
in a reformed (decommunised) formula.144
Apart from the conventional civil society structures in the Western sense, i.e. 
non­governmental organisations typically registered formally as foundations 
or associations, financed from grants and strongly institutionalised (or in some 
cases bureaucratised),145 a grassroots, networked social movement has devel­
oped in Ukraine in recent years, with a multitude of co­operation formulas, 
144 For example, the various committees operating within blocks of flats, housing estates or streets, 
as well as parents’ committees ensuring constant co­operation between parents and teachers.
145 Accounting for the spending of grant money requires adequate organisational and book­
keeping resources.
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usually informal, financed from contributions or crowdfunded through Face­
book (with many of those forms of co­operation forms operating via Facebook), 
and in some cases, supported by donations from local entrepreneurs. Those 
forms and forums of co­operation have been the strength of the Revolution 
of Dignity, for which – unlike in the case of the 2014 Orange Revolution – no­
one had prepared in advance.146
The movement combines the new possibilities to act offered by social media 
(including crowdfunding), with the traditional Ukrainian anarcho­democ­
ratism, with its reluctance to working together within large organisations, 
and the growing aversion of contemporary societies to politics in general. This 
movement should not be expected to create a powerful political party or a simi­
lar organisation; rather, it will influence public affairs on a local scale, more 
likely through its own activities, than through pressure on the public authori­
ties. However, the experience of the year 2014 demonstrates that in critical situ­
ations, it will be able to form quickly and sustain mass social movements. That 
potential is one of the opportunities for the growth of democracy in Ukraine.
3. Post-atheist orthodoxy
The Soviet state was not simply atheist: it was actively anti­religious and toler­
ated the private profession of religious beliefs as a temporary concession. Its 
objective was to fully eradicate ‘religious superstitions’ and replace them with 
a ‘science­based worldview’. The most important tool in fighting religion was not 
repression, but measures designed to deprive religious organisations of legal 
personhood. Soviet law only recognised the existence of ‘communities of believ­
ers’ (religious communities), which could hire ‘cult personnel’, lease cult objects 
from the state, etc. Monastic orders, episcopal curiae and the like were also 
treated as ‘religious communities’. In this way, organised religious life became 
entirely subordinate to the state, i.e. in practice to the administrative bodies 
and the security services. The categorical ban on teaching religion to minors 
(even at home) further posed a major threat to the continuity of religious life.
That policy delivered a particularly hard blow to the Orthodox Church, which 
had previously been subordinated to secular authorities in the Russian Empire 
(the first stage of its loss of independence came with the enforcement by the 
146 Cf. С. Дацюк, op. cit. The author is very critical (perhaps overly critical?) of NGOs funded 
from grants, but it should be remembered that after 2004, Ukraine saw the arrival of many 
Russian donors alongside the Western ones.
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secular authorities of Patriarch Nikon’s reform in the second half of the 17th 
century, and the second with the abolition of the patriarchate by Peter I and 
the transformation of the Russian Orthodox church into an organisation mod­
elled on the German Protestant Staatskirche). Stalin’s appeal to people’s religious 
beliefs during World War II and the re­creation of the patriarchate (under the 
patronage of the KGB, if not at their hands directly) changed little, especially 
since Khrushchev subsequently reinstated the previous anti­religious policies147 
which continued, albeit without massive repressions, until the period of pere-
stroika. In that situation, Ukraine was in a privileged position anyway: because 
Moscow’s priority objective was to eradicate the Greek Catholic faith, the Ortho­
dox Church in Ukraine was to develop here while facing relatively fewer con­
straints. As a result, around the year 1988, approximately 50% of all the opera­
tional churches in the Soviet Union were located in Ukraine (3500 out of 7500), 
and 80% of newly ordained priests came from the Ukrainian SSR. This was one 
of the reasons why later on, the Moscow patriarchs later steadfastly opposed the 
separation of the Ukrainian Orthodoxy and the formation of an autocephalous 
church – because without Ukraine, the Russian Orthodox Church would no 
longer be the biggest one in all the Orthodox world.
The main effect of the efforts to suppress religious teaching and reduce religious life 
to its ritual aspect was to make Soviet Orthodoxy, which even before was focused 
on rituals more than it was on religious and moral reflection, even more supersti­
tious. The level of intellectual and spiritual formation of the parish­level clergy was 
very low; in many churches no sermons were delivered for decades, many priests 
were informants of the KGB, and the task of providing people with spiritual guid­
ance was largely taken over by the ‘matushki’, i.e. the priests’ spouses.
That was in line with the doublethink and the tendency toward ambiguous action 
characteristic of the Soviet societies in general. In the village houses, religious 
icons were replaced by portraits – if not of Soviet leaders, then of Shevchenko. 
The place of the startsi (the old ones) and kobzari (kobza players) as persons 
of authority was taken over during the Brezhnev era by veterans of the Great 
Patriotic War, often adorned by grotesque numbers of orders and medals.148
147 During the great atheisation in the years 1959–1961, two­thirds of all operating churches 
were closed down, but not one in Eastern Galicia.
148 Startsi was the term used in Russia and Ukraine to denote men who lived as hermits without 
authorisation from the Church hierarchy, and who enjoyed much more authority than the 
Orthodox clergy. They were often believed to be miracle­workers, and were often mentally 
ill. The most famous one was Grigori Rasputin, while Yurodivy, a character from Push­
kin’s Boris Godunov, is the literary archetype of a starets. The term was sometimes also used 
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At the same time, popular science and technology newspapers promoted vari­
ous para­scientific concepts for decades, and irrationalist views borrowed from 
the cultures of China, India and Tibet thrived on the margins of Soviet popular 
culture. All that paved the way towards the explosion of the so­called ekstra-
sens149 in the final year of the Soviet Union, of which Kashpirovsky150 and the 
YUSMALOS Great White Brotherhood151 became the most prominent symbols. It 
is beyond any doubt that ekstrasens thrived under covert patronage of the KGB, 
although their motives for this are not entirely clear.152
The revival of Orthodoxy in independent Ukraine was spontaneous and dynamic. 
On the one hand, very quickly large numbers of new parishes were established 
and churches opened very quickly, but on the other, the catechumens received 
no preparation (at least until 2000); baptism was offered to anyone interested, 
without any instruction. The spiritual regeneration of the Ukrainian Ortho­
doxy almost immediately became paralysed by its schism, and by unseemly 
fights over church buildings between the ‘Kyiv’ and the ‘Moscow’ Orthodoxies, 
and as well as between the Orthodox and the Greek Catholics, which inevita­
bly politicised the dispute. The advocates of a Kyiv Patriarchate independent 
of Moscow started to gravitate towards nationalism,153 while those who pre­
ferred to remain under Moscow’s patronage yielded to the Russian ‘tsarodoxy’, 
e.g. by transplanting to Ukraine the cult of Nikolai II, who has been declared 
a saint by the Russian Orthodox Church.
to denote monks revered for their spiritual guidance. Kobzari were the Ukrainian wander­
ing bards, who also enjoyed high authority among village people as being well­travelled. 
Both groups were eradicated during the Stalin era.
149 This non­translatable term originates from the English word extra-sensory, and refers 
to various concepts and practices related to healing, para­medicine, spell­casting, fortune­
telling and other occult practices, as well as to associated persons: healers, fortune­tellers 
and the like.
150 Anatoliy Kashpirovsky, born in 1939 in Ukraine to a military family, was a Soviet athlete, 
psychiatrist and psychotherapist who became famous for his televised sessions of what 
resembled psychotherapy or collective hypnosis, some regarded him as a healer, and others 
– as an imposter.
151 Also known as the White Brotherhood, a syncretic sect relying on psychological manipula­
tion. It started in Kyiv in 1990, which and at some point had hundreds of thousands of mem­
bers, mostly young Ukrainians and Russians. In November 1993 its members tried to take 
over Saint Sophia’s Cathedral in Kyiv, in the aftermath of which the leaders were arrested 
and convicted, and the sect disintegrated.
152 The founder of the White Brotherhood, Yuriy Krivonogov, was a former KGB staff member, 
a cybernetics specialist who probably worked in the unit in charge of psychological manip­
ulation techniques.
153 In the 1990s, militias of the UNA­UNSO nationalist organisation took part in many battles 
for church buildings.
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The most important religious organisations in Ukraine are the Ukrainian Ortho­
dox Church, which recognises the supremacy of the patriarchs of Moscow and 
All­Russia, has the largest network of dioceses and parishes in Ukraine, and 
is the only one recognised by the international Orthodox community, followed 
by the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Kyiv Patriarchate (which probably 
has the largest number of adherents) and the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church 
(predominant in the three oblasts of Eastern Galicia). The remaining religious 
organisations are minority faiths: the most important ones include the Ukrain­
ian Autocephalous Orthodox Church (present mainly in Eastern Galicia), the 
Roman Catholic Church and two Baptist organisations.
The schism and the pastoral negligence have led to the emergence of a group 
of believers who identify as prosto pravoslavni (‘simply Orthodox’) and do not 
consider themselves to be members of any of the Churches. Various studies 
show that this groups accounts for around 16–20% of the population, i.e. a much 
greater proportion of the total number of Orthodox believers.154 Only 20% of peo­
ple who identify as Orthodox believers engage in religious practice regularly, 
while 37% have never received Holy Communion and never read the Gospel, and 
16% never pray.155 Such is the scale of the failure of Ukraine’s Orthodox clergy.
The Greek Catholic church, which has benefited from organisational and 
spiritual support of from the Greek Catholic diaspora, was in a better situ­
ation. However, despite great effort, it remained a local community – out­
side Eastern Galicia and Transcarpathia, the only Greek Catholics are people 
who have migrated from those two regions. The other religious communities 
are of marginal importance, even if some of them have been developing very 
dynamically (the various Baptist, Adventist and Pentecostal denominations 
or Jehovah’s Witnesses).
Since the beginning of independence, Ukraine’s religious life has been marked 
on the one hand by a rivalry between the different branches of the Ortho­
dox Church, and on the other – by the aspiration of some of the laity (includ­
ing politicians) to establish a Ukrainian particular church (pomisna tserkva 
in Ukrainian) that would bring together the Orthodox and the Greek Catholics. 
154 According to a 2000–2002 poll, slightly over 50%. A. Bychenko, N. Dudar, Religiosity 
of Ukrainian Society: the Level, Character, and Specifics, [in:] National Security & Defence, 
2002, Issue 10.
155 A 2016 study by Research & Branding Group; http://rb.com.ua/eng/analitics/socyum/?date 
=2016, accessed on 31 October 2016.
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As a result of those conflicts, as well as generational change, the Ukrainian 
Orthodox Church, which was initially the largest religious organisation, has 
started to lose believers to the Kyiv Patriarchate, which also has many more 
young and educated people among its adherents. The process has probably been 
accelerated by the war.
According to most scholars of religion in Kyiv, adherents of the Kyiv Patriar­
chate are the predominant group among Ukraine’s Orthodox believers, but the 
basis for those claims is rather questionable. One can suppose that the ‘Kyiv 
option’ is mostly a political declaration (in line with the view commonly held 
in Ukraine that an independent state should have an independent church) 
and that it is prevalent among people who consider religion to be a manifesta­
tion of national life. Adherents of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church, commonly 
referred to as the ‘Moscow Church’, are probably the largest group among the 
regularly practicing believers,156 because only that Church is recognised by the 
global Orthodox community and, consequently, it is the only one that adminis­
ters sacraments in a valid manner. Because of that factor, the Moscow Church 
attracts not only supporters of the pro­Russian option and traditionalists, but 
also many people who experience their religion more profoundly.157
The numbers of adherents of the different churches are always difficult to esti­
mate. The figures reported by the religious organisations themselves are always 
overblown, and the results of sociological research may be distorted by people’s 
reluctance to reveal their confession if they think it is ‘not approved of ’ (e.g. 
it is likely that some people who say they are simply Orthodox do so to conceal 
their links to the Moscow Patriarchate in one part of Ukraine, and links to the 
Kyiv Patriarchate in another). Research conducted by the Razumkov Centre 
in November 2016 (i.e. not throughout the entire territory of Ukraine) showed 
that 64.7% of respondents considered themselves to be believers, of which 39.5% 
identified as adherents of the Kyiv Patriarchate, 23.1% as adherents of the Ukrain­
ian Orthodox Church, and 25.4% as simply Orthodox.158 Greek Catholics accounted 
156 In reality, it is a largely autonomous structure, which recognises the canonical primacy 
of the Moscow patriarchs but is not subordinated to them. On the other hand, the Church’s 
hierarchy includes many advocates of restoring the former subordination to Moscow.
157 It is worth noting that Viktor Yushchenko, an advocate of breaking the canonical ties with 
Moscow, received his sacraments in churches of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church. Petro 
Poroshenko is also a member of that Church.
158 In a study conducted by the same polling institution in the spring of 2016 (http://old.razum­
kov.org.ua/ukr/poll.php?poll_id=1121, accessed on 7 November 2016.) 65.4% of respondents 
identified as Orthodox; affiliations with the different branches of Orthodoxy were not stud­
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for 8.2% of the total, Protestants of different denominations for 1.2%, Roman 
Catholics for 0.8%,159 ‘simply Christians’,160 and atheists and non­believers – for 
11.4%161. The decrease in the number of non­believers is notable: in a 1998 study 
they accounted for as much as 41% of the total (with members of the various 
Orthodox Churches accounting for 45% and Greek Catholics for 6.3%).162
At the onset of independence, Ukraine had 10,000 registered religious com­
munities and 800 non­registered ones of which the authorities were aware, 
including 6000 Orthodox communities, 2000 Greek Catholic communities, 
1500 Baptist communities and 300 Roman Catholic communities.163 Three years 
later, the number of religious communities had risen to nearly 15,000, including 
8000 Orthodox communities, 3000 Greek Catholic communities, 1400 Baptist 
communities (in this case, some of the small communities must have merged), 
and 600 Roman Catholic communities.164 By 2011, the number of religious com­
munities had reached 34,000, including 18,000 Orthodox communities (includ­
ing 12,000 parishes of the ‘Moscow Church’), 4000 Greek Catholic communi­
ties, 9500 Evangelical communities in total, and 1100 Roman Catholic com­
munities. While comparing those numbers, though, one should bear in mind 
that the communities of the major churches are large, usually with more than 
1000 members, while the Evangelical communities are usually small, some­
times numbering only several dozen people.
*
Independent Ukraine has not revised the fundamentals of the Soviet reli­
gious policy. It did not restore legal personality to religious organsations, 
and the state and local authorities still only recognise individual communi­
ties, even though the quasi public nature of churches is recognised in the 
western oblasts. Worse still, Ukraine’s secular authorities have almost from 
the start considered themselves to be authorised to interfere in the matters 
ied or not reported. It should be noted that with the narrower geographical scope, the study 
showed a lower percentage of adherents of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church, which are pre­
sent in the largest numbers in Crimea and in Donbas.
159 This means that there were around 420,000 Roman Catholics in Ukraine.
160 Presumably these were mostly people who did not want to admit to an unthinking lack 
of faith.
161 www.pravda.com.ua/news/2016/12/6/7129011, accessed on 18 December 2016.
162 Study by Socis­GALLUP in Den, 26 February 1998.
163 О. Кривенко, З точки зору цифр, [in:] Postup, 1991, Issue 5.
164 Kościoły i związki wyznaniowe na Ukrainie, [in:] Radość Wiary, 1994, Issue 4.
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of the churches. President Kravchuk supported the schism within the Ortho­
dox Church (the establishment of the Kyiv Patriarchate led by Metropolitan 
Filaret), and President Yushchenko tried to force the ecumenical patriarch 
to award autocephaly to the Ukrainian Orthodoxy, against the objections of the 
Patriarch of Moscow and in violation of the internal rules of the Orthodox 
Church.165 Yanukovych, on the other hand, obtained the Moscow patriarch’s 
consent to grant the prestigious status of a lavra to the provincial monastery 
in Svyatohorsk in the Luhansk oblast.
The above examples show that the political class in Ukraine and large parts 
of the religious community understand the separation of church and state 
as the right of the secular authorities to interfere with the affairs of the church. 
This is further confirmed by the fact that the teaching of (the Greek Catholic 
or Orthodox) religion at schools is tolerated in some oblasts (mainly in western 
Ukraine) even while the separation of church and state is still enshrined in the 
constitution.166
On the other hand, it is difficult to argue that Ukraine is a fully secular state 
if the preamble of its constitution reads: “aware of our responsibility before 
God, our own conscience, past, present and future generations”, and its presi­
dents have been taking their oath of office in the presence of the Gospel since 
1991 (even if they do not swear on the Gospel). Chaplains have been informally 
operating in some hospitals and penal institutions167, and a multi­faith mili­
tary chaplain service was quickly formed in 2014. Finally, an Orthodox Church 
of Saint Volodymyr, subject to the Church of the Moscow Patriarchy, has been 
located in one of the premises of the Verkhovna Rada since 2008.
165 However these activities did have a historical precedent: in 1919 an Ukrainian Autocepha­
lous Orthodox Church was established by a decree of the socialist authorities of the Ukrain­
ian People’s Republic.
166 Art. 35, third sentence of the constitution of Ukraine reads: “The Church and religious 
organisations in Ukraine are separated from the State, and the school — from the Church. 
No religion shall be recognised by the State as mandatory”. The first sentence exactly ech­
oes a provision in the 1977 Soviet constitution.
167 A bill regulating the provision of religious service in hospitals did not make it through the 
Verkhovna Rada in November 2016.
85
O
SW
 S
TU
D
IE
S 
 1
1/
20
17
vII. demograPhIc collaPse
The demographic collapse experienced by Ukraine has been the country’s sin­
gle greatest failure. On 1 January 1991, Ukraine had a population of 51.9 million 
(including 35.1 million in cities and 16.8 million in rural areas), and previous 
projections predicted further growth: the country’s population was expected 
to increase to 53.4 million by 2015 (40.2 million and 13.2 million in the urban 
and rural areas respectively, which meant that further urbanisation was 
expected).168 Meanwhile, according to the official figures as of 1 January 2014 (i.e. 
the last comparable dataset available),169 Ukraine had a population of 45.4 million 
(32.3 million and 14.1 million in urban and rural areas, respectively). The figures 
do not include migration, the volume of which is estimated at several million 
people. The country’s population had already stopped growing in 1993 when 
a decrease of 130,000 people, i.e. (0.25%), was reported.
Thus, in a period of peaceful development, Ukraine lost 6.7 million people, 
mostly due to the diminishing rate of natural population increase: while 
657,000 children were born in the country in in 1990, in 2000 the number was 
only 385,000, and 504,000 in 2013 (corresponding to rates of natural increase 
of 0.5‰ in 1990, ­7.6‰ in 2000 and ­3.4‰ in 2013). In the same years, 1,019,000, 
409,000 and 148,000 pregnancy terminations170 were registered respectively,171 
and the number of terminations dropped below the number of births only 
in 2001. In 2014, 70,000 terminations were registered; the decrease is partly 
due to a smaller reporting base as than in the previous years. The largest 
numbers of terminations (above 300 per 1000 live births in 2012) were reg­
istered in Sevastopol and in the Kyiv, Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts. The deep 
decrease in the number of abortions is also linked to the greater availability 
of contraception and information about family planning, as well as cultural 
change, especially the rejection of the Soviet­era view of abortion as a generally 
accepted birth­control method.
168 Сборник статистических материалов 1990, Moscow 1991, p. 65.
169 Figures for the following years exclude Crimea, and the figures for the Donetsk and Luhansk 
oblasts are very rough approximations.
170 Abortion has been legal in Ukraine since 1955: it is available on demand until the 12th week, 
and as late as the 22nd with a medical commission’s prescription.
171 Figures from the Ministry of Health of Ukraine, http://www.moz.gov.ua/ua/portal/pre_ 
20 12 0313_2.html, accessed on 27 October 2016, and О. Рудий, Абортована країна, https://
zaxid.net/abortovana_krayina_n1405175, accessed 30 Sep tember 2016.
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According to the newest, incomplete figures, Ukraine had a population of 42.6 mil­
lion as of 1 December 2016 (the figure excludes Crimea, and is based on a very 
imprecise estimation for the separatist­controlled areas). Within the first eleven 
months of 2016, 365,000 children were born and 330,000 people died.
Despite the increase in the number of births observed in recent years, the gen­
eral downward trend is unlikely to be reversed in the long term: very few chil­
dren were born in the second half of the 1990s and that deficit of future parents 
cannot be compensated for.
Chart 4. The population of Ukraine (total, urban, rural) in the years 
1990–2017 (figures as of 1 January of the in successive years)
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The figures for 2015–2017 exclude Crimea and the occupied part of Donbas; the figures for early 2017 have 
no breakdown into urban and rural areas.
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Chart 5. Dynamics of live births, deaths and rate of natural increase in 
Ukraine in the years 1990–2013 (‰)
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Chart 6. Dynamics of live births and pregnancy terminations in the years 
1990–2013 (absolute figures)
1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 20122008 20100
200000
400000
600000
800000
1000000
1200000
pregnancy terminations 
live births 
The most recent demographic forecasts, which did not assume that the coun­
try’s territory would shrink, predicted further population decline in Ukraine: 
according to the Institute of Demography of the National Academy of Sci­
ence of Ukraine, the country’s population was expected to shrink to 44.3 mil­
lion by 2020 and to 39.2 million by 2050, while the United Nations predicted 
a decline to 43.2 million by 2020 and to 33.6 million by 2050.172
172 Quoted from the Wikipedia entry ‘Демографічні прогнози для України’, accessed 
on 31 October 2016.
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There are only two regions which have not experienced population decline: Kyiv, 
which invariably attracts new inhabitants as the capital city, and the largely 
rural Transcarpathia region which reports a higher­than­average birth rate. 
The Rivne, Volyn and Ivanofrankivsk oblasts, which are similar to Transcar­
pathia in many respects, have reported slight population declines (below 5%), 
while the deepest steepest drops (above 20%) were reported by the industrial 
Kirovohrad and Luhansk oblasts and the increasingly depopulating Chernihiv 
and Sumy oblasts.173
According to the 1989 census, 66.7% of the inhabitants of Ukraine lived in cities; 
by early 2014 that percentage had risen to 69%, but the populations of a large 
number of cities have been shrinking since around 2000 (the trend was first 
registered in the 2001 census). Back in 2012 it was estimated that Ukraine had 
only two cities with populations above one million, i.e. namely Kyiv and Kharkiv 
(Dnipropetrovsk and Donetsk had dropped below one million, and Odessa was 
fluctuating around that threshold). Of the forty largest cities in Ukraine, Kyiv 
was the only one to report more inhabitants in 2012 than in 1989, but numerous 
smaller cities such as Vinnytsia or Lutsk had started to grow again after 2000. 
It is characteristic that the cities which grow are mostly those which are the 
urban centres of agricultural regions, or cities near the western border that live 
off cross­border trade. The industrial cities in eastern Ukraine were reporting 
shrinking populations long before the war broke out.
The diminishing population growth and the emigration of young people from 
villages, which has continued for generations, has resulted in the depopulation 
of rural areas, especially in central Ukraine. Many villages have been deserted 
completely; others have populations of less than 200, several dozen or even 
under ten people, usually old age pensioners,174 and there are hundreds of vil­
lages where no children or young people live.175 In the years 1991–2012, 601 local­
ities (villages and rural settlements) were deleted from the records, in most 
cases because they had no inhabitants left.176 Apart from Transcarpathia and 
173 The reasons for which why these two oblasts, which are also rural and undeveloped, do 
not perform as well and Volyn and Transcarpathia, are likely related to the deeper impact 
of Communism on social structures.
174 Around the year 2009, 65% of villages had populations of less than 500 people. Л. Кучма, 
Сломанное десятилетие, Kyiv 2011, p. 480.
175 М. Василевський, Жодної дитини за чотири роки,	[in:] Den, 1 November 2006.
176 www.pravda.com.ua/news/2013/04/9/6987778/view_print accessed on 10 April 2016. 
According to other sources, 350 villages disappeared from the map of Ukraine after 2000: 
Ю. Самаева, Докучная сказка..., op. cit.
89
O
SW
 S
TU
D
IE
S 
 1
1/
20
17
some counties in Volyn, this process is set to continue. The ongoing consolida­
tion of small municipalities (consisting of one to three villages) into collective 
municipalities of several dozen villages will be conducive to a concentration 
of people in the central villages, and reinforce the tendency for the smallest 
villages to become abandoned and formally liquidated.
The changes have distorted the proportions between generations. While the 
proportion of working­age people (older than 16) increased by 4.7% in the years 
1991–2012, the proportion of people above retirement age (over 60) 177 increased 
by 2.9%, and the proportion of young people fell by 7.5% (to 15.4% of the popu­
lation). The average age in Ukraine rose from 36.5 years in 1989 to 40.6 years 
in 2014 (it is lowest in Volyn and Transcarpathia). In 2014, Ukraine had 
251 persons per 1000 at working age under 16, and 344 persons per 1000 over 
retirement age (compared to 390 and 305, respectively, in 1991).
177 Until recently, the retirement age in Ukraine was 55 years for women and 60 years for men. 
In 2011, this was raised to 60 years for women (the change was to be implemented gradu­
ally over 10 years), while for men it remained unchanged (apart from state functionaries and 
academic workers, for whom it was extended to 62 years). Despite pressure from the IMF, 
Ukraine insists that it will not extend the retirement age for men in the coming decade, argu­
ing that the average life expectancy for men in Ukraine is 65 years (which is a manipulation: 
65–67 years is the life expectancy at birth; while the life expectancy at 60 was 18.45 years 
in 2013 (15.5 years for men and 20.63 for women). In 2013, Ukraine had 13.6 million old age and 
disabled pensioners, 1.4 million of whom were receiving disability pensions.
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Charts 7&8. Graphical representation of the number of men and women by 
year of birth in the years 1989 and 2014
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The average life expectancy at birth rose from 70.4 years in 1990 to 71.4 years 
in 2013, which is one of the poorest results in Europe (although it must be remem­
bered that Ukraine’s life expectancy had declined considerably in the 1990s, 
reaching the lowest point of 66.8 years in 1995). The increase is due to the con­
siderable fall in infant (from 12.8‰ in 1990 to 8.0‰ in 2013) and child mortality, 
as well as a radical decrease in the number of accidents at work (from 6.2 per 
1000 workers in 1990 to 0.9 in 2013).178 Nevertheless, the excessive mortality 
rate of middle­aged men remains a huge problem, with one in ten of Ukraine’s 
male inhabitants of Ukraine dying before the age of 35, and one in four – before 
the age of 60.179 The country’s general mortality rate was 14.5‰ in 2015, i.e. the 
second highest in the world (after Lesotho with 14.9, and ahead of Bulgaria with 
14.5, Burkina Faso with 14.3 and Latvia with 14.3).180 One of the main causes 
of the excessive mortality rate is alcoholism181; other causes include the poor 
condition of the healthcare system.
The number of people who have left Ukraine for a longer time or permanently, 
in contrast to those who regularly cross and re­cross the border (and constitute 
the only group of migrants for which reliable figures are available) has been 
variously estimated as high as 5–7 million.182 Research by the National Academy 
of Sciences of Ukraine puts the number of emigrant workers at 1.2 million in the 
years 2010–2012, corresponding to 3.4% of Ukraine’s inhabitants between the 
ages of 15 and 70; for the years 2005–2008 it was estimated at 1.5 million.183 Sim­
ilar figures (1.5 million people emigrating to work in the years 2005–2008 and 
1.2 million in the years 2010–2013) are given in the newest studies on the sub­
178 This proves that safety at work has improved considerably, even when bearing the less 
accurate reporting in mind.
179 Kuzio, op. cit., p. 298.
180 http://glavcom.ua/publications/ukrajina­druga­u­sviti­za­pokaznikami­smertnosti­
statistika­cru­359397.html, accessed on 3 July 2016. The article quotes CIA figures. Accord­
ing to the same figures, Ukraine ranks 182nd globally in terms of the number of births.
181 Legal alcohol sales per capita fell from 4.1 litres of pure alcohol in 1990 to 2.8 litres in 2013. 
The largest sale volumes are currently reported in Kyiv (6.9 litres). The figures do not 
include illicit alcohol production; the very low level of alcohol sales in the second half of the 
1990s (1.6 litres in 1995 and 1.4 litres in 2000) should be linked to the development of illicit 
alcohol production. According to T. Kuzio (op. cit., p. 298), vodka consumption per capita 
in Ukraine corresponded to 8 litres of pure alcohol in 2013, putting the country in the top 
three for global alcohol consumption after Russia and Belarus.
182 Åslund, How Ukraine..., op. cit., p. 235, figures for 2008; the highest estimates would corre­
spond to around 20% of all people aged 18–60 on average, which undermines the credibility 
of those figures.
183 Украинцы откликнулись на зов родины, https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/2199654, 
accessed on 6 June 2016.
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ject.184 However, none of the studies differentiate between those who go abroad 
for two, three or five years but intend to come back to Ukraine, and those who 
intend to permanently settle down in the new country. We do not know how 
large the second category is. The number of people emigrating from Ukraine 
has been increasing again since 2014, but it is a matter of estimations how many 
of them intend to come back and how many are leaving for good. In most cases, 
the decision not to return will depend on further developments in the war 
in eastern Ukraine.
*
All predominantly Christian post­Communist states have experienced steep 
population decline,185 which is unquestionably related to similar demographic 
processes in certain developed countries.186 The concept of a ‘second demographic 
transition’, which was first put forward in demographic research in the mid­
1980s, refers to a permanent tendency of developed countries to have birth rates 
below the replacement level, in other words, to experience natural population 
decline. Whether or not that concept is accurate, the Ukrainian demographic 
processes should be considered in the wider context of regional and even global 
trends. The declining rates of population increase cannot be attributed solely 
to the (unquestionable) mistakes of Kyiv’s social policy, or the consequences of the 
post­Communist transformation, including the pauperisation of society.
The Ukrainian government conducted the last census in 2001. The new one has 
been postponed since 2011 and there are no indications that it will be conducted 
in the coming years. Apart from the obvious economic arguments and the fact 
that for the last three years, it has been impossible to cover the country’s entire 
territory, two other factors have been discouraging the government from order­
ing a census. One concerns the worries that the census could show a growing 
proportion of Russian­speakers (which seems no longer valid today as declar­
ing oneself as a Ukrainian­speaker has been ‘politically correct’ again since 
2014), and the other – the fear that the census would reveal the real population 
numbers of Ukraine, i.e. expose the scale of emigration in the last two decades.
184 D. Drbohlav, M. Jaroszewicz (ed.), Ukrainian Migration in Times of Crisis: Forced and 
Labour Mobility, Prague 2016, p. 16.
185 According to Eurostat, the rate of natural increase in 2012 was –3.5‰ in Ukraine, –5.2‰ 
in Bulgaria, –3.2‰ in Romania, 0.5‰ in Slovakia, etc.
186 According to Eurostat, the rate of natural increase in 2013 was 1.4‰ in Italy, 2.2‰ in Portu­
gal, 0.6‰ in Denmark, 0,0‰ in Austria, etc.
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vIII. KyIv versus moscow
At the onset, independent Ukraine did not have a clear conception of its place 
in the international community. The declaration of suverenitet stated that 
Ukraine would be a non­aligned state187 without nuclear weapons, which was 
a direct declaration of its desire to break with the Soviet military alliance struc­
ture, but also of a desire not to develop close ties with the Western structures. 
This was due to more than just political caution (the Soviet Union still existed 
at the time the declaration was adopted): the declaration also reflected the genu­
ine aversion to NATO harboured by most of the Ukrainian political elite, as well 
as the aversion to making decisive choices which later turned out to be a per­
manent feature of Ukrainian politics.
Ukraine had to find its place in a new geopolitical reality. The greatest novelty 
and challenge concerned the fact that while Russia was now a neighbouring 
country, the close ties between the two countries had not disappeared. Those 
ties consisted not only of the most evident economic and infrastructural links, 
but also the social relationships built up over the several decades during which 
Ukraine had existed within the Soviet migration space, as well as cultural rela­
tions. Equally important, or perhaps more so, were the ties between the secret 
services, the legacy of being part of a single system of armed forces and security 
services, as well as the ‘twin’ relations between the two countries’ criminal 
worlds; and finally, the fact that thousands of bureaucrats and technocrats had 
become accustomed to viewing Moscow as the actual decision­making centre.188 
Many of those ties had to be preserved, but all of them needed to be ‘delimited’. 
Meanwhile Kyiv seemed to care little about demarcating its post­Soviet bor­
ders, even in the most basic sense of separating its territory from the territories 
of other states (in which it was fully and actively backed by Moscow).
Ukraine was a founding member of the Commonwealth of Independent States 
(the establishment of which was a formula for, and probably also the pre­req­
uisite of, the dissolution of the Soviet Union), but it did not become a full mem­
ber, having rejected the organisation’s statutes. In practice, on some occasions 
187 This was an euphemism used in order to avoid the word ‘neutrality’, which was associated 
with the treaty­guaranteed status of Austria or Switzerland.
188 Ukraine’s tendency to take Moscow’s interests into account as a priority was probably the 
main reason why it Ukraine was so slow to establish its energy independence; the other rea­
son concerned the bureaucratic inertia which led people to continue with business as usual 
instead of looking for new solutions. In this case, as in many others, the two approaches 
complemented each other.
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Kyiv behaved as though Ukraine was a member, and on others as though it was 
a non­member, depending on its current political interest. It avoided joining 
structures and agreements it perceived as unfavourable (including the agree­
ment on co­operation in the area of defence, i.e. the so­called Tashkent Treaty). 
Later, when the Commonwealth lost much of its importance, Kyiv again care­
fully manoeuvred its way whenever Russia insisted it take part in re­integration 
undertakings; for instance in 2000 Ukraine joined the Eurasia Economic Com­
munity, but only as an observer.
After the initial period of fascination with the Baltic­Black Sea axis con­
cept, which was particularly active during Kravchuk’s presidency (and was 
also influenced by the fact that similar concepts, including the Intermarium 
or ‘NATO­bis’, were being nurtured at that time in Poland), President Kuchma 
realised that such projects had no future, and that Ukraine needed to seek the 
support of Western powers. He also realised that he could play Russia and the 
West (especially the United States) off against one another to Ukraine’s ben­
efit. Kyiv could gain a great deal in the West by implying that Ukraine might 
be forced to make concessions to Russia, while it could extract much from Mos­
cow by threatening to build closer relations with the United States. No wonder 
that Kyiv announced its strategic partnership with the United States as early 
as 1996, and another with the Russian Federation (as well as Poland) the year 
after.189 Later, more than a dozen other states were granted the title of Ukraine’s 
‘strategic partners’, as a result of which the very idea of strategic partnership 
lost any significance (in 2001, the then foreign minister of Ukraine, Anatoliy 
Zlenko, tried to salvage the situation by saying that Ukraine had two strategic 
partners: Russia and the United States). It is notable that the list of Ukraine’s 
‘strategic’ partners has never included Germany or France.
During Kuchma’s presidency Ukraine first expressed its willingness to join 
the European Union and NATO, but it was aware that those aspirations were 
unlikely to materialise in the foreseeable future. It got a cold reception in both 
organisations: the leaders of the Alliance understood that an attempt at incor­
porating Crimea, with its Russian navy bases, into NATO’s structures could 
189 Polish­Ukrainian relations are outside the scope of this paper, but it is worth noting the role 
of Polish diplomacy in Ukraine’s efforts to strengthen its international position, first in the 
years 1992–1993, when Kyiv did not have a true diplomatic corps of its own, and then in 1996–
1997, when negotiations on NATO enlargement were underway. (The idea of a Ukraine­NATO 
Charter was first publicly proposed by Polish president Aleksander Kwaśniewski during his 
address at the Royal Institute of International Relations in London on 24 October 1996).
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be a casus belli,190 while the EU had other priorities, including the threats posed 
by the successive wars in the Western Balkans and mounting internal problems. 
Or, as two British political scientists put it: “Ukraine’s problem was that the EU 
did not care enough about Ukraine’s pro­European choice — and Russia cared 
too much.”191
Under Yanukovych, Kyiv came under constant and mounting pressure from 
Moscow to join the various re­integration initiatives, and responded by try­
ing to negotiate compromise formulas, such as limited co­operation with the 
Eurasian Customs Union (the so­called 3+1 formula), or Ukraine’s simultaneous 
membership in two free trade areas, the CIS and the EU, etc. At the same time, 
Kyiv continued its negotiations with Brussels, and finally in 2013 it managed 
to close the negotiations of the Association Agreement with the EU, whose sig­
nature Russia blocked at the last minute with a brutal act of blackmail. Earlier 
in 2013, Ukraine officially rescinded its aspirations to join NATO by adopting 
a bill on its ‘non­aligned status’, thus also creating a safeguard against potential 
accession to a hypothetical Eurasian military pact.
What followed was the revolution, the war and Ukraine’s decisive rapproche­
ment with the West, including the signature of the Association Agreement and 
the repeal (in December 2014) of the bill on the country’s non­aligned status. 
These measures signified the end of the original ‘multi­vector’ policy of trying 
to benefit from the divergences of interests between Russia and the West. Kyiv 
now needs to meet the expectations of its Western economic partners (espe­
cially the IMF); so far this has resulted in a noticeable but still insufficient uptick 
in its determination to fight corruption and implement the solutions provided 
for in the Association Agreement.
Nevertheless, Russia has succeeded in blocking Ukraine’s prospects of joining 
the European Union and NATO. The EU could theoretically consider the acces­
sion of a state which does not control parts of its territory,192 but not of a state 
which is involved in an ongoing military conflict. And Russia will make sure 
that the conflict continues at least until (if ever) Moscow significantly revises its 
190 The Georgian war in 2008 marked the end of Ukraine’s Euro­Atlantic opportunities. How­
ever, it should be noted that Ukraine was denied the prospect of membership (i.e. it was not 
given the MAP) several months before the war started.
191 R. Dragneva­Lewers, K. Wolczuk, Ukraine Between the EU and Russia. The Integration 
Challenge, London 2015, p. 128.
192 The accession of the permanently divided Cyprus in 2004 set a precedent.
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international strategy. Likewise, NATO will not consider admitting a country 
at war. Kyiv seems to be aware of that, which is probably one of the reasons 
why it opposed the attempts at imposing a resolution of the conflict on Russia’s 
conditions, as laid down in the Minsk Agreement.
Irrespective of how Kyiv defines its future relations with Moscow and how those 
relations develop in future, they are of crucial importance for Ukraine, and the 
stability of the Ukrainian state depends on its ability to develop a stable and 
mutually acceptable modus vivendi, which today seems more distant that at any 
point during the last quarter of a century.
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IX. one uKraIne and many uKraInes
The territory of Ukraine is very diverse, mainly because no state or autono­
mous territory encompassing all the lands inhabited by Ukrainians today 
had existed before the 20th century.193 Large parts of today’s ethnically 
Ukrainian territory saw their first agricultural and urban settlements only 
in the 18th and 19th centuries. In the early 20th century, three major ‘macro­
regions’ of Ukraine could be distinguished: the ‘old’ Ukraine, which had 
been part of the Russian Empire since the 17th–18th century; the ‘new’ Ukraine 
(or Novorossiya in Russian terminology), annexed by the Empire in the late 
18th and early 19th century; and Red Ruthenia, which had been controlled 
by the Austrian empire (Eastern Galicia or Halychyna), as well as the mar­
ginal ‘micro­regions’ of Transcarpathia and Bukovina which had been part 
of Czechoslovakia and Romania. Crimea was not part of ethnically Ukrain­
ian territory (nor did it become ethnically Ukrainian after its incorporation 
into the Ukrainian SSR). None of those regions had any overarching regional 
political structures acting as intermediaries between the administrative 
units (guberniates in Russia, counties in Austria; the autonomous Kingdom 
of Galicia and Lodomeria combined ethnically Polish and Ukrainian terri­
tories) and the centre of the state.
The situation started to change during the Russian Revolution. In 1917, Ukrain­
ian socialists founded the Ukrainian People’s Republic, in response to which 
some Bolsheviks in Donetsk tried in 1918 to organise a ‘Donets­Krivoy Rog 
Soviet Republic’ which would have become part of the all­Russian federation 
of republics.194 However, the Bolshevik leadership rejected the idea, probably 
because it intended to ‘balance’ the predominantly peasant ‘old’ Ukraine with 
the proletarian centres in the east (the fact that nearly all the rural areas in the 
projected republic were ethnically Ukrainian is a separate matter). As a result, 
the Ukrainian SSR was created, which comprised three distinct regions: the 
west, the east and the south. After western Volhynia and eastern Galicia were 
incorporated during World War II, the original west became the centre of the 
country, and Ukraine became even more regionally diversified.
193 The topic has been raised in nearly all studies on contemporary Ukraine. For more informa­
tion about the issue see: Olszański, Unity stronger than divisions..., op. cit.
194 The concept of the Soviet Union did not exist at that time; the aim was to be separate from 
the Bolshevik Ukraine within the Bolshevik, federative all­Russia.
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The ‘regional issue’ did not exist in the Soviet Union. The state was so diverse 
(in terms of climate zones, ethnicities and economic conditions) and at the same 
time so centralised that diversity was considered to be obvious and permanent. 
Both factors were part of the Soviet narrative of identity. Even the ‘foreign­
ness’ of Ukraine’s western oblasts, as emphasised in Soviet propaganda, did not 
have any major significance: Lviv (which, by the way, had a large proportion 
of Russian inhabitants)195 was perceived as a ‘magical European’ city rather than 
a hostile one.
The situation of the independent Ukrainian state was different: not because 
the differences between its regions were particularly great (most states in the 
world are regionally diversified to a similar or greater degree), but because, 
on the one hand, for many supporters of independence the Ukrainian language 
amounted to a national sacrum, and on the other, those who opposed inde­
pendence exploited the country’s deep inter­regional differences to question 
Ukraine’s right to independent statehood.
Already in the late Soviet period, a view had developed in Ukraine and beyond 
that the country was essentially divided into two distinctive parts: the Ukrain­
ian­speaking, patriotic (nationalistic), Greek Catholic and pro­Western west 
(approximately corresponding to the third ‘macro­region’ mentioned before), 
and the Russian­speaking, Orthodox (or more accurately post­Orthodox) and 
pro­Soviet east (corresponding, approximately, the remaining two ‘macro­
regions’). Some also believed that central Ukraine (Dnieper Ukraine) was a dis­
tinct region. These regions were supposedly so fundamentally different that 
fusing them into one nation could only be achieved if the inhabitants of one 
of them (it was implied that it should be the west) gave up their own identity, 
or at least their state­ and nation­building ambitions. The country thus entered 
independence with this myth of ‘two Ukraines’.
However, that view ignored the consequences of several decades of the Ukrain­
ian territory’s administrative unity, freedom of internal migration (and the 
consequences of ‘managed’ migrations), ‘marriage migrations’, and the unify­
ing nature of school education and state propaganda. It also ignored the fact 
that Ukrainian identity was built neither on the ‘Lviv’ narrative, nor on the 
195 In 1951, Russians accounted for 38.8% of the population of Lviv, by 1989 that percentage 
had decreased to 16.1% (census data). For more information see: К. Кондратюк,	 Зміни	
етносоціального складу населення Львова (1944–2000) in Visnyk of the Lviv University, 
Ser. Istor. 2007, p. 611.
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‘Donetsk’ narrative (merging those would indeed be difficult to imagine), but 
on the ‘Kyiv’ narrative of Taras Shevchenko and Zaporizhia. This narrative was 
acceptable to all who had their roots in Ukraine (although it did not necessarily 
have to be as acceptable to a large portion of the internal Soviet immigrants).
Contrary to the view preached in Russia, a common ‘Novorussian’ identity/
consciousness bringing together the inhabitants of south­eastern Ukraine 
from Kharkiv to Odessa never really formed. Its several parts were too differ­
ent to be able to be combined by anything except subordination to the same 
state organism, or membership in the same political nation. The Donetsk Basin, 
which would later turn out to be a lynchpin of the Novorossiya project put for­
ward by Moscow, did not have a distinct cultural identity at all: its inhabitants, 
who for the most part were recent immigrants from other regions of the USSR, 
only shared a territorial affiliation and a sense of pride in their professions, 
inherited from Soviet propaganda, and still genuinely felt today.
In the independent state the old, ‘soft’ version of Ukrainianness / Little Rus­
sianness, which had allowed people to be Ukrainian, Russian and Soviet all 
at the same time, ceased to suffice. Later still, it became virtually impossible. 
Ukrainianness started to be political; it was now a citizenship. On top of that, 
Russian propaganda exploited the regional differences to call the legitimacy 
of the Ukrainian state into question: questions were raised about Ukraine’s title 
to not only Crimea, but also the Donbas and other regions with a predominantly 
Russian­speaking population, or even all of the lands conquered by the Russian 
Empire which had previously belonged to the Crimean Khanate and the Otto­
man Empire, from Donetsk to the Danube estuary.
Despite its strong centralist tendencies, the independent Ukrainian state had 
to remain internally pluralist: Kyiv cannot ever dominate the entire country the 
way Minsk dominated Belarus or Budapest dominated Hungary. Almost imme­
diately a kind of ‘concert of metropolises’ formed. This involved Kyiv, Kharkiv, 
Dnipropetrovsk and Donetsk, the four cities with populations above one million, 
which were Ukraine’s major political and economic centres (elites from the lat­
ter two cities played a crucial role in the development of Ukraine, while the role 
of Kharkiv was less prominent). The ‘concert’ also included two semi­metropo­
lises, i.e. Odessa and Lviv (the latter mainly as a provider of intellectual elites who 
thought in state and national categories). This natural internal pluralism became 
an important ‘anchor’ for Ukrainian democracy, especially once the transforming 
Soviet elites recognised the parliament and local representative bodies as good 
instruments through which to compete and negotiate their respective interests.
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The country’s bureaucratic centralism, which embraced this ‘concert of metrop­
olises’, brought about an unexpected benefit for the country’s unity: it attracted 
very large numbers of members of the local economic and intellectual elites 
to the capital city. This drained the regions of human resources, which was 
bad for the country’s development, but strengthened the unity of Ukraine. 
The centrifugal tendencies of Ukraine’s eastern regions were also eased by the 
fact that the elites of those regions co­decided on the country’s affairs at almost 
all moments after independence.
In the 1990s, the people­to­people ties between the regions started to falter. 
Travelling became more expensive, the system of organised holidays and 
health spa treatments collapsed, and people became generally impoverished, 
as a result of which the number of intercity passenger trips decreased by nearly 
two­thirds.196 According to research in 2012, a third of Ukrainians (and as many 
as 50% in western Ukraine) have never travelled beyond their home oblast.197 
Football fans (ultras) are the only social group to have travelled the entire coun­
try (or at least visited most of the large cities); and it seems no accident that they 
have generally been opposed to the separatist tendencies.
The territorial differences based on material factors rather than ideas still per­
sist in Ukraine: the eastern oblasts continue to be dominated by large industry, 
while the centre and the west are dominated by agriculture, trade and smaller 
scale industry (the de­industrialisation of the last century has contributed 
to the restoration of this dualism).
Differences concerning ideas such as language, confession or the closeness and 
form of one’s bond with the state/nation have been evolving. In particular, they 
have ceased to be strictly territorial (even though the decline in inter­regional 
travel may have been conducive to the development of more pronounced terri­
torial differences). Internal migrations are still taking place, and social media 
has largely offset the consequences of the erosion of direct contacts, at least for 
the young and middle generations. School education reinforces the view that the 
196 According to the official statistics, in 1989 the Ukrainian railways moved 704.1 million 
passengers, inland waterways – 20.2 million, and road transport (including city buses) 
– 8,382.9 million. By 2013 these numbers had decreased to 425.2 million, 600,000 and 
3,343.6 million, respectively. However, one should bear in mind the effects of the develop­
ment of individual motorisation (as a result of which the passengers of city transport other 
than the subway also decreased).
197 http://news.bigmir.net/ukraine/568083­Opros­Kajdii­tretii­jitel­Ykraini­ni­razy­ne­bil­
v­drygom­regione­strani, accessed on 20 January 2017.
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state’s unity is natural. The events of the years 2014–5 have considerably under­
mined the importance of language as a defining factor in one’s identity. A new 
factor came with the wave of refugees from the Donbas, the number of which has 
been estimated at 1.5 million people. Those people have been resettling in various 
regions of Ukraine, but in most cases, they have not abandoned their ‘eastern’ 
identity. In this way, regional differences have largely transformed into political 
differences, similar to those found in other young democracies. Generational, 
social and ideological differences have also been widening. Some of these might 
pose a challenge to the internal order in Ukraine, but not to its unity.
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X. neITher war nor Peace
The Revolution of Dignity was much less expected than the Orange Revolution 
had been ten years before. The latter had been prepared in advance: even though 
its scale still took the organisers by surprise, the permanent rally in Independ­
ence Square had been planned and activists had trained in ‘colour revolution’ 
techniques for some time. The protests which erupted in November 2013, on the 
other hand, had not been prepared by anyone, primarily because nobody had 
predicted that Yanukovych would take the last­minute decision not to sign the 
Association Agreement with the EU. At the same time, tensions in Ukraine were 
much higher than in the autumn of 2004, with growing anger fuelled by the 
mounting arrogance and lawlessness of the local and central administration, 
often of a criminal nature. The Vradiivka riots in July 2013198 were a warning sig­
nal for the government – a signal which, however, was ignored. Meanwhile, the 
interests of all the oligarchs, as well as the budding middle classes, came under 
threat as the ‘Family’, i.e. the business and political circles surrounding the 
president’s son Oleksandr Yanukovych, tried to take control over much of the 
national economy, no longer through corruption but this time using openly 
criminal methods.
The independence generation described above, which was the driving force 
behind the revolution, had by now become much larger, more mature and more 
aware of its interests. These were young progressive people, personally inter­
ested in Ukraine’s rapprochement with the EU, distrustful of authority, and 
especially of politicians. Initially this group mainly comprised students from 
Kyiv and Lviv, later joined by representatives of nearly all social classes and 
groups. While the ‘orange’ Maidan of 2004 had predominantly been the work 
of activists and the Kyiv intelligentsia, the winter Maidan of 2014 also attracted 
workers and farmers, left­wing liberals and right­wing radicals, and veterans 
of the Afghanistan war. With the material support of both the middle class and 
some of the oligarchs, it was able to maintain a ‘fortress town’ in the centre 
of Kyiv for nearly two months, the functioning of which was an excellent lesson 
in civil attitudes, self­discipline and self­organisation, and unleashed a great 
potential of generosity and creativity. The Maidan also offered people an oppor­
tunity to undergo basic defence training and get their first experiences of fire 
and bloodshed: by the time Yanukovych’s rule collapsed, Ukraine had at least 
198 For more information about the Vradiivka atrocity and the public reaction, see K. Kwiat­
kowska­Moskalewicz, Zabić smoka. Ukraińskie rewolucje, Wołowiec 2016, pp. 109–118; the 
previous chapter also provides some important context (pp. 88–108).
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several thousand young people who had shed the ‘civilian’ aversion to the use 
of force, even if they did not yet know how to really fight.
1. The war for the donbas
Immediately after the collapse of Yanukovych’s rule, Russia annexed Crimea 
and proceeded to try to unleash a ‘Russian spring’, i.e. to stoke a rebellion against 
Kyiv in the eastern and southern parts of Ukraine, from Kharkiv to Odessa. 
What it wanted to achieve was a ‘federalisation’ of Ukraine, i.e. its transforma­
tion into a state made up of two constituents, which would permanently thwart 
Kyiv’s aspirations to rapprochement with the West and bind it with Russia. That 
plan failed as it ran into opposition from not only most of the young generation, 
the middle class, a majority of the oligarchs, but also the bureaucracy and the 
state apparatus (the interests of the latter, including the existing corruption 
patterns, had by then become too closely linked to the Ukrainian state for the 
administration apparatus to be willing to risk major change). Meanwhile, the 
‘silent pro­Russian majority’ on whose support Russia counted turned out not 
to be a majority any more: the generation of ‘orphans of the Soviet Union’ had 
grown older, smaller and less active.
The ‘Russian spring’ only succeeded in parts of the Donbas. It was there that 
the separatist rebellion started, conducted by paramilitary formations from 
Russia and members of the Ukrainian special police forces which had been 
disbanded in the wake of the Revolution, and backed primarily by immigrant 
communities with loose links to Ukraine, and also apparently by sections of the 
criminal world. The rebellion also had the silent support of old­age pensioners, 
nostalgic about the times of Brezhnev­era prosperity (and their own youth). 
In view of the disintegration or marginalisation of the major pro­Russian forces 
in Donbas, i.e. the Progressive Socialist Party of Ukraine and the Communist 
Party of Ukraine,199 Russia re­activated fringe separatist communities like the 
Donetsk People’s Republic (an organisation by that name had existed at least 
since 2010). When their first actions met with success, Russia provided back­
ing in the form of both media coverage and military assistance (instructors, 
militants, special troops, and later also regular army units).
Ukraine was defenceless in the face of Russian aggression. In early 2014, its 
armed forces theoretically had around 121,000 troops, but only 5000 at best 
199 This was the result of consistent efforts by the Party of Regions.
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(and possibly as few as 3000) were combat­ready,200 and even those were oper­
ating within small groups rather than fully staffed units. That was the result 
of the deliberate dismantling of the armed forces under Yanukovych,201 as well 
as the fact that all Ukrainian governments since 1992 had neglected the army. 
As a result, Ukraine surrendered Crimea without a fight (and much of its armed 
forces along with it), was unable to quickly respond to the Russian­inspired 
capture of government buildings in the cities of the Donbas, and later on, was 
highly inept at conducting its first military operations.
In that situation, the burden of defending the country was taken on by the 
Maidan Self­Defence, supported by volunteers, especially from the eastern 
oblasts, and backed financially and organisation­wise by the Dnipropetrovsk 
oligarch Ihor Kolomoyskiy. The volunteer battalions formed in this way (dobro-
baty) were poorly armed, disastrously equipped and usually poorly trained 
(even though there were many army and police veterans within their ranks), 
but they were militant and persistent. And since at that time they were fight­
ing equally poorly trained and badly commanded (albeit slightly better armed) 
semi­regular units, the difference in the level of determination was decisive. 
Thus, the Ukrainian volunteers managed to stop the advancement of the rebel­
lion until the newly established National Guard and the Land Troops recon­
structed at an impressive pace could join the fight.202
When the Ukrainians gained a sufficient advantage in summer 2014 to be able 
to suppress the rebellion by force, Russia decided to intervene directly, and 
deployed regular units with heavy weaponry. The Ukrainians were defeated (but 
not crushed), and the dobrobaty suffered massive losses in the battle of Ilovaysk 
in August 2014. Further fighting led to an impasse: Kyiv was unable to expel 
the Russians beyond the border and dismantle the self­proclaimed republics, 
200 Як „зливали” Крим: у РНБО розсекретили стенограму засідання за 2014 рік, 22 February 
2016, https://www.obozrevatel.com/ukr/crime/42817­yak­zlivali­krim­v­rnbo­rozsekre­
tili­stenogramu­zasidannya­za­2014­rik.htm, accessed on 25 February 2016, and Встреча 
начальника Генерального штаба вооруженных сил Украины В. Муженко с блоггерами, 
28 February 2016, http://bmpd.livejournal.com/1762315.html, accessed on 28 February 2016.
201 The dismantling of the army may be blamed to a large extent on the presence of Russian 
agents within the Ministry of Defence and the General Staff, which the president tolerated. 
Dmytro Salamatin, one of the defence ministers from that period, had only been a citizen 
of Ukraine since 2004.
202 The National Guard was formed in 2014 by reorganising the Internal Troops, which were 
in a much better condition than the armed forces, but had no artillery of their own, and 
some of whose units had been actively involved in resisting the Revolution of Dignity.
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while Russia was unable to force the Ukrainians to capitulate.203 In that situ­
ation, a ceasefire deal was concluded, which was apparently taken seriously 
only by the Western negotiators who wanted a cessation of hostilities, but not 
a resolution to the conflict.
Since February 2015, Ukraine has been in a state of ‘neither peace nor war’: 
the country pretends to be involved not in a war, but rather an ‘anti­terror 
operation’, even though at the same time it has spoken of an occupation of the 
Donbas.204 Ukraine also still maintains diplomatic and consular relations with 
the Russian Federation, as well as elaborate trade relations and visa­free travel 
arrangements.205 The 1997 Treaty on Friendship, Co­operation and Partnership 
likewise remains in force. Russia, on the other hand, has been pretending that 
it is not at war, but merely providing humanitarian assistance to the separa­
tist republics.206 Meanwhile, every day several Ukrainian soldiers are injured 
or killed in armed incidents, mostly involving artillery fire (there is no reliable 
information available on the losses suffered by the Russians and the separa­
tists). The low­intensity trench warfare goes on and may continue for years, 
especially since neither side considers itself to have been forced to make any 
major political concessions.
Fighting a war against external aggression, which also involves some elements 
of civil war, has been a challenge for the Ukrainian state, comparable only 
to the Chernobyl disaster. Among other reasons, this is because the response 
requires not only military, organisational and economic measures, but also 
a kind of reflection which would lead to the revision of many views which had 
hitherto seemed obvious. Ukraine has looked in the mirror again, and has seen 
an image of itself that is new in many respects.
2. The wartime state
Despite its limited scope, the war has inflicted massive damage on the coun­
try, and it should be remembered that Ukraine was in a difficult economic 
203 For more information on the progress of military operations, see the Timeline.
204 The fact that Ukraine is at war with Russia was officially recognised for the first time 
in a resolution adopted by the Verkhovna Rada on 8 September 2016 condemning the resolu­
tions in the Polish Sejm and Senate on the Volhynia massacres.
205 A proposal to abolish visa­free travel was put on the Verkhovna Rada’s agenda as late 
as autumn 2016, but it did not make it through the Rada.
206 It is commonly known that the so­called ‘humanitarian convoys’ deliver arms and muni­
tions, among other things.
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situation even before then. According to available figures, so far on the Ukrain­
ian side more than 2500 troops and 6,000 civilians have been killed and more 
than 22,000 troops and 11,000 civilians have been wounded. The losses of the 
separatist and Russian formations and civilian casualties in the ORDLO207 are 
unknown, but presumably comparable.208 The losses suffered by the Ukrain­
ian armed forces have thus exceeded those suffered by the Ukrainian SSR dur­
ing the ten years of the war in Afghanistan. The number of displaced persons 
is estimated at 2–2.5 million,209 including around 1.6 million internally within 
Ukraine and 900,000 in Russia. Much of the industrial activity in the Donbas 
has stopped, in some cases permanently.210 However, as some of the plants still 
operating in the Donbas are owned by companies registered in Kyiv, they are 
probably paying taxes both to the Ukrainian budget and to the self­proclaimed 
republics.
As a consequence of the war, Ukraine’s GDP dropped by 6.3% in 2014 and 10.4% 
in 2015 (only to rise again by around 1.8% in 2016). Moscow had expected Ukraine 
to experience complete economic meltdown, but Arseniy Yatsenyuk’s govern­
ment managed to avert the worst as it obtained external support, improved the 
budget situation and curbed inflation, and even managed to stop buying gas 
from Russia, thus depriving Moscow of an important instrument of pressure. 
Efforts to fix the banking system were also undertaken (e.g. some banks were 
207 This acronym was first used in the bill of 17 March 2015 to describe the areas controlled 
by the separatists and Russians. It is used quite frequently to avoid using the word ‘repub­
lics’. It stands for Okremi Raiony Donetskoyi [ta] Luhanskoyi Oblastei, or the separate counties 
of the Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts.
208 Figures published by Ukraine on the third anniversary of the annexation of Crimea pointed 
to referred to 9,800 killed and 23,000 wounded in Donbas; presumably that figure includes 
civilian and military casualties on both sides of the front. See http://www.pravda.com.ua/
news/2017/02/21/7135971/, accessed on 21 February 2017.
209 Official Ukrainian statistics mention 953,400 displaced by the end of 2015, including 20,900 from 
Crimea. П. Лоза,	Свої чи чужі?, Nasze Słowo, 4 April 2016, Issue 14, http://www.nasze­slowo.
pl/%d1%81%d0%b2%d0%be%d1%97­%d1%87%d0%b8­%d1%87%d1%83%d0%b6%d1%96/. On the 
other hand, the head of the state administration in the Donetsk oblast said in the summer 
of 2016 that of the 740,000 displaced persons registered in the Kyiv­controlled part of the 
Donetsk oblast, only 250,000 are present there while the others have registered as dis­
placed persons in order to obtain benefits while in fact living in the separatist­controlled 
areas; www.pravda.com.ua/news/2016/06/14/7111729/, accessed on 14 June 2016.
210 No reliable information on the subject is available. It seems that some of the plants which 
stopped operations in the first months of the war have since resumed activities. In the 
spring of 2016 it was estimated, on the basis of an analysis of city lighting, that economic 
activity had dropped to 30–50% of the pre­conflict level in the large cities of the Donbas and 
to around 10% in the small towns. See: http://voxukraine.org/2016/07/18/and­the­lights­
went­out­measuring­the­economic­situation­in­eastern­ukraine­en,/ accessed on 18 July 
2016. The methodology of the study is also available there.
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wound down), and the economy was switched to war mode, with large contracts 
awarded to the defence companies in an effort to rebuild and modernise the 
armed forces on a scale that would have been unthinkable if the country had not 
been at war.211 Finally, a number of deregulation measures were implemented, 
this time actually beneficial to the middle class and ordinary citizens.
The ‘Revolution of Dignity’ nonetheless failed to create a new elite capable of tak­
ing power, as a result of which the ‘oligarchic­bureaucratic opposition’ took over 
in Ukraine. The oligarchs’ position did falter seriously at the beginning of the 
war, but no attempt was made to restrain their role in political life.212 The new 
Ukrainian leadership again has links to the oligarchic business, and does not 
consider a thorough change of the system of government to be possible (also 
because of the risk such a change would involve if undertaken during war­
time). On the other hand, the return to the ‘oligarchic consensus’ formed before 
2012 has also brought some benefits for Ukraine, albeit in the form of a lesser 
evil; after all, the Yanukovych team had aimed at transforming that pluralist 
system into a centralised, authoritarian­criminal dictatorship that would have 
blocked any hope of future change.
The five­party coalition formed after the 2014 elections, which included two 
‘oligarchic’ groupings (the Petro Poroshenko Bloc and the People’s Front), two 
populist parties (Batkivshchyna and the Radical Party) and Self­Reliance, a for­
mation of unclear identity, functioned poorly almost from the start because the 
populists and Self­Reliance blocked some of the government’s proposals. That 
forced the president and prime minister to seek the support of what remained 
of the Party of Regions, i.e. those groupings which had re­embraced the oligar­
chic consensus once Yanukovych was gone and with which Poroshenko felt he 
had more in common politically than with Yulia Tymoshenko or the young radi­
cal democrats. The government’s fight against corruption was met with fierce 
resistance by the bureaucracy and the justice administration (whose function­
aries make up one of the most corrupt professional groups in Ukraine), and had 
stalled practically completely by mid­2016. However, Ukraine managed to estab­
lish a specialised body to fight corruption (the National Anti­Corruption Body) 
and, in October 2016, to launch a system for the electronic declarations of assets 
by politicians and officials, and to force those concerned to actually file their 
211 Official defence spending increased rose from 0.97% of GDP in 2013 and 1.77% in 2014 (a cor­
rection of the budget adopted still under Yanukovych) to 2.7% in 2015 and 3.6% in 2016.
212 For more information, see Konończuk, op. cit.
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declarations. The range of arbitrary administrative decisions, one of the founda­
tions of corruption, was also significantly limited.
The war was one of the reasons why Ukraine made faster progress in reform­
ing itself – not only because it inspired greater determination to do so, but also 
because it put an end to the worst aspects of Kyiv’s ‘multi­vector’ policy. Pre­
viously, Ukraine had tended to negotiate its political and economic benefits, 
including financial assistance, by suggesting to one of its partners (either the 
West or Russia) that refusal would force it to seek rapprochement with the other 
one. That worked for more than 20 years, also as a way to avoid modernising 
the economy. However after the war broke out, Kyiv could not continue that 
this policy and was forced, albeit reluctantly, to meet the conditions imposed 
on it by the International Monetary Fund.
The three years of the war have shown that the Ukrainian state is stronger and 
built on more robust foundations than had commonly been believed. Despite all 
its shortcomings and deficiencies, the Ukrainian state has demonstrated that 
it is a stable system capable of responding to new challenges, defending itself 
and evolving.
3.  faltering internal security
At the time of the Revolution of Dignity, and later during the initial phase of the 
war, civilians in Ukraine got hold of large numbers of weapons (mostly fire­
arms, man­portable anti­tank weapons and mines, including anti­personnel 
and anti­tank mines).213 In 2014, many volunteer armed formations were created 
which only theoretically recognised the supremacy of the Ukrainian authori­
ties, while in reality they were controlled by no­one except their commanders. 
Para­military organisations, which had been banned but tolerated in Ukraine, 
grew considerably in strength. The criminal world also armed itself better, 
while at the same time the police stopped operating in many areas. As a result, 
the state lost its monopoly on the use of force, and the law & order authorities 
lost control of what was happening in the criminal underworld.
The largest threat to public order, posed by the dobrobaty, was tackled quickly 
and effectively. Contrary to the fears voiced in late 2014, the units accepted being 
subordinated to the state’s command structures without resistance (though 
213 This is indirectly confirmed by the Ukrainian media, which report almost every week on dis­
coveries of hidden arms and munitions depot, usually attributed to the separatist saboteurs.
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not without friction), and were then incorporated into the structures of either 
the National Guard or the land troops, usually keeping their original names 
and their status as ‘separate’ units. In this way, they ceased to be volunteer for­
mations. At the same time, they were joined by professional commanders and 
submitted to daily military routines. For some units it sufficed to purge them 
of people with criminal inclinations; but there was one unit, the ‘Tornado’ patrol 
service company of the Interior Ministry, which had to be formally disbanded.
The Volunteer Corps of the Right Sector (probably numbering around 1000 peo­
ple and running several training centres in central Ukraine) was the one unit 
which was not incorporated into the regular army and yet whose activities 
continued to be tolerated. The strongest among the ‘new’ units, i.e. the Azov 
Regiment of the Interior Ministry’s National Guard, has also retained consid­
erable autonomy and maintains its own network of training centres, includ­
ing a sergeant school.214 The ‘Azovtsy’ also form a political movement of their 
own, but in military terms, they are more of a laboratory for new forms and 
procedures than a security threat. What does pose a risk, though, is the fact 
that in many localities, cells of the ‘Azov’ Civilian Corps have been taking 
over the functions of the police,215 which will lead to wrangles with the newly 
formed regular police.
The de facto division of the country into two zones which were never fully iso­
lated from one another has been conducive to the development of crime, espe­
cially corruption at the checkpoints controlling traffic and cargo movements 
across the ceasefire line. On the one hand, the line’s permeability has made life 
easier for the people who have found themselves in the separatist­controlled 
territories; but on the other, it has been corrupting the Ukrainian state’s 
new cadres, who should be stimulating the regeneration of law enforcement 
in Ukraine. The problem is not limited to small trade; Ukraine’s energy sector 
needs large amounts of anthracite, which is mined in the separatist­controlled 
territory, a fact which has led to the creation of illegal supply schemes. Energy 
supply has thus been ensured, but at the price of undermining the process 
of the state’s ‘cleansing’.
214 A new­type of non­commissioned officer school; https://foxx.salon24.pl/729942,kijowq­
29.09%e2%80%932016­zakonczenie­pierwszego­kursu­szkoly­sierzantow­im­konowalca, 
(material unavailable), accessed on 17 October 2016.
215 С. Шебеліст, «Азов»­стайл, http://zaxid.net/news/showNews.do?azovstayl&objectId=1406755, 
acces sed on 17 October 2016.
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As it does always and everywhere, the war has also brought about a rise in com­
mon crime. Large numbers of criminals joined the ranks of the volunteer units 
(usually for short periods); mentally unstable people came into the possession 
of weapons; and many veterans failed to build civilian lives. The disorganisation 
of the militsiya (including the criminal departments), and the subsequent efforts 
to build the police from scratch emboldened the criminal world. The post­revo­
lutionary shakiness of the state structures created favourable conditions for the 
local ‘barons’ and extremist organisations trying to create a business basis for 
their activities (one case illustrating this phenomenon was the well­publicised 
standoff in Mukachevo on 11 July 2015 between the Right Sector militants and 
the people of the local ‘contraband king’).
In June 2015, the number of firearms possessed illegally by private persons 
in Ukraine was estimated at 6 million (only 4.5 million according to other esti­
mates), compared to 800,000 registered firearms. That corresponds to 11–14 fire­
arms (both legal and illegal) per 100 inhabitants, compared to 6.6 in 2012 (which 
was a similar level to the United Kingdom).216 The numbers of military weap­
ons held in illegal arsenals has also increased. It is therefore hardly surprising 
that in 2014, the number of criminal acts involving firearms increased rose 
by as much as 40% according to some estimates (detailed figures are not avail­
able), and doubled in 2015. At the same time, the number of criminal acts involv­
ing knives and similar objects decreased, as firearms had apparently replaced 
knives in the arsenals of common criminals.217
The upward trend in the number of heavy crimes also continued in 2016 (the num­
ber of such acts in Kyiv increased by a third within nine months).218 Interestingly, 
the largest rise in robberies recorded by law enforcement agencies took place 
in two districts of Volhynia (82% and 72% respectively); the causes for this should 
be seen not in a sudden rise of crime, but in the increased effectiveness of law 
enforcement. Various reports also suggest that law enforcement and courts treat 
serious crimes committed by war veterans with great indulgence. This situation 
does not contribute to the restoration of the state structures’ authority.
216 О. Лой, До зброї готові!, 10 December 2015, http://glavcom.ua/articles/35932.html, 
accessed on 11 December 2015.
217 Ibidem.
218 Ю. Луценко, Про причини погрішення ситуації із станом злочинності та пропозиції 
щодо законодавчого забезпечення проведення реформи у правоохоронних органах 
(summary of the prosecutor general’s testimony before the parliamentary committee), 
http://blogs.pravda.com.ua/authors/lucenko/57e354f186267, accessed on 22 September 2016.
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The situation in Volhynia has unexpectedly presented a new challenge for the 
Ukrainian authorities. In the northern districts of the Volyn, Rivne and Zhy­
tomir oblasts, which are heavily forested, sparsely populated and very poor, 
amber deposits have been exploited illegally, but under controlled, organised 
systems patronage, potentially reaching as far as Kyiv. At present the sharp rise 
in amber prices, the deepening pauperisation and the instability of state order 
has led to the mass illegal extraction of amber, which poses a threat to the for­
est and water management in the region on the one hand, and control over the 
export of amber by structures on the borderline of the criminal world and the 
nationalist organisations219. Consequently, Kiev lost control of some of these 
regions in 2015, and from available reports has still not recovered control over 
them. However, the situation does not pose a threat to Ukraine’s territorial 
integrity, and it is probably for this reason that Kyiv has not been paying much 
attention to it.
4. a wartime society
The Revolution has revealed the massive potential for self­organisation 
of Ukrainian society, as well as its one of its important weaknesses, inamely the 
fact that the Ukrainian people are apparently disinclined to form overarching 
structures capable of integrating the efforts of individual groups, communities 
and individuals on a regional scale, and even less so on a national scale. Even 
the Maidan did not have a single administrative or command structure, and 
later on, individual volunteer groups or even individual people supported the 
state’s defence effort independently of one another.220 Still, those activities were 
highly synergetic, and made a massive contribution to averting the threat which 
Ukraine faced in the spring of 2014.
At first, individual groups, organisations and persons took to providing the 
volunteer armed formations with food and essential equipment (not arms, 
but including helmets, bulletproof vests and thermal imagers). Later, support 
was extended to the National Guard and the armed forces, which also lacked 
219 The killing of the Right Sector militant Oleksandr Muzychko, who died as the police tried 
to arrest him on 24 March 2014, was probably linked to the fight for control of that market. 
Volyn is also home to structures controlled by one of the Lviv crime leaders, Volodymyr 
Didukh, also known as ‘Vova­Morda’, who is believed to be a secret patron of the Svoboda 
party.
220 A similar feature was visible in the formation of the dobrobaty, which did not try to create 
an overarching structure.
112
O
SW
 S
TU
D
IE
S 
 1
1/
20
17
everything, starting from shoes.221 Quite rapidly, local communities developed 
a form of patronage – not over units, but over individual soldiers coming from 
a given town or village. Volunteer news agencies were established which dealt 
solely with news about developments in the war. The importance of that support 
in 2014 cannot be overestimated.
The volunteering movement subsequently started to provide assistance to the 
Donbas and Crimea refugees, whom the state had neglected, and (in a less mas­
sive but more professional manner) to provide psychological care and rehabili­
tation to the veterans returning to civilian life (the first service of this kind had 
already been established in the Maidan; today the Maidan Psychological Service 
comprises around 500 specialists in 20 cities). The emergence of local associa­
tions of ATO veterans is a new phenomenon, but such associations have already 
been operating in all the districts of Kyiv. These and other forms of activity have 
been building up new social ties (also based on the potential of social media) 
and rebuilding the old ones (for instance, when funerals of soldiers fallen in the 
east were attended by people from entire counties).
The war has become the ‘laboratory’ of a new nation. At the front, it did not mat­
ter what language the defenders of the homeland spoke (most spoke Russian, 
and many considered themselves to be both Russians and Ukrainian patriots 
at the same time). Ukraine’s ‘ethnic’ nationalists were forced to acknowledge 
this reality (and Svoboda’s blind adherence to its linguacentrism has greatly 
contributed to the party’s declining popularity). It was also behind the front­
lines that a new reflection on the meaning of nationhood emerged. This included 
a realisation of the distinction between the Russian­language culture of Ukraine 
and Russian culture in Ukraine (i.e. culture imported from the Russian Federa­
tion). At the same time, attitudes towards history lost importance as a measure 
of patriotism or identity: the main measure was now which side you wanted 
to win the war, and which to lose it.222
The popularity of the Azov Battalion (later a regiment), with its charismatic lead­
ership and the its voluntary­political backing in the form of the Azov Civilian 
221 For more information on the volunteering, see T. A. Olszański, Aftermath of the Maidan. 
Ukrainian society two years after the revolution, OSW Commentary, 4 March 2016, https://
www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/osw­commentary/2016­03­04/aftermath­maidan­
ukrainian­society­two­years­after­revolution.
222 This is how Pavlo Kazarin, a Kyiv­based journalist, put it during a panel at the Batory Foun­
dation in Warsaw on 11 October 2016.
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Corps, brought about a rapid rise of a new formula of Ukrainian nationalism223, 
which exhibits racist views, but not ethnic hatred, draws upon Ukraine’s pre­
Christian traditions, and at best accepts the Bandera tradition in inverted com­
mas.224 This community has even produced the idea that the Russian language 
spoken in eastern Ukraine is in fact a local variety of Ukrainian.225 Irrespective 
of who devised that formula, it may prove to be fruitful. And if it takes root, 
it will change the way of thinking about the language issue in Ukraine.226
The new generation of Ukrainians increasingly brings together both Ukrain­
ian­ and Russian­speakers, as well as speakers of surzhyk. It also offers a space 
to Ukrainian Russians and other minorities227 – all except the Ukrainian Soviets. 
The latter are lost to Ukraine after the three years of the war.
The military operations, involving the massive shelling of residential districts 
and large numbers of civilian casualties, have driven many people, mostly 
those identifying with Ukraine, away from the Donbas. Those who remain are 
mainly old­age pensioners, the least educated and the least mobile workers, i.e. 
those groups within which the Soviet identity has been the strongest, as well 
as the people who had been involved in the creation of the separatist republics. 
The war incited great fear, but also great hatred; it created new narratives and 
new heroes, of whom we know very little. That cannot be reversed.
During the three years of the war, Kyiv has not developed any political offer for 
the people of the Donbas; it has not even brought itself to seriously reflect on the 
223 For more information, see T. Olszański, Ukraine’s wartime nationalism, OSW Commen-
tary, Issue 179, 19 August 2015, https://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/osw­commen­
tary/2015­08­19/ukraines­wartime­nationalism
224 Andriy Biletsky, the leader of the Azov movement, publicly stated in September 2016 that 
Bandera’s ideas were no longer valid in the 21st century, http://news.liga.net/interview/
politics/12867152­andrey_biletskiy_i_vlast_i_oppozitsiya_dlya_nas_odinakovye_vragi.
htm, accessed on 24 October 2016.
225 В. Шкляр, Думa про братів азовських, in Чорне сонце, Kharkiv 2016. It says on p. 49 that 
the inhabitants of Mariupol “speak a south­eastern dialect of the Ukrainian language. Yes, 
the vocabulary is mostly Russian, but the phonetics and syntax are Ukrainian with some 
Greek influences”. On p. 69 it says that the range of this ‘dialect’ extends to the Kharkiv 
region.
226 Such an operation may be successful, as demonstrated by the separation of Serbo­Croatian 
into Serbian, Croatian, Bosnian and Montenegrin over the last quarter of a century, which 
happened because of the political will of the users rather than actual linguistic processes 
(especially in the latter two cases).
227 It is symbolic that the first two people to die on the Maidan were an Armenian (a son of refu­
gees) and a Belarusian (an immigrant without citizenship).
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conditions for the region’s future re­integration. Even if any such reintegration 
manages to eliminate the separatist elites from public life, and even if most 
of the war refugees return to their homes (which is unlikely), the Soviet part 
of society will not become part of Ukraine’s civic community – not only because 
of the impact of the separatist indoctrination of recent years, but also because 
those people had never really been ‘politically Ukrainian’.
*
There are many indications that Kyiv has accepted the loss of Crimea, even 
if it continues to use the rhetoric of ‘de­occupation’ for formal and international 
purposes. However, the loss of parts of the Donbas is unacceptable, either to the 
Ukrainian leadership, or to the majority of the public, partly because too much 
blood has already been shed for the region. Still, in view of Kyiv’s official activi­
ties, it is unclear whether the Ukrainian leadership is really seeking to restore 
its sovereign rule in the area; it seems as though maintaining a ‘frozen’ conflict 
which claims a couple of casualties a day could be acceptable to Ukraine’s leaders.
Kyiv has run out of options. Officially it has to accept the terms of the peace 
deals, which would permanently disintegrate the state by granting one of the 
regions a right to veto the entire state’s strategic decisions228, and thus block its 
integration with European structures. That is because Ukraine is under pres­
sure from the Western powers, whose main concern is to get Ukraine off the 
‘hot’ international agenda, and who are therefore inclined to accept Russia’s 
proposals. On the other hand, however, Kyiv cannot afford a renewed armed 
confrontation with Moscow. Neither can it implement the Minsk agreements, 
not only because they are dangerous to Ukraine, but also because they would 
unleash public protests which might threaten the government.
The status quo is not entirely unfavourable to Kyiv. The war has undermined the 
influence of pro­Russian groups and communities on public life, and deprived 
an important part of that electorate, which was hostile to Ukraine’s current 
policies and leadership, of the possibility to vote. As long as Kyiv does not control 
the Donbas, it need not worry about the reconstruction of that region’s economy 
and social life. The war has also diverted the politically active public’s attention 
228 The essence of the Russian proposals is to grant special rights to eastern Ukraine (at this 
stage, to the Donbas alone) but not right­bank Ukraine or eastern Galicia. In this way, 
it would be possible to block rapprochement with the West, but not with Russia.
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from the unmet promises of the Revolution of Dignity (even though that impact 
has been wearing off).
It seems that under the leadership of pragmatic and cautious politicians, averse 
to radical and risky action, Ukraine has decided to maintain the status quo, 
i.e. tolerate the limited hostilities, sabotage the implementation of the Minsk 
accords (in which the other side has been greatly helping Kyiv) and wait for 
a change in the international situation, or perhaps for the end of Vladimir 
Putin’s rule. This playing for time is dangerous, but it is also the least danger­
ous solution among those which are realistically available.
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conclusIon: The successes and faIlures 
of IndePendenT uKraIne
When the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic set out to transform into Ukraine 
in 1991, global actors and observers formulated various expectations regard­
ing the new state. It was supposed to become a strong nation­(ethnocentric) 
state and push Russia and ‘Russianness’ back to the east; or Russia’s friendly 
neighbour, co­operating with Moscow in many spheres (in fact Russia’s satel­
lite); or the West’s partner, committed to developing a neoliberal economy open 
to foreign capital; or a state pursuing a liberal social policy, and stepping back 
to make room for developed civil society, etc. Few reflected about whether those 
visions were realistic and suited to the actual condition of the Ukrainian state, 
its social structure, its economy and its dominant beliefs.
Ukraine has not met any of those expectations, whether formulated by the 
United States, the European Union, the nationalist diaspora organisations, 
George Soros or the Patriarch of Moscow and All­Russia. Or Poland. Nor has 
it met the expectations of its own people. However, it has survived and withstood 
constant pressure, and later, also open aggression from Russia. It has built up its 
central government bodies and the administrative apparatus, reconstructed its 
economy, albeit not according to neoliberal prescriptions, and allowed society 
to rebuild itself spontaneously, in its own way. On the one hand, this may not 
be much, but on the other – it is a great deal.
Back in 1991, Ukraine faced three crucial challenges which it had to respond 
to at the same time. Firstly, it needed to create itself as a state, develop its 
defence capabilities (not limited to the military dimension) and find a position 
in the international community adequate to its potential. Secondly, it needed 
to develop the foundations for a functioning market economy, not by transform­
ing the Soviet­era command­and­control system, but rather by emerging from 
an economic non­system created by the chaotic reforms implemented between 
1988 and 1991. And finally, the third, seldom noticed challenge concerned adjust­
ing its budding market economy to the requirements of the ‘turbo­capitalism’229 
which had gained momentum since the collapse of the Soviet system, and had 
throughout the world dismantled the mechanisms of post­war free market sys­
229 The term was coined by Edward Luttwak in his book Turbo-Capitalism: Winners and Losers 
in the Global Economy (Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1998), in which he unapologetically dissects 
the processes of deregulation and privatisation taking place in the global economy since the 
1980s. This term seems more accurate than ‘neoliberalism’.
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tems with a strong regulatory role of the state, state­guaranteed social security, 
clear ownership structures and manufacturing (real economy) sectors predom­
inating over the financial sectors. The latter challenge was the most difficult one 
because the dominant discourse of the 1990s conflated market economy with 
turbo­capitalism, for instance by dismissing the view that there was a need 
for the state to play an active role in social and economic life as being a relic 
of Communist ideology. Part of that challenge was to adjust to the accelerating 
processes of globalisation processes, including the revolutionary changes con­
cerning the flow of information.
It should also be noted that the changes taking place globally in recent decades 
have brought about a steady shrinking of the sovereignty of states, which have 
been losing more and more prerogatives to international institutions and pro­
cedures (which is one of the aspects of globalisation). For states and societies 
which had just gained or regained independence (i.e. those which had to build 
a new social and economic system from scratch while simultaneously modifying 
it in the process, rather than adapting an established one), being a part of that 
process was a nuisance, if not a threat, and created new difficulties, which were 
unknown and difficult to understand even for states with a long history of stable 
existence.
1.  ‘assets’
Ukraine’s greatest achievement during the first quarter of a century of inde­
pendent existence has been to build a full­fledged state, understood as a sys­
tem of institutions and procedures of political, economic, social or military 
nature. The Ukrainian state has many deficiencies, some of which are a legacy 
of Communism, while some others – are the consequences of choosing to exit 
Communism in an evolutionary way, by allowing an the oligarchisation of the 
nomenklatura and admitting corruption as an acceptable way to create wealth 
and make up for the deficiencies of the legal system at all levels of public life.
Ukraine has managed to preserve a large part of its industrial potential, mod­
ernise its most obsolete manufacturing capacities (to some degree), preserve 
the potential of research­intensive sectors of industry, including the space 
industry230, and build an IT sector, largely based on outsourcing arrangements, 
230 Ukrainian­produced space rockets have been launched 150 times since 1991; http://www.
nkau.gov.ua/nsau/catalogNEW.nsf/mainU/731F5A089D942FA8C2256FBF002DFA78?Open
Document&Lang=U, accessed on 1 December 2016.
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although the latter happened despite, and not as a result of, the state’s policies. 
The country has also seen the massive development of ‘non­oligarchic’ enter­
prise, which has faced state­created hurdles created by the state at almost all 
times since independence and was forced to participate in the patterns of cor­
ruption, but which nonetheless eased the consequences of the collapse of the 
Soviet economic system and greatly contributed to the transformation of the 
Ukrainian people’s way of thinking.
With most of the large manufacturing plants having been taken over by the 
domestic oligarchic capital, the modernisation of industry in Ukraine was 
slowed down or stalled, but on the other hand, the country managed to retain 
its national production potential, reducing its economic and political depen­
dence on external actors, especially Russia.
Thanks to its cultural policy, which was at times prudent and at times pro­
crastinating, Ukraine managed to avoid the major conflicts over regional and 
linguistic differences, which some circles abroad had feared in the early 1990s 
– and others looked forward to. Contrary to the expectations of the advocates 
of Ukrainian ethnocentrism and those of the ‘Russkiy mir’, Ukraine turned out 
to be pluralist in this respect, rather than divided. Today some authors even 
believe that the disputes over those differences mainly serve to mask social 
conflicts.231 While the war has restored significance to the ‘national question’, 
it has also demonstrated very clearly that language is irrelevant as a criterion 
of patriotism.232
Ukraine has also managed to raise a generation of conscious citizens, much more 
open to the world than the older generations, partly owing to the development 
of information technologies which happened independently of the Ukrainian 
state’s actions and engendered social change in all the societies participating 
in it. That new openness has made people less attached to previously promoted 
231 А. Котляр, А. Ермолаев, Страной руководит корпорация. Государственные институты 
при ва тизированы, https://zn.ua/socium/andrey­ermolaev­stranoy­rukovodit­korporaciya­
gosudarstvennye­instituty­privatizirovany­_.html, accessed on 10 February 2014. The text was 
written on 7 February 2014, i.e. still before Yanukovych’s rule had collapsed.
232 However, one also finds radical opinions such as these: “Without a basic knowledge of the 
country’s language, the national culture, the true history, man (…) is reduced to crap for 
foreign cultures”, and “If there are 78% of Ukrainians in Ukraine, the percentage of Ukrain­
ian­language television and radio shows, newspapers, magazines, books etc. should be the 
same.” (В. Лизанчук, Антирусификация, или еще раз о мове, https://zn.ua/SOCIUM/
antirusifikaciya­ili­esche­raz­o­move­_.html, accessed on 4 July 2016. The text was pub­
lished in Dzerkalo Tyzhnya, one of Ukraine’s leading opinion papers.
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traditions, whether Soviet (such as the cult of wartime heroes), or folklore­
national (formalised folk culture purged of its original spiritual meaning), and 
modernised the Ukrainian patriotism (which in some cases meant the resur­
gence of nationalistic attitudes or the adoption the patterns typical of Western 
Europe’s extreme right).
The Ukrainian society has proven to be unexpectedly mature and has demon­
strated its ability to compensate for the state’s shortcomings to some extent, 
in particular when under threat. The former Soviet subservient attitudes have 
given way to a new, civic attitude towards the state – not in everyone, as the old­
est generation is no longer able to revise its established worldviews, but among 
a growing group of citizens. This much has been proven by the people’s reaction 
to the war.
Finally, Ukraine has also managed to stay independent from Russia. Kyiv has 
kept out of all the re­integration programmes proposed by Moscow, from the 
Tashkent Treaty (the defence treaty of the CIS members) to the Eurasian Eco­
nomic Community. It has not allowed Russia to take control over the system 
of transit gas pipelines (which was Gazprom’s priority for years) or any other 
key sectors of the national economy. And since 2013, Ukraine has radically 
reduced its dependence on energy resource supplies from Russia.
2.  ‘liabilities’
The main impediment hindering the Ukrainian SSR’s transformation into the 
new Ukrainian state consisted in the weakness of the elites, especially the polit­
ical leadership; its poor knowledge of the world; and procrastination and negli­
gence (including a disastrous quality of legislation, even at the purely linguistic 
level). What was missing was a long­term, comprehensive reform programme, 
or at least a vision of the kind of state that Ukraine should become. The Ukrain­
ian leaders’ thinking still runs in terms of years, not decades.
As the new Ukrainian state was unable to replace the civil service, the judges, 
the police cadres etc. within a short timeframe, the old bureaucratic and cor­
rupt practices became consolidated and were adjusted to the new conditions. 
After the Communist Party committees were abolished, the bureaucracy, the 
police and other services started to enjoy complete impunity, which led to a dra­
matic rise in corruption in everyday situations, especially as the development 
of enterprise created new opportunities in this regard. However, because cor­
ruption was also rampant at the highest echelons of the state, mainly in the 
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form of the embezzlement of public funds, which reached enormous propor­
tions and created many fortunes, no­one was serious about combating common 
bribery.233 Worse still, the Ukrainian state tolerated the lawlessness of the new 
rich and of local state functionaries (the Vradiivka case mentioned above was 
a particularly horrifying case, but it was just one of many).234
It was only after the Revolution of Dignity that Kyiv took on corruption, espe­
cially in the judiciary, under pressure from the public and from the IMF. 
The reforms were met with resistance from the bureaucracy (especially the 
judges) and politicians defending their interests. As a result, it took longer than 
expected to create the necessary legal and organisational basis. The political 
class and sections of the bureaucracy have been forced to disclose their assets, 
but it is doubtful that this will be followed by measures to call those who are 
evidently guilty of corruption and thievery to account. A more important ques­
tion, though, is whether the new measures will help to curb corruption in the 
future. According to some observers, the fierceness with which the new anti­
corruption measures and regulations have been opposed indicates that they 
may actually be having some effect.235 Still, corruption cannot be eradicated 
with repression alone: what is also needed is a thorough change in both the 
system and in mentality.
Ukraine has built the institutions of electoral democracy, but it has not man­
aged to implement democratic standards comparable to those achieved by the 
post­Communist countries in central Europe (and it is that region, and not the 
mature democracies of Western Europe, that should be the point of reference). 
Still, the Ukrainian public has embraced pro­democratic attitudes to a suffi­
cient extent to be able to effectively put pressure on the state bodies. However, 
a radical breakthrough will only be possible with the development of the mid­
dle class, which needs to grow bigger and wealthier, better educated and more 
233 According to 2006 estimates, only a quarter of the total value of bribes, estimated at more 
than US$ 8 billion, was related to business activity. After the Revolution of Dignity, the 
value of the Ukrainian ‘bribe market’ and the average value of individual bribes increased 
considerably.
234 Due to limited space, the problem of organised crime is not addressed here. However, 
it should be noted that the phenomenon has been at least tolerated by the public authorities 
and enforcement bodies. Regarding common crime, the number of registered criminal acts 
rose from 370,000 to 564,000 between 1990 and 2013, but the number of crimes against 
life has dropped noticeably (from 3200 to 2000 in the case of manslaughter and attempted 
manslaughter, and from 2,700 to 500 in the case of rape and attempted rape).
235 See: А. Пасхавер, Море волнуется, http://zn.ua/internal/more­volnuetsya­_.html accessed 
on 11 April 2016.
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self­assured, because it is in that group’s interest to curb the lawlessness of public 
authorities. For now, the disastrously low level of public confidence in Ukraine 
has been conducive to keeping business in the grey economy, and thus preserv­
ing corruption and blocking the development of civic attitudes.
One of the consequences of the bureaucratic­oligarchic order which has formed 
in Ukraine concerns the orientation towards short­term profit (a phenomenon 
similar to rent­seeking), an aversion to investment (which has also been dis­
played by the state and local administration), and a politically motivated dis­
regard for the interests of the lower strata of society. As a result, Ukraine has 
experienced a dramatic decline in its infrastructure, including the degrada­
tion of the poorly maintained or completely neglected roads, streets and rail­
ways, and the closure of provincial schools, culture institutions and healthcare 
facilities. Many public buildings, including historic monuments, have been 
left to decay. No reform of social security systems has been undertaken, due 
to which those systems have collapsed due to underfunding. The environmental 
situation, which was already very bad in Soviet times, has deteriorated further: 
the effects of years of neglect, which the new state has tried to fix in only some 
places, have been exacerbated by a massive increase in the volume of waste 
resulting from rising consumption, as well as the growing marketing role 
of packaging and its increased environmental footprint. All those phenomena 
have undone the effects of decades of civilisational development in Ukraine, and 
will take decades to reverse even partially.
Ukrainian society, which was quite egalitarian before 1991, has now seen the 
emergence of drastic inequalities that people find unacceptable. The nouveaux 
riches (not necessarily the great oligarchs) demonstrate their new status through 
ostentatious consumption, while at the other end of the spectrum, ‘redundant 
people’ have emerged, deprived of adequate social security, or indeed any at all. 
Successive waves of inflation have eroded the people’s savings, while the old 
social maladies such as alcoholism have been joined by a new one: drug abuse.236
The development model Ukraine has adopted has promoted the growth of large 
metropolises and led to a decline of smaller cities, and especially rural areas. 
Because of the progressing modernisation of agriculture, and the dwindling 
236 The rise in drug abuse, in Ukraine and elsewhere, was largely a result of a deliberate 'promo­
tional campaign' by criminal organisations dealing in drugs, which the state failed to coun­
ter adequately, and did not even try to counter at all in this particular respect. The number 
of drug related crimes rose in Ukraine from 7,000 to 34,000 between 1900 and 2013.
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demand for labour that comes with it, Ukraine’s rural areas will likely continue 
to depopulate, and hundreds of localities, especially in central and southern 
Ukraine, will cease to exist.
However, the single greatest failure of the Ukrainian state concerns its dramatic 
decline in population. Within less than 25 years, the population of the country 
which did not experience war, 237 natural disasters or massive emigration in that 
period, shrank by nearly seven million, which corresponds to the population 
size of the Donbas. The effects of that process cannot be reversed, and it should 
be expected to worsen.
*
When analysing developments in Ukraine and the world (and it should be noted 
that the pace of global change has also posed new, unexpected challenges 
to Ukraine), we seldom reflect on the scope of our right to judge one or any other 
country through the lens of our expectations, which we assume to have been 
realistically possible to meet. For instance, if we wanted Ukraine to develop 
in a way similar to Poland’s pathway to EU membership, does that give us the 
right to blame Ukraine for not wanting, or not being able, to take that route? We 
leave this question open here.
Ukraine has come a very long way over the quarter of a century of its inde­
pendence, and has achieved a great deal. Today it is a different state, a different 
country and a different society than it was in the summer of 1991. It did not 
implement a plan or programme adopted in advance, but acted by trial and 
error. It therefore made many mistakes, and in many cases has paid a high price. 
It has failed to achieve many of its objectives, in some cases because it could not 
pursue them with sufficient skill and perseverance, and in others, because from 
the start they were beyond the ‘horizon of events’, lying in the realm of dreams, 
not opportunities.
Is the bottom line of the Ukrainian nation’s first 25 years of real statehood 
positive or negative? This is open to debate. In our view, it is positive: Ukraine 
has used more opportunities than it has wasted, and the Ukrainian state, 
237 The consequences of the annexation of Crimea and the war are not included here because 
they concerned the loss of control (including reporting capacity) over parts of the popula­
tion, and not a real decline in population. Crimea still has a population of around 3 million, 
even if they are no longer counted in Kyiv’s statistics.
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understood as a complex arrangement of institutions, procedures, habits and 
social attitudes, has built an impressive capacity to identify challenges and 
respond to them, a potential much bigger than that which it could muster 
in 1991. Despite all the burdens and missed opportunities, its development has 
not been blocked.
The assessment of the reach and quality of the change undergone by Ukraine 
will largely depend on the individual’s level of expectations, and to what extent 
we are guided by prudence in formulating those expectations. If the author 
may take the liberty at the end to speak in a personal tone and less analytically 
– those who expect the impossible (or everything at once, which essentially 
amounts to the same thing), will always be disappointed.
Tadeusz	a.	Olszański
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TImelIne: uKraIne, 1986–2016
Principal	developments	before	1986
1922
The Soviet Union is established as a federative state, as a result of which Ukraine 
gains limited autonomy, and is able to consolidate its structural separateness 
built in 1917 and strengthen its national identity. The existence of the Ukrainian 
SSR as a ‘sovereign socialist Soviet state’ will enable Ukraine to peacefully gain 
its independence in 1991.
1932–1933
The Holodomor (Great Famine), a catastrophic famine affecting most of Ukraine’s 
territory. According to many authors, it was deliberately caused by the Soviet 
leadership (it is beyond any doubt that Soviet policy deliberately exacerbated 
the consequences of the famine). According to reliable estimates, the Holodomor 
claimed around 3 million lives (around 10% of Ukraine’s rural population).
1941–1945
The USSR is involved in World War II, Ukraine’s entire territory is transitorily occu­
pied by the Germans. The number of casualties is estimated at 5–8 million, and 
damage to property at 40%. After post­War reconstruction, Ukraine will not regain 
the same potential it had before the War within the Soviet state. The consequences 
of both demographic disasters, i.e. the Holodomor and the War, are still felt today.
1944–1945
Eastern Galicia, western Volhynia, Transcarpathia, northern Bukovina and 
southern Bessarabia are incorporated into the Ukrainian SSR. The administra­
tive consolidation of lands with predominantly Ukrainian populations is com­
pleted, inadvertently defining the future borders of the Ukrainian state.
1954
The Russian SFSR transfers the Crimea oblast and the separate city of Sevastopol 
to the Ukrainian SSR. As a result of the move, which was made purely for technical 
and administrative reasons, Crimea later became part of independent Ukraine.
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1985
A programme for reforms to the Soviet state (perestroika) is proclaimed. An anti­
alcohol campaign is launched which undermines the state’s financial stability.
1986
26	april. A disaster occurs at the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant. The costs 
of the rescue operation, which goes on for many months, weaken the Soviet 
economy. A national revival begins in Ukraine.
19	October. A bill on individual economic activity is passed in the USSR. It is the 
first step towards legalising the private sector and the beginning of its dynamic 
development.
1987
27	January. The policy of glasnost is proclaimed, which considerably under­
mines the power of censorship.
18	June. A general amnesty is declared, which also includes political prisoners 
(most of whom were Ukrainians) and army deserters.
6	July. Crimean Tatars stage their first demonstration in Moscow, which marks 
the beginning of their fight for the right to return from Central Asia to Crimea.
1988
20	February. An ethnic Armenian uprising begins in the Nagorno­Karabakh 
Autonomous oblast, which later transforms into the Armenian­Azerbaijani war 
(within the USSR). The war will continue till 12 May 1994, and will become the 
longest and bloodiest ‘post­Soviet’ military conflict.
26	May. A bill is passed in the USSR permitting co­operatives (private businesses) 
to hire workers. Most restrictions faced by the private sector are abolished.
7	July. Members of the Ukrainian Helsinki Group (the main dissident organi­
sation of the 1970s, recreated in 1987) transform the Group into the Ukrainian 
Helsinki Union (a political organisation), which on 30 April 1990 becomes the 
first democratic party in Ukraine, the Ukrainian Republican Party.
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13	November. The first ‘independent’ demonstration is legally organised in Kyiv 
by the environmental group Zelenyi Svit and joined by 10,000 demonstrators.
16	November. Estonia is the first Soviet republic to declare suverenitet.
1989
6	February. The Round Table negotiations begin in Poland, in the aftermath 
of which the Communist party agrees to share power with the opposition. 
The Communist regimes in the Warsaw Pact countries start to collapse.
15	February. The last Soviet soldiers leave Afghanistan.
17	May. Greek Catholic bishops, priests and believers go on hunger strike 
in Moscow. The strike continues for four months, the strikers demand legali­
sation of the Greek Catholic Church in Ukraine. In autumn the same year, Greek 
Catholic communities which used to operate underground, start taking over 
church buildings (closed down or used by Orthodox communities ). In March 
1991, Cardinal Lubachivsky, the Church’s leader, arrives in Lviv.
4	June. The Communists in Poland lose the general elections, and in the after­
math, the first non­communist government is formed in Poland on 12 Septem­
ber under the leadership of Tadeusz Mazowiecki (ministers nominated by the 
Polish Communist party (PZPR) will step down in July 1990).
18–24	 July. Miners in the Donbas stage massive strikes, raising economic 
demands (following similar strikes in the Kuznetsk Coal Basin in Russia). In the 
aftermath, the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR adopts a bill on the repub­
lic’s economic independence.
23	august. A human chain links Vilnius, Riga and Tallinn, marking the begin­
ning of the Baltic states’ path to independence.
8–10	 september. The Ukrainian People’s Movement for Reconstruction, 
a nationwide civic league which had been forming since July, holds its found­
ing congress. Some of the delegates call for independence, support for which 
is growing.
17	september.	100,000 people rally in Lviv on the anniversary of the annexa­
tion of the Western Ukraine by the Soviet Union and in defence of the Greek 
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Catholic Church, sparking a series of mass patriotic rallies in the western 
oblasts and Kyiv.
28	september. Gorbachev has Volodymyr Shcherbytsky removed from office. 
Shcherbytsky was the first secretary of the Ukrainian Communist Party of the 
Soviet Union and the last ‘Brezhnev­era’ chief of republic­level party structures 
(in office since 25 February 1972).
10	November. The border between East and West Germany is opened. Commu­
nist regimes in Europe collapse one after another, ending with the execution 
of Nicolae Ceauşescu on 25 December.
1990
21	January. A human chain, formed by more than one million people to cel­
ebrate the anniversary of Ukraine’s 1918 Unification Act, links Ivano­Frankivsk 
and Lviv with Kyiv.
31	January. The Russian Orthodox Church transforms its Ukrainian dioceses 
into an autonomous patriarchal exarchate.
7	February. The Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union 
abolishes the leading role of the party.
4	March.	Elections are held to the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR, based 
on majoritarian representation principles. Non­Communist organisations also 
take part as the Democratic Bloc, gaining a quarter of the seats. In June Leo­
nid Kravchuk becomes the speaker of the Supreme Council (Verkhovna Rada 
in Ukrainian). Meanwhile, representatives of the People’s Movement of Ukraine 
gain a significant majority of mandates in the oblast and city soviets in East­
ern Galicia in the elections to these bodies. The Movement’s leader Vyacheslav 
Chornovil becomes the head of the Lviv Oblast Soviet. The region gains de facto 
autonomy which will last until the proclamation of independence.
11	March. Lithuania proclaims independence.
5	June. A sobor of the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church, which had 
been operating within the Ukrainian diaspora, is held in Kyiv. This marks the 
beginning of the processes that will lead to the schism within the Ukrainian 
Orthodox community and its division into two churches, one recognising the 
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supremacy of the Moscow Patriarch, and the other the supremacy of the Patri­
arch of Kyiv.
11	June. The Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR introduces a Kyiv time zone.
12	June. The Russian SFSR proclaims suverenitet, marking the beginning of the 
so­called suverenitet parade. On the same day, the Federation Council of the USSR 
establishes a working group for the preparation of a new Union Treaty.
16	July. The Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR adopts the declaration of the 
suverenitet of Ukraine while keeping the country’s original name (355 votes for, 
4 against).
23	september. The constitution of the Ukrainian SSR is amended by formally 
abolishing the leading role of the Communist party, putting republic­level leg­
islation above Union legislation, establishing the Supreme Court of the USSR 
as the highest appellate court, and establishing the Office of the Prosecutor 
General of Ukraine.
2–17	October. The so­called ‘Revolution on Granite’, a student protest in central 
Kyiv, calling on Ukraine to break the negotiations of the new Union Treaty and 
demanding the resignation of the Masol government. The hunger strike is joined 
by around 300 people. The parliamentary opposition withholds support for the 
protesters, who are massively supported by the inhabitants of Kyiv (for exam­
ple by a demonstration on 15 October with a turnout of 100,000 people, during 
which a first attempt to bring the national flag into the Supreme Soviet building 
is made). The developments speed up the evolution of views and attitudes of the 
Kyiv­based nomenklatura. Before, on 1 October, the People’s Council’s calls for 
a general strike under the same slogan fail to bring a result.
25	October. The second congress of the People’s Movement of Ukraine formu­
lates a programme for independence.
28	October. The Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR adopts a language bill 
granting Ukrainian the status of state language, and providing for the Ukraini­
anisation of the republic’s structures within five years.
12	November. The Polish foreign minister visits Kyiv. The two sides sign a dec­
laration on the principles and basic directions of the development of Polish­
Ukrainian relations.
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19	November. A treaty between the Russian SFSR and Ukrainian SSR on the 
principles of mutual relations is signed, which recognises Ukraine’s territorial 
integrity, among other provisions.
1991
10	January. Attempts at crushing the independence movements in Lithuania 
and Latvia, bloody clashes in Vilnius.
20	January. A referendum is held in Crimea. With a turnout of 81%, 93% of the 
voters, i.e. 76% of all eligible to vote, favour granting Crimea the status of a ‘USSR 
entity’, i.e. a Union republic. In the wake of the vote, the authorities of the Crimea 
oblast establish the government of an autonomous republic, and on 12 February 
Kyiv restores the Crimean Autonomous SSR.
16	February. The oblast soviets of Lviv, Ivano­Frankivsk and Ternopil, con­
trolled by the People’s Movement of Ukraine, establish the Galician Assembly 
(Halytska Asambleia), an autonomous co­ordination structure.
24–26	February. NATO forces taking part in Operation Desert Sabre defeat the 
Iraqi army, whose training and arms are modelled on the Soviet army.
28	February. Serbian Krajina proclaims independence. The Serbian­Croatian 
war begins.
17	March. An all­Union referendum on the future of the Soviet Union is held, 
but it is boycotted by the Baltic republics, Georgia, Armenia and Moldova. 
In Ukraine, people generally support the option of keeping the reformed Soviet 
Union, and for adhering to Ukraine’s Declaration of suverenitet. In eastern Gali­
cia, there is universal support for independence. The campaign ‘No to the Union 
Treaty’ starts in Ukraine.
27	June–6	July. In the aftermath of the Ten­Day War, Slovenia gains independ­
ence and Yugoslavia begins to break up.
28	June,	1	July. The Warsaw Pact and the Council for Mutual Economic Assis­
tance are dissolved.
5	July. The Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR establishes the office of Presi­
dent of the Republic, and calls a presidential election on 1 December.
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31	 July. The Soviet­American START I treaty, which had been negotiated 
since 1982, is signed. It provides for a reduction of strategic nuclear arsenals. 
The United States’ desire to see the treaty implemented was one of the reasons 
why the US did not want the Soviet Union to break up.
1	august. The US President visits Kyiv and delivers a speech criticising the 
Union republic’s aspirations to independence.
3	august. Gorbachev announces that the new Union Treaty will be signed 
on 20 August. Ukraine is not expected to join.
19–21	august. The Yanayev coup, a failed attempt by Communist conservatives 
to overthrow Gorbachev. In the aftermath, most Soviet republics proclaim inde­
pendence.
24	august. The Supreme Soviet of Ukraine adopts a resolution on the proc­
lamation of independence of Ukraine (321 votes for, 2 against), and then the 
Act of Independence (346 for, 1 against) and calls a referendum to obtain 
popular endorsement for this act. It also passes bills on depoliticising the 
prosecution authorities, the Ministry of the Interior and the KGB, but the 
bill on de­communising the entire state apparatus is rejected. There is no 
reaction from Moscow. The Act also states that the new state’s official name 
is to be Ukraine.
26	august. The Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of Ukraine issues a decree 
suspending the activities of the Communist Party of Ukraine (its assets had 
been nationalised the day before, and on 30 September the party is banned). 
This marks the beginning of the rapid dissolution of the structures of the party, 
the Komsomol and other bodies. The Communist Party of Ukraine will be re­
established in June 1993, and banned again in 2015.
4	september. The state flag is raised on the dome of the Verkhovna Rada building. 
The Soviet emblems on its façade will survive until the spring of 2000, and the 
five­pronged star on the flag mast until February 2014.
12	september. The Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine adopts a bill stating that Ukraine 
is the legal successor of the Ukrainian SSR, and partly of the Soviet Union.
10	October.	The Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine adopts a bill on citizenship, granting 
Ukrainian citizenship to all permanent residents of the country.
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1	december. In the referendum, 90.32% of voters (28.8 million people) vote for 
independence, with a turnout of 84.18% (31.9 million). In Crimea, 54.2% vote for 
independence, with a turnout of 67.5%, and in Sevastopol 57.1% vote in favour, 
with a turnout of 63.7%, which means that in both cases around a third of all 
those eligible to vote voted for independence.
Leonid Kravchuk is elected president (61.6% of the vote in the first round). His 
main rival, Vyacheslav Chornovil, gets 23.3% of the vote.
In a local referendum organised in the Transcarpathia oblast, 78% of the voters 
are for ‘special self­government’ (effectively authonomy) for the oblast. Kyiv 
ignores the referendum; in the aftermath, in May 1993, a so­called Tempo­
rary Government of Transcarpathian Ruthenians is created. However, despite 
behind­the­scenes support from Moscow, political separatism in Transcar­
pathia does not develop, while the Ruthenian movement (which claims that 
the inhabitants of Transcarpathia are ethnically distinct from the Ukrainians) 
becomes an instrument of the local post­nomenklatura elites.
2	december. Poland recognises the independence of Ukraine, followed by Can­
ada and Hungary (on 3 December). Prior to the conference in Viskuli, Ukraine 
will have been recognised by only 13 states, mostly post­Communist (Russia 
on 5 December) and Latin American countries. By 24 December it will have been 
recognised by another 14, including Sweden, Norway and Switzerland.
8–9	december. The presidents of Russia, Ukraine and Belarus meet in Viskuli, in the 
Belarusian part of the Belovezha Forest. The agreement establishing the Common­
wealth of Independent States is signed, and the Soviet Union effectively ceases to exist. 
The agreement is ratified by the parliaments of Ukraine and Belarus on 10 December, 
and by the parliament of Russia on 12 December (on the same day Russia terminates 
the 1922 Union Treaty). On 21 December, the agreement is signed again in Alma­Ata 
(now Almaty), this time with the other former Union republics (except the Baltic 
states and Georgia). Ukraine will never ratify the CIS Statute signed on 22 January 
1993; it will remain a founding member but never becomes a member.238
25	december. Gorbachev leaves the Kremlin, and the Soviet flag is replaced 
by the Russian one. The Soviet Union formally ceases to exist as a subject 
of international law.
238 Kyiv has apparently forgotten about this, as in October 2016 the Ukrainian foreign minister 
announced that Ukraine was looking at options for withdrawing from the CIS.
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The United States recognises the independence of Ukraine. In the days that fol­
low, all the world powers follow in its footsteps (Israel on 25 December, Ger­
many and India on 26 December, China on 27 December, France, Italy and Japan 
on 28 December, the United Kingdom on 31 December). The Holy See recognises 
Ukraine on 8 August 1992.
1992
3	January. Soldiers and reservists of the former Soviet armed forces stationed 
in Ukraine start to take oaths of allegiance to Ukraine. Ultimately around 
60% of all the troops take the oath. The Black Sea Fleet is not part of the oath 
campaign.
10	January. A temporary currency known as the karbovanets (coupon) is intro­
duced. Initially it circulates in parallel to the rouble, but as of April it is the 
sole currency for cash transactions, and as of November, also for non­cash 
transactions.
15	January. The Verkhovna Rada adopts a new national anthem (music only). 
On 22 January, the state flag is adopted, and the coat of arms on 19 February.
5	February. The Supreme Council of Crimea proclaims its independence and 
calls a referendum on 2 August to confirm the decision; following Kyiv’s firm 
reaction, the declaration of independence is repealed and the referendum can­
celled.
2	March–21	June. The war in Transnistria. A group of Ukrainian volunteers 
from the UNA­UNSO take part in the military operations on the separatist side.
4	March. The Verkhovna Rada adopts a bill on the privatisation of state­owned 
enterprises, and in June the first privatisation programme is announced. The pri­
vatisation of large enterprises proceeds with difficulty, and many of them are 
taken over by their former managers.
22	June. Estonia adopts a national currency. The rouble zone begins to disin­
tegrate.
25	June. The Orthodox Church of the Kyiv Patriarchate is proclaimed in reaction 
to the Moscow Patriarch’s refusal to grant autocephalous status (canonical inde­
pendence) to Ukraine. The move leads to a schism within Ukrainian Orthodoxy.
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14	august	1992–27	december	1993. The war in Abkhazia. A group of Ukrainian 
volunteers from UNA­UNSO fight on the Georgian side.
22	august. Mykola Plaviuk, the exiled president of the Ukrainian People’s 
Republic (UNR), hands over the republic’s insignia to President Kravchuk, along 
with a declaration stating that Ukraine is the legal successor to the UNR and 
will continue its traditions.
3	september. Ukraine joins the International Monetary Fund.
13	October. Leonid Kuchma, then director of the Pivdenmash plant, is nomi­
nated as prime minister. The nomination marks the beginning of the political 
career of Ukraine’s future president, who will hold the office for two terms.
18	November. The President of Ukraine is given the power to issue decrees with 
the force of parliamentary bills.
12	November. The Karbovanets becomes the sole currency in Ukraine. The coun­
try finally leaves the rouble zone.
1993
26	January. Viktor Yushchenko is appointed the governor of the National Bank 
of Ukraine (based on a recommendation from his predecessor Vadym Hetman 
and the members of the agricultural sector nomenklatura). This marks the 
beginning of Yushchenko’s political career.
7	June. Miners in the Donbas start a massive strike, this time controlled by the 
mine managers. It is the largest strike in the history of Ukraine (including the 
Soviet period): 230 of the 250 of coal mines and nearly 500 other businesses go 
on strike. Their demands include autonomy for the Donbas. In the aftermath 
of the strike Kuchma’s government collapses and a snap election is called.
31	august. Prime minister Leonid Kuchma resigns (his resignation is accepted 
only on 21 September). A further confrontation between the president and the 
leadership of the Verkhovna Rada leads to an early election on 27 March, and 
a presidential election on 26 June 1994.
22	 september. President Kravchuk designates the Donetsk entrepreneur 
Yukhym Zvyahilsky as acting prime minister and personally takes the lead 
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in the government. The move is a de facto abolition of the office of prime min­
ister. The miners’ protests subside as a result, but Ukraine experiences several 
months of governmental chaos.
24	september–6	November. Civil war in Georgia over the attempted return 
to power of Zviad Gamaskhurdia, the president ousted in a bloody coup on 6 Jan­
uary 1992.
3–4	October. The constitutional crisis in Russia, which had been mounting since 
March, ends with an attempted coup by supporters of the Supreme Council 
speaker Ruslan Khasbulatov, which is brutally suppressed by President Yeltsin. 
The Supreme Council is disbanded, and in the aftermath, a clear separation 
of powers is introduced in Russia, with significantly stronger powers for the 
executive.
10	November. Members of the totalitarian sect YUSMALOS Great White Broth­
erhood try to seize the Saint Sophia Cathedral in Kyiv. The sect’s leaders are 
arrested and the Brotherhood ceases to exist.
1994
14	January. The presidents of Ukraine, Russia and the United States sign a mem­
orandum on transferring the strategic nuclear weapons deployed in Ukrainian 
territory to Russia. The process of transferring the warheads continues until 
mid­1996.
30	January. Yuriy Meshkov is elected president of Crimea. Shortly afterwards, 
the republic’s 1992 constitution is restored and a referendum on Crimea’s inde­
pendence is called. President Kravchuk cancels the referendum decree, but oth­
erwise Kyiv tolerates the Crimean leadership’s separatist ambitions for more 
than a year.
9	February. Ukraine joins NATO’s Partnership for Peace programme.
27	March,	10	april. Parties with a Communist orientation win the parlia­
mentary elections (128 mandates of the 330 that were filled). Right­wing 
movements and parties win 83 mandates. Because of the obligatory turnout 
threshold of 50%, in some constituencies the voting has to be repeated several 
times, but still it proves impossible to elect the full number of 450 parliamen­
tary deputies.
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14	april. Ukraine signs a Partnership and Co­operation Agreement with the 
European Union.
29	June,	1	July. The presidential elections. Leonid Kuchma is elected in the sec­
ond round (52.15% of the vote). The transfer of power from Kravchuk to Kuchma 
is the first instance of a democratic succession of power in the post­Soviet states.
11	October. President Kuchma delivers his policy statement ‘On the path of radi­
cal economic reforms’. The first attempt is made at introducing market economy 
mechanisms; it collapses in May 1995.
22	November. After lengthy disputes, Ukraine ratifies the Nuclear Non­Prolif­
eration Treaty as a non­nuclear state.
5	december. The so­called Budapest Memorandum is signed, under which the 
United States, the United Kingdom and the Russian Federation offer guarantees 
of security to Ukraine in return for it giving up nuclear weapons.
11	december–31	august	1996. The First Chechen War. A group of UNA­UNSO 
volunteers take part on the Chechen side.
1995
17	March. The Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine repeals the constitution of Crimea 
and abolishes the office of the republic’s president, while at the same time con­
firming the terms of Crimea’s autonomy. A protest by the Crimean authorities 
is suppressed in Kyiv without bloodshed; on 6	May Meshkov leaves Crimea for 
Russia. Crimean separatism disappears for many years.
8	June. The president and the speaker of the Verkhovna Rada sign the Constitu­
tional Agreement.
18	July. Funeral of Patriarch Volodymyr (Romanyuk), the leader of the Ukrain­
ian Orthodox Church of the Kyiv Patriarchate. UNA­UNSO militias provoke riots 
during the funeral (the first in independent Ukraine) and a brutal reaction from 
the militsyia. In violation of previous arrangements, during the riots the patriarch 
is buried on the pavement in front of the entrance of the Saint Sophia Cathedral.
19	November. Ukraine is admitted to the Council of Europe as the second CIS 
member after Moldova.
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1996
27	May. President Kuchma nominates Pavlo Lazarenko, a Dnipropetrovsk oli­
garch, as prime minister (Lazarenko succeeds Yevhen Marchuk, a cadre officer 
of the KGB and the first head of the Security Service of Ukraine). Mounting 
rivalry over the natural gas market between the Donetsk and Dnipropetrovsk 
clans. Lazarenko is dismissed on 2 July 1997.
16	June. A failed attempt to assassinate Lazarenko takes place in Kyiv (according 
to some observers, the attempt was feigned). The conflict between the Donetsk 
and Dnipropetrovsk clans over shares in the domestic gas market enters a hot 
phase.
28	June. After all­night deliberations, the Verkhovna Rada adopts the constitu­
tion by 315 votes in the presence of the president. Kuchma signs the constitution 
on 12	July, following which the parliamentary deputies (except the 75 Commu­
nists) swear on it.
2	september. Monetary reforms: the karbovanets is replaced by the hryvnia 
at a rate of 100 000 : 1. The old banknotes remain in circulation until 16 Sep­
tember. Ukraine is the last post­Soviet state to carry out monetary reform.
19	september. Ukraine and the United States declare that their relations are 
a ‘strategic partnership’. In May 1997, the same status is given to relations with 
Poland and Russia, and later with more than a dozen other countries.
3	November. Yevhen Shcherban, an oligarch and parliamentarian, is assas­
sinated at the Donetsk airport. The conflict between the Donetsk and Dnipro­
petrovsk clans ends. The Donetsk oligarchs are forced to give up their monopo­
listic aspirations, and President Kuchma imposes a ‘non­aggression pact’ on the 
clans, under which the Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts gain informal autonomy.
1997
30	May. Signature of the Ukrainian­Russian Treaty on Friendship, Co­opera­
tion and Partnership, which had been initialled back in 1995, and of an agree­
ment regulating the status of Russia’s navy in Crimea. Under the latter, the 
Black Sea Fleet is to be stationed in Sevastopol until the end of 2017. Russia only 
ratifies the treaty in December 1998, and in December 2008 it is extended for 
another ten years.
137
O
SW
 S
TU
D
IE
S 
 1
1/
20
17
2	June. Signature of the Ukrainian­Romanian treaty of Partnership and Co­oper­
ation (the last of Ukraine’s treaties on mutual relations with neighbour countries).
9	July. NATO and Ukraine sign the Charter on Distinctive Partnership.
27	august. Signature of the Founding Act on mutual relations between NATO 
and the Russian Federation, which paved the way towards NATO enlargement. 
Thanks to efforts by Polish diplomacy, among others, its signature was condi­
tional on the previous regulation of Russian­Ukrainian relations and the sig­
nature of the NATO­Ukraine Charter.
1998
1	March. The Partnership and Co­operation Agreement between Ukraine and 
the EU comes into force.
29	March. Parliamentary elections are held (for the first time under the mixed 
system, with half the deputies elected in first­past­the­post constituencies, and 
the other half in proportional elections). Parties representing the oligarchs gain 
a majority in the new Verkhovna Rada.
22	april. Vadym Hetman, the first governor of the National Bank of Ukraine, and 
at that time an influential parliamentarian and patron of Yushchenko’s career, 
is assassinated in Kyiv. His death thwarted the formation of an independent ‘banker 
clan’, and prevented Yushchenko from running in the 1999 presidential election.
13	august. The Russian currency market collapses. Ukraine proves to be fairly 
resilient (the exchange rate of the hryvnia decreases by around 80%). Despite 
short­term losses, the crisis makes imports less profitable and contributes to the 
economic revival in Ukraine.
1999
25	 February. Vyacheslav Chornovil, the leader of the People’s Movement 
of Ukraine and Kuchma’s potential rival in the presidential elections, dies 
in a car accident. His death seals the divisions within the Movement and its 
subsequent marginalisation.
2	March. Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary join NATO (Ukraine’s other 
western neighbours, Romanian and Slovakia, will join in 2004).
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24	March–10	June. NATO airstrikes against Yugoslavia.
12	June. KFOR is created, Ukraine deploys 1300 troops in Kosovo.
31	October,	14	November. Presidential elections. Leonid Kuchma is elected for 
a second term in the runoff (with 56.2% of the vote).
6	december. Conclusions of the governmental commission on the OUN­UPA 
are announced, paving the way towards the rehabilitation of the Ukrainian 
Insurgent Army.239
22	december. The Verkhovna Rada approves Viktor Yushchenko’s nomination 
as prime minister. Thorough economic reforms begin.
31	december. Russian president Boris Yeltsin resigns. Beginning of Vladimir 
Putin’s rule.
2000
16	april. A referendum on constitutional amendments is called by Kuchma, 
preceded by a ten­day period of early voting. The amendments proposed by the 
president are backed by 82–90% of voters, with a turnout of 81%. The referen­
dum results are clearly fraudulent. The president does not try to implement the 
amendments ‘endorsed’ by the rigged referendum.
16	september. Georgiy Gongadze, a noted Kyiv­based journalist, is kidnapped 
and murdered.
25	 November. The anniversary of the Holodomor is officially celebrated 
as a public holiday for the first time (nationwide celebrations had been organ­
ised since 1990).
28	November. Oleksandr Moroz presents the so­called Melnychenko tapes 
to the Verkhovna Rada. The tapes, of questionable origin and credibility, imply 
that Gongadze’s kidnapping had been inspired by President Kuchma. Moroz’s 
allegations trigger a political crisis that will continue until the 2004 presiden­
tial elections.
239 The text was published in Den on 6 December 1999.
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15	december. The Chernobyl nuclear power plant is officially closed down 
(electricity production stops at the last functioning unit). For technical rea­
sons, the plant will have to continue operating ‘in liquidation’ for several 
more decades.
2001
19	January. Yulia Tymoshenko dismissed from her post as deputy prime 
minister for energy. On 13	February, she is arrested on corruption charges 
concerning her business activities in the first half of the 1990s. After her 
release on 9	april she becomes the leader of the opposition to President 
Kuchma.
9	March. A massive demonstration against the president in Kyiv ends with 
a brutal police intervention provoked by the UNA­UNSO. Shocked by the events, 
the protesters temporarily suspended any activities aimed at forcing Kuchma 
to resign.
26	 april. Viktor Yushchenko’s government collapses. Anatoliy Kinakh 
is appointed the next prime minister and his government follows the same main 
directions as Yushchenko’s cabinet did, but with less determination.
23–27	July. Pope John Paul II visits Kyiv and Lviv.
11	september. Terror attack on the World Trade Center in New York.
25	October. The land code is adopted, which inter alia introduces property 
rights to agricultural land. The implementation of regulations authorising 
free trade in agricultural land is suspended, and remains in suspension until 
the present.
5	december. The first census in independent Ukraine. The previous one was 
conducted in the USSR in 1989, and the next one, which was originally planned 
for 2011, is yet to be conducted.
2002
31	March. Parliamentary elections are held (under mixed electoral regulations). 
Viktor Yushchenko’s Our Ukraine Bloc receives the most votes, but it is the pro­
Kuchma parties that form a parliamentary majority.
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11	april. Allegations that Ukraine illegally sold radar units to Iraq (which later 
turn out to be unfounded) deepen Ukraine’s international isolation, which 
started in the aftermath of the Gongadze killing. In the following months, the 
United States steps up pressure on the Ukrainian president to resign.
16	september. Start of the ‘Rise up, Ukraine’ campaign, organised by Yulia 
Tymoshenko, and aimed at forcing the president to resign. The first demon­
stration in Kyiv is very large (mainly thanks to the support of the Communists), 
but later the campaign loses momentum. Our Ukraine distances itself from the 
campaign.
21	November.	The Verkhovna Rada approves the nomination of Viktor Yanu­
kovych, then the chief of the Donetsk Oblast State Administration, as prime 
minister.
2003
20	March. Kyiv sends a chemical and radiation defence battalion to Kuwait 
in a gesture of support for the anti­Iraqi coalition.
19	september. Russia, Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Belarus establish the CIS Com­
mon Economic Space as a formula for re­integration of the post­Soviet economic 
space. The agreement remains a dead letter.
30	september–23	October. Crisis caused by Russia’s decision to build a bridge 
to connect the Taman Peninsula with Ukraine’s Tuzla Spit in the Kerch Strait; 
the threat of armed incidents. Kyiv manages to get Russia to stop the construc­
tion and recognise Tuzla as belonging to Ukraine. The outcome boosts President 
Kuchma’s ratings; a patriotic mobilisation in Ukraine follows.
2	November.	The rigged parliamentary elections in Georgia trigger mass pro­
tests (the Rose Revolution) and force President Eduard Shevardnadze to resign 
on 23	November	while the election results are declared invalid. The events are 
the first in a series of so­called ‘colour revolutions’, and are watched closely 
in Ukraine. Activists from Georgia’s Khmara movement will later train pro­
Yushchenko activists in Ukraine.
30	december. The Constitutional Court in Ukraine rules that Kuchma’s second 
term is his first term under the new Constitution, which means he is eligible to run 
for one more term. Kuchma nonetheless chooses not to run for president again.
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2004
1	May. Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic and Slovakia join the EU. Romania, 
Ukraine’s last non­EU western neighbour, will join in 2007.
14	June. The Krivorizhstal steelworks conglomerate is privatised by a consor­
tium of companies owned by the top oligarchs Rinat Akhmetov and Viktor 
Pinchuk. The transaction is the most widely publicised of Ukraine’s corrupt 
privatisations, but at the same time it represents a battle which the Ukrainian 
oligarchs won against the lobbyists of foreign (Russian and Indian) steel com­
panies. Criticism of that move will become one of the topics of the presidential 
campaign. After the Orange Revolution, the transaction will be invalidated and 
the company sold to ArcelorMittal on 24 October 2005 after a new tender.
23	 June. A constitutional amendment weakening the president’s powers 
is passed at the first reading (it will be ultimately adopted on 8 December).
5	september. Viktor Yushchenko falls sick with a mysterious disease, com­
monly believed to have been caused by poisoning (the causes have never been 
fully explained). It disrupts his campaign, but his popularity unexpectedly 
increases on a wave of sympathy.
31	October. The first round of presidential elections. Viktor Yanukovych gains 
a very narrow lead over Viktor Yushchenko (40.12% versus 39.15%). Yushchen­
ko’s supporters and foreign observers express critical opinions about the vote.
21	November. Second round of presidential elections. Exit polls point to a clear 
victory for Yushchenko, while the initial results published by the Central Elec­
toral Commission show a narrow advantage for Yanukovych. It is commonly 
believed that massive irregularities took place during the voting. Yushchenko 
calls for protests (the rally in central Kyiv had been prepared in advance).
22	November. Yushchenko supporters gather for a rally in Kyiv and start an 
occupation of Independence Square. The mayor of Kyiv backs the protests. 
The Orange Revolution begins.240
240 For a detailed timeline of those events, see Wojciech Stanisławski, The orange ribbon. A calen-
dar of the political crisis in Ukraine, autumn 2004, OSW, Warsaw 2005 (a version in Ukrain­
ian entitled Pomaranchevyi bant is also available).
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24	November. The Central Electoral Commission announces the official elec­
tion results which proclaim Yanukovych the winner (49.4% to 46.61%). The USA, 
NATO and the EU refuse to recognise the results.
25	November. The Supreme Court bars the official publication of results, pend­
ing the resolution of the complaint filed by Yushchenko’s staff.
27	November. The Verkhovna Rada rules that the announced results do not 
reflect the will of the voters, and its speaker Volodymyr Lytvyn suggests that 
the second round of voting should be repeated.
28	November. A congress of members of city and oblast councils from east­
ern and southern Ukraine is held in Severodonetsk. The participants recognise 
the election of Yanukovych as legitimate, and threaten to hold a referendum 
on autonomy for southern and eastern Ukraine (but not on separation from 
Ukraine, as the media incorrectly claimed). No further steps are taken.
3	december. The Supreme Court rules that it is impossible to determine the 
result of the second round of voting, and orders that the vote be repeated 
on 26 December.
8	december. The Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine adopts the constitutional amend­
ment initially passed in June (483 votes in favour). This is a compromise aimed 
at resolving the crisis and safeguarding the interests of Yushchenko’s oppo­
nents. Viktor Yushchenko proclaims the victory of the Orange Revolution.
26	december. Viktor Yushchenko is elected president (51.99% versus 44.20%). 
He is sworn in on 23	January	2005.
2005
24	January. Yulia Tymoshenko is appointed prime minister after embarrassing 
disputes within the president’s circle (Yushchenko initially refuses to deliver 
on his pre­election commitment concerning the prime minister’s post).
21	February. The EU­Ukraine Action Plan is signed.
8	september. In the aftermath of a serious political conflict within Yushchen­
ko’s circle, the Yulia Tymoshenko government collapses and Petro Poroshenko 
loses his post as secretary of the National Security and Defence Council. 
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On 22	september Yuriy Yekhanurov becomes the new prime minister. The new 
leadership thus irreversibly wastes its transition period, when the 1996 consti­
tution was still in place and Yushchenko had broader powers, and thus seals the 
disintegration of the ‘Orange’ political camp.
2006
1	January. The constitutional amendment adopted on 8 December 2004 comes 
into force. Some provisions concerning the status of deputies and the function­
ing of the parliament will only be enacted after the parliamentary elections.
Russia cuts off natural gas supplies to Ukraine for the first time, demand­
ing that Kyiv accept a drastic price rise. Ukraine responds by collecting gas 
destined for European countries from transit gas pipelines, but after sev­
eral days it is forced to capitulate. On 4	January gas supplies resume. In the 
days that follow, Moscow threatens to cut off gas supplies during the price 
negotiations.
17	February. The United States officially recognises Ukraine as a market economy.
26	March. Parliamentary elections (held under proportional regulations) 
are won by the Party of Regions. As a result, on 4	august Viktor Yanukovych 
becomes prime minister again.
2007
2	april. President Yushchenko dissolves the Verkhovna Rada, alleging that 
the parliamentary majority has violated the constitution (the decision itself 
is dubious from the constitutional point of view), and calls a new election for 
27 April. A political crisis begins, which end when the elections are postponed 
till autumn.
30	september. The Party of Regions wins the early parliamentary elections 
(held under proportional regulations) but the government is formed from the 
Yulia Tymoshenko Bloc and Our Ukraine–People’s Self­Defence. On 19	decem-
ber Yulia Tymoshenko becomes prime minister again.
2008
4	april. NATO refuses to award a Membership Action Plan (MAP) to Ukraine.
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16	May. Ukraine joins the WTO (membership negotiations for which started 
back in December 1993).
8–12	august. The Russian­Georgian war. Immediately after the war, a number 
of publications appear in Russia which discuss a possible Russian­Ukrainian 
war based on a similar scenario.
15	 september. In the aftermath of the bankruptcy of the New York­based 
Lehman Brothers bank, the American sub­prime crisis transforms into a global 
financial crisis, and later into a crisis of the real economy. Ukraine is particu­
larly severely hit by the dwindling demand for steel products, which is related 
not only to the crisis but also the end of China’s Olympics investments.
8	October. President Yushchenko dissolves the parliament and calls another 
early election on 7	december. The decision triggers a political crisis that will 
end on 12	November with Yushchenko backing down on his decision (before 
which the Administrative Court in Kyiv will invalidate the president’s decree). 
A political success for Yulia Tymoshenko.
2009
1	January. Russia again cuts off natural gas supplies to Ukraine, demanding a dras­
tic price rise. Gas supplies to the EU are again reduced. On 18	January, Prime Min­
ister Tymoshenko accepts the extremely unfavourable terms of gas supplies from 
Russia (her conflict with President Yushchenko greatly contributed to the adverse 
outcome of the negotiations, which also involved representatives of the EU).
6	June. Viktor Yanukovych terminates the agreement on a grand parliamentary 
coalition and the introduction of anti­democratic amendments in the constitu­
tion which had been negotiated with Tymoshenko. The initiative to introduce 
the amendments had come from Tymoshenko.
27	November. The Eurasian Customs Union is created by Russia, Belarus and 
Kazakhstan.
2010
7	February. Viktor Yanukovych wins the presidential election, defeating Yulia 
Tymoshenko (48.9% versus 45.5 % in the second round; in the first round Yanu­
kovych’s advantage was 35.3% versus 25.1%).
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11	March. A government under Mykola Azarov is formed.
21	april. The presidents of Ukraine and Russia sign the so­called Kharkiv agree­
ments, which reduce the price of gas paid by Ukraine in return for an exten­
sion of the Russian navy’s stationing in Crimea to 2042, with the possibility 
of further extensions. The agreement, which Ukraine was forced to sign because 
of the unfavourable terms of gas supplies negotiated in early 2009, is perceived 
as treason by patriotic sections of society, and boosts Yulia Tymoshenko’s popu­
larity again.
1	October. The Constitutional Court restores the June 1996 version of the consti­
tution, thus making the government subordinate to the president again.
10	October. The Eurasian Economic Community, designed to rival the European 
Union, is established under the aegis of Moscow; in 2014, the Community will 
transform into an Economic Union. Russia starts (futile) efforts to get Ukraine 
to join, which would have rendered Ukraine’s future association with the EU 
impossible.
16	November. The Tax Maidan begins. This is a protest by small and medium­
sized entrepreneurs against a new tax code. Protests in the Independence 
Square are joined by several tens of thousands of people, and around one mil­
lion throughout the country. In the aftermath Yanukovych vetoes some of the 
new code’s provisions.
17	december. Beginning of the Arab Spring, i.e. social protests and revolutions 
in Arab countries, which will continue until 26 October 2013.
2011
13	January–23	November. Civil war in Libya, during which European NATO 
members intervene with air strikes. The war leads to a lasting destabilisation 
of the Libyan state; a new civil war will erupt on 16 May 2014.
26	January. The outbreak of the civil war in Syria; the lasting destabilisation 
of the Syrian state. The mass flow of refugees to Turkey will lead to the refugee 
crisis in 2015.
5	august. Yulia Tymoshenko is arrested on corruption charges; on 11 Octo­
ber she is sentenced to 7 years in prison for abuses of power during the gas 
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negotiations in 2009. Her conviction is a violation of the unwritten political 
agreement dating back to Kuchma’s presidency.
1	October. Entry into force of the pensions reform which inter alia,introduced 
a so­called second pillar (individual pension accounts), extended the retirement 
age for women from 55 to 60, and for men working in the public administra­
tion from 60 to 62 years, and reduced the future pensions of the civil service. 
The reform, implemented under pressure from the IMF, did not solve any of the 
problems of the Ukrainian pension system.
2012
5	June. The Verkhovna Rada adopts a bill regulating the status of the official lan­
guage and minority languages, and replacing the old Soviet­era bill from 1989. 
The bill comes in for harsh criticism from the opposition as allegedly promoting 
‘Russification’. The opposition protests for several days in Kyiv (the so­called 
Language Maidan), but the protests are not particularly energetic.
19	July. The Association Agreement between Ukraine and the European Union 
is initialled.
28	October. The Party of Regions wins the parliamentary elections (held under 
mixed regulations), but the fragmented opposition parties also confirm their 
strength. The elections are deemed to have been the dirtiest in the history 
of Ukraine.
24	december. A new government is formed, led by Azarov. The cabinet includes 
member of the so­called ‘family’ (a group of politicians and entrepreneurs asso­
ciated with Viktor Yanukovych and his son Oleksandr).
2013
26	June. In Vradiivka (Mykolaiv Oblast) police officers rape Iryna Krashkova. 
Violent protests erupt in response (involving an attempted storming of the 
police building), which end with the ‘Vradiivka march’ to Kyiv in July. Opposi­
tion parties try to exploit the event politically, but in vain. The Vradiivka rebel­
lion may be seen as a prelude to the Revolution of Dignity.
27	October. Presidents Yanukovych and Putin secretly meet in Sochi. According 
to unconfirmed reports, Putin demands that Kyiv give up the plans to sign the 
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Association Agreement with the EU and threatens to take away Crimea from 
Ukraine as the mildest measure.
21	November. A week before the planned signature of the Association Agree­
ment, Kyiv announced its withdrawal.
Student demonstrations begin in Independence Square in Kyiv and in Lviv, 
and also in other cities. The protests are initially apolitical, with the opposition 
leaders struggling to organise their own, separate rallies. In later October, the 
protests gradually subside.
30	November. In the night, special police forces brutally attack a handful 
of protesters remaining in Independence Square. Some demonstrators find 
refuge in the St. Michaels Monastery (the church of the Kyiv Patriarchate). 
The ostensible brutality of the police triggers widespread outrage and rekindles 
the protests.
1	december. A massive demonstration is held in central Kyiv, in the course of which 
the Maidan becomes permanently occupied by the protesters and transformed 
into a camp, and later a fortress. The Maidan Self­Defence is created. Towards 
the end of the demonstration, some protesters try to get into the president’s office 
on Bankova street; militants attack the security forces and the police responds 
brutally. These events may be seen as the beginning of the Revolution of Dignity.
17	december. The presidents of Russia and Ukraine meet in Moscow. Yanuko­
vych obtains a temporary decrease in the price of natural gas and a promise 
that Russia will invest US$15 billion in Ukrainian treasury bonds. The success 
encourages Yanukovych not to yield to the protests.
2014
16	January. The Verkhovna Rada adopts a package of bills limiting the freedom 
to demonstrate and the freedom of speech (in the latter case, the new rules are 
modelled on Russian solutions). Because of the scandalous abuse of procedure 
during their passing, the new rules are illegal. They are repealed on 28	January.
Several hours later, an attempt by the protesters to march from the Maidan 
to the Rada building ends in clashes in Hrushevsky street.
22	January. At night, Hrushevsky street sees the first fatalities.
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23	January. The process of the opposition seizing administration buildings 
outside Kyiv begins. Within several days, the government loses control of the 
western oblasts.
28	January. Prime Minister Azarov resigns, but his government continues 
to operate ‘in a state of being dismissed’. President Yanukovych fails to nomi­
nate a new candidate for prime minister.
18–20	February. Bloody fighting in central Kyiv, ending with a massacre 
of insurgents on Institutskaya street (the so­called Heavenly Hundred). 
Negotiations between the opposition and Yanukovych take place in parallel. 
The bloodshed means that Yanukovych loses any chances of staying in power 
for even a short time.
21	February. The Verkhovna Rada restores the 2004 constitution (386 votes 
for), and, by a special bill, releases Yulia Tymoshenko from prison. Opposition 
leaders reach an agreement with Yanukovych, under which a presidential 
election is to be held in the autumn of 2014, but the people on the Maidan 
reject the deal. At night, Yanukovych flees from Kyiv, and several days later 
leaves Ukraine. Prime Minister Azarov and many presidential aides also flee 
or go into hiding.
22	February. The Verkhovna Rada speaker Volodymyr Rybak resigns, thanks 
to which it is possible to legally elect Oleksandr Turchynov as the new speaker 
(285 votes for). The Rada deposes President Yanukovych (329 votes in favour); 
Turchynov is now acting president, in his capacity as the Rada speaker. Arseniy 
Yatsenyuk is nominated as prime minister (his government is formed on 27 Feb­
ruary). A new presidential election is called for 25 May.
In Kharkiv, council delegates representing the self­governments of the eastern 
and southern oblasts of Ukraine hold a congress. Yanukovych, who is in Kharkiv 
at that time, chooses not to take part in the congress, thus undermining its 
potential political significance. The decision also marks his ultimate withdrawal 
from Ukraine’s political life.
27	February. Beginning of destabilisation in Crimea. On 11	March,	the	parlia­
ment of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea adopts a declaration of independ­
ence; on 16	March a referendum is held on accession to the Russian Federation, 
and on 21	March President Putin signs documents formalising the annexation 
of Crimea. Kyiv practically fails to respond at all.
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28	February. The Verkhovna Rada repeals the 2012 language bill. The deci­
sion does not come into force (Turchynov, acting as the Rada speaker, refuses 
to sign it and does not allow the bill to be reconsidered), but information about 
the repeal is exploited by the opponents of the new leadership in Ukraine and 
abroad.
1	March,	9	March. Supporters of the pro­Russian option hold rallies in Kharkiv 
and other cities in eastern Ukraine, demanding the ‘federalisation’ of the state. 
The so­called ‘Russian Spring’ begins, which will enter a heated phase in mid­
March. Under the impression of the annexation of Crimea, the campaign sub­
sides everywhere except the Donbas.
6	april. A demonstration in Donetsk ends with the seizure by force of the 
local government building. The next day the rebellion leaders proclaim the 
‘Donetsk People’s Republic’ (the ‘Luhansk People’s Republic’ will be proclaimed 
on 27 April), and in the following days, they take power in most cities of the 
Donetsk Basin. Ukraine’s reaction is inconsistent; the launch of the Anti­Terror 
Operation announced on 13	april is not followed by any forceful measures, 
which at that time could still have suppressed the rebellion within a day.
15	april. The first clashes between the Ukrainian armed forces and the separa­
tists near Slavyansk and Kramatorsk, where volunteer formations from Russia 
have arrived by then. Fighting begins throughout the Donbas, mainly involving 
volunteer forces. The separatists are better armed and trained (particularly 
the volunteers’ Russian instructors), but the Ukrainian volunteers are more 
determined. Over time, the fighting intensifies and the uncoordinated clashes 
transform into a regular war, with the growing involvement of Russia. In early 
June, the separatists dismantle Ukrainian border posts, gaining the possibility 
of uncontrolled contact with the Russian Federation.
2	May. Clashes between supporters of Ukraine’s unity (mainly football fans) 
and pro­Russian formations in the streets of Odessa. The police tolerate the use 
of firearms by pro­Russian militants. In the final phase of the clashes, a fire 
breaks out in the trade union headquarters, in which several dozen people rep­
resenting the pro­Russian option are killed (the total number of casualties is 74). 
In the aftermath, separatist sentiments in Odessa subside.
25	May. Petro Poroshenko is elected as president in the first round of voting 
(54.7% of the vote). The process of re­establishing legal government in Ukraine 
after the February coup is complete.
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12	June. The presence of regular units of the Armed Forces of the Russian Fed­
eration in the Donbas is confirmed for the first time, marking the de facto begin­
ning of the Ukrainian­Russian war.
24	June. President Poroshenko and Prime Minister Yatsenyuk cause a government 
crisis, which leads to the dissolution of the Verkhovna Rada and early elections.
27	June. The second part of the Ukraine­EU Association Agreement is signed (the 
first part was signed on 30 March). On 19	september,	the Agreement is ratified 
by the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine and the European Parliament. However, the 
process of ratification by the EU member states remains incomplete, because the 
already taken decision to ratify was overturned in a referendum in the Netherlands 
on 6 April 2016. In this situation, those provisions of the Deep and Comprehensive 
Free Trade Area (DCFTA) which do not fall into the exclusive competence of the 
member states are being implemented on a provisional basis. This provisional 
implementation also does not cover many of the political provisions. The progress 
towards the abolition of visas for Ukrainian nationals comes to a standstill.
1	July. A general offensive by Ukrainian armed forces (regular and volunteer) 
begins. On 5 July, Ukrainian forces seize Slavyansk and Kramatorsk, and move 
forward towards Donetsk and Luhansk. In late July, the Ukrainians come very 
close to suppressing the separatist rebellion, but act too slowly and without 
sufficient determination.
17	July. The separatists shoot down a Malaysian airliner (298 people, mostly 
Dutch nationals, are killed). The incident draws Western public opinion’s atten­
tion to the Donbas war.
11	august. The separatist forces launch a counter­offensive with the decisive 
support of heavily armed Russian units. The dobrobaty [voluntary units] suffer 
a severe defeat near Ilovaisk, Ukraine loses Saur­Mohyla and Novoazovsk, and 
in early September the Russians try unsuccessfully to seize Mariupol.
5	september. The ceasefire (i.e. the first Minsk accords) comes into force. 
Despite that, fierce fighting over the Donetsk air terminal, which started in May, 
will continue until 21 January 2015; major clashes will also continue at other 
sections of the frontline.
26	October. The pro­Western political groups (the Petro Poroshenko Bloc, the 
People’s Front and Batkivshchyna) gain a stable majority in the parliamentary 
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elections. For the first time, the Communists do not make it to the Rada. The elec­
tion results are greatly influenced by the involuntary absence of the Crimea and 
Donbas voters and the disintegration of the Party of Regions. Because of the 
mixed election rules, no deputies are elected from the 27 first­past­the­post con­
stituencies in Crimea and Donbas.
27	November. Arseniy Yatsenyuk becomes prime minister, and the govern­
ment is formed on 2	december. Within a couple of months, ‘internal opposition’ 
emerges within the ranks of the ruling coalition (comprising the Radical Party 
and Batkivshchyna).
2015
12	February. A new ceasefire agreement (Minsk II) is concluded, which envis­
ages a ‘special status’ (de facto broad autonomy) for the ORDLO. Kyiv accepts the 
unfavourable conditions under pressure from Germany and France.
18	February. The end of the battle of Debaltseve; the Ukrainian forces are 
defeated. The city, which was supposed to remain on the Ukrainian side under 
the Minsk accords, is taken over by the separatists. Large­scale military opera­
tions come to an end, but incidents along the ceasefire line will continue, and 
the several attempts at fully implementing the ceasefire will fail.
30	March. The police clash with amber miners in the Zhitomir oblast; the 
incident highlights the exploitative extraction of amber in the northern part 
of Volhynia which has been going on since the previous year, and the state’s loss 
of control over that area.
June. The rapid increase in the numbers of refugees from the Middle East arriv­
ing in the EU transforms into a political crisis threatening the stability of the EU.
4	November. The Petro Poroshenko Bloc succeeds in the local elections, but 
the government camp as a whole emerges weakened. In most regions, the 
old,corrupt local political arrangements stay in power.
2016
14	april. Yatsenyuk is dismissed, Volodymyr Hroysman becomes the new 
prime minister. The move means that President Petro Poroshenko assumes full 
responsibility for the state.
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23	June. In the British referendum, 52% vote to leave the European Union.
24	august. During the night preceding the independence anniversary celebra­
tions in Kryve Ozero (Mykolaiv oblast) police officers kill a handcuffed detainee. 
In the morning, riots erupt with the attempted lynching of the policemen. 
The event, which is often compared to the Vradiivka incident in 2013, reveals 
that the process of building the new police force is not perfect, and that tensions 
persist in provincial Ukraine.
The twenty­fifth anniversary of the Declaration of Independence. The President 
of Poland is the only foreign head of state to attend the celebrations in Kyiv. 
The military parade in Kyiv is the first display of the new military uniforms 
of Ukraine’s forces. On the day of the anniversary, 43 major armed incidents 
take place on the Donbas frontline; one Ukrainian soldier is killed and four are 
wounded.
Warsaw, July – November 2016
